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*Athens, Sparta, and the Building of the First Bipolar War:  
Constructivist Explanations for the Peloponnesian War*

*A Return to the Mos Maiorum?  
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*Mycenaeans at Late Minoan III C Halasmenos, East Crete*

*Aisthesis*

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## Foreword

I am happy to present the 2013 volume of *Aisthesis*. We were again fortunate to receive a diverse range of submissions: the articles in the current volume tackle topics spanning three millennia and draw on insights from International Relations, Comparative Literature, Social History, and Archaeology. I hope that this variety makes engaging and informative reading. I also hope that it represents the special sympathy between this journal's defining epithets, *undergraduate* and *Classics*: a spirit of intellectual exploration supported by a long tradition of interdisciplinary inquiry. Thanks are due to all of the undergraduate Classicists who submitted their work and to the four final contributors in particular. I would also like to acknowledge the generous support of the ASSU Publications Board and the Stanford Department of Classics. And to each of the *Aisthesis* staff, σοὶ δὲ θεοὶ τῶνδ' ἀντὶ χάριω μενοεικέα δοῖεν.

Ben Radcliffe  
Editor-in-Chief

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Athens, Sparta, and the Building of the First Bipolar War: Constructivist Explanations for the Peloponnesian War</b> Michael Peddycoart <i>Stanford University</i>	1
<b>A Return to the <i>Mos Maiorum</i>? Contextualizing the Augustan Legislation on Manumission</b> Leah Bernardo-Ciddio <i>York University</i>	15
<b>Antony's Funeral Oration for Caesar in a Historical Context</b> Tori Lee <i>Brown University</i>	35
<b>Mycenaeans at Late Minoan IIIC Halasmenos, East Crete</b> Kira Hopkins <i>St Anne's College, University of Oxford</i>	43

## ATHENS, SPARTA, AND THE BUILDING OF THE FIRST BIPOLAR WAR Constructivist Explanations for the Peloponnesian War

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### ABSTRACT

Political scientists have often used the Peloponnesian War as a historical case study for examining the dynamics of hegemonic power structures within a microcosm of the international system. However, they often examine the struggle between the city-states of Athens and Sparta in realist terms, frequently overemphasizing power relations based on relative military capabilities. As an alternative to this approach, this study examines this ancient conflict through the constructivist lens developed by political scientist Alexander Wendt. The result from this changed perspective is a more nuanced understanding of the ways Athens' and Sparta's perceptions of one another changed before and during this bellicose period. By examining the Peloponnesian War using a constructivist framework, one can even begin to apply the theoretical analyses addressed in this study to a new examination of Cold War relations between the United States and Soviet Union.

*"Let no one call it cowardice if we, in all our numbers, hesitate  
before attacking one city."*

*King Archidamus of Sparta<sup>1</sup>*

Beginning in 431 BC, Athens and its maritime empire and the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta, became engaged in a hegemonic struggle in Greece that would shatter any last vestiges of the brief camaraderie shared between the two city-states during the Pentecontaetia<sup>2</sup> following the Greco-Persian Wars. The first half of the war began with the siege of Potidaea, the death of Pericles, and the Plague in Athens and dragged on until the Peace of Nicias in 321. By 415 BC, hostilities had resumed between Athens and Sparta and would continue this time until Athens' surrender in 404 BC. Thucydides' seminal account of the Peloponnesian War portrays Athens and Sparta – the first, a naval empire at the height of its cultural and political golden age; the second, a legendary militant society steeped in tradition and isolationism – caught in a violent power struggle that initially appears reminiscent of a Hobbesian state of nature in which each state is free to pursue its goals in relations to other states without moral or legal restrictions.<sup>3</sup> However, I would argue that a realist model, in which states – behaving as unitary actors – struggle against one another for survival in an anarchic system,<sup>4</sup>

1 Rex Warner, trans., *Thucydides* (New York: Penguin Books, 1954), 84.

2 Pentecontaetia is the fifty-year period in ancient Greece between the defeat of the second Persian Invasion of Greece in 479 BC and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 433 BC.

3 Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 23-24.

4 Anarchy in international relations is a term that refers to the absence of a universal sovereign or government. In the case of ancient Greece, the land was broken up into networks of autonomous city-states that had no universal ruler or government institution.

does not accurately capture the conditions under which these two powers went to war. Rather, a constructivist model, as outlined by Alexander Wendt, best explains how the interactions and subsequent perceptions formed between the two city-states and their respective allies shaped the nature of this war. In particular, while a “competitive” security system existed in the Greek peninsula as a whole, “concerts” of cooperative security systems existed within both the Peloponnesian League and the Athenian Empire.<sup>5</sup>

While an ancient conflict like the Peloponnesian War lacks the intercontinental dimensions or nuclear considerations of more modern wars, it serves as an invaluable microcosm of international bipolar security behavior through which to examine hegemonic interactions. Moreover, while many scholars use the Cold War as the litmus test for the veracity of different political theories in bipolar environments, the utility of the Peloponnesian War as a historical framework from which to study international relations theory surpasses that of the Cold War framework in at least one important way: the “cold” struggle fought between Athens and Sparta primarily through proxy states during the *Pentecontaetia* actually erupted into direct war between the two hegemon themselves. Thus, we are able to examine not only how constructivism plays out in diplomacy between two competing hegemon but also how this theory manifests itself when the two hegemon actively engage each other in war.

The first section of this study provides an explanation of Wendt’s constructivism and its applicability to the city-state political systems that existed in Greece at the time of the war. I then examine how Sparta formed its perception of Athens as a rival after processing the input of its allies and the threatening signals coming from the Athenians. The subsequent section, in turn, addresses how Athens formed its own perceptions of Sparta based on diplomatic pressures from its own allies and Sparta’s escalation of hostilities. In the conclusion, I briefly explore the merits of using the Peloponnesian War’s constructivist paradigms to shed new light on the nature of hegemonic struggle during the Cold War.

#### WENDT’S CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE GREEK CITY-STATES

In his consequential article entitled “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” Alexander Wendt contests the realist position that self-help and power politics are natural structures in a naturally anarchical world and instead posits that self-help and power politics are formed by processes that depend on the intersubjective understandings, expectations, and distribution of knowledge that constitute actors’ perception of self and others.<sup>6</sup> Understanding this ancient war from a constructivist perspective thus necessitates the examination of how Sparta perceived Athens leading up to the outbreak of war and vice versa and how these perceptions created expectations and security considerations for each of these city-states. A realist explanation would simply

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5 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization and Global Governance Second Edition* (2006): 23.

6 Wendt, “Anarchy,” 22-23.

attribute Sparta's decision to go to war with Athens to offensive realism, because such a strategy, according to John Mearsheimer, outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous (i.e. anarchical) world.<sup>7</sup> This explanation fails to consider the nuanced considerations behind Sparta's calculated decision to attack Athens, which included, among other things, the independent actions of its more bellicose Peloponnesian allies, Athens' building of the Long Walls and the expansion of its empire, and the domestic considerations at play in the Spartan Assembly. Anarchy and distribution of power are insufficient in explaining what meanings or values Sparta assigned to each of these considerations or even what meaning Sparta assigned to Athens itself as an actor. Contrary to the strategies Mearsheimer and offensive realists might use in explaining the causes of the Peloponnesian War, I will adopt Wendt's assumption that people (and city-states) act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning that these objects have for them because this assumption takes into account both power politics and constructed relationships.<sup>8</sup>

Wendt identifies three important types of systems on a standard continuum of security systems. The first type of system, competitive security systems, describes an environment in which all actors are suspicious of each other and one actor's gain is another actor's loss.<sup>9</sup> This Hobbesian end of the spectrum closely resembles a realist depiction of inter-state relationships and can be used to explain some of the wartime interactions between Athens and Sparta. The second system type, individualistic security systems, follows neoliberal tradition and describes an environment in which states are indifferent to the relationship between their security and that of others and are primarily concerned with absolute gains. This model is largely useless in explaining Greece as a system during the Peloponnesian War because Greek city-states were constantly joining and breaking alliances with the two hegemonies in order to increase their relative power.<sup>10</sup> On the opposite end of the spectrum from competitive security systems lie cooperative systems, in which the security of each actor is perceived as the responsibility of all.<sup>11</sup> This model accurately depicts the security arrangements between allied city-states during the war, with the qualification that this type of cooperative system was limited to "concerts" of collective security, like the Peloponnesian League, that were still at the mercy of the domestic considerations of its member city-states.

In analyzing the different actors' reasons for going to war, one must keep in mind the constructivist assumption that actors construct social threats. As such, if the constructivist model is to hold for the Peloponnesian War, then Actor A (be it Sparta or Athens) will make inferences about Actor B's intent based on two considerations:

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7 John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 11.

8 Wendt, "Anarchy," 22.

9 *Ibid.*, 23.

10 G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 182.

11 Wendt, "Anarchy," 24.



1. The gestures and physical qualities of Actor B, which are in part contrived by Actor B and which include the direction of movement, noise, numbers, and immediate consequences of these gestures.
2. The signals Actor A would intend by such qualities were it to make such a gesture itself.<sup>12</sup>

In the following sections, I will not only demonstrate how the gestures and physical qualities of the Athenian Empire during the Pentecontaetia sent threatening signals to Sparta but also how Sparta considered these signals in the context of its own existing alliances and peace treaties before concluding that this threat warranted the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica in 431 BC.

In the later section discussing Athens' actions and its perceptions of the capabilities of the Peloponnesian League and Sparta, I will use what Wendt calls the "predator" argument to describe Athens. In the "predator" argument, a state becomes a predator when its biology, domestic politics, or systemic victimization makes the state predisposed to violence.<sup>13</sup> In the case of Athens, the flight of the Athenians to Salamis and the subsequent razing of Athens by the Persians in 480 BC may have led to Athenian expansionism during the Pentecontaetia. Wendt argues that if collective security identity is high when a predator emerges, then rival states that are part of a collective security system will defend any member that the predator attacks. If the predator is strong enough to withstand the collective, a polarized struggle will emerge in which balance-of-power politics will be reestablished.<sup>14</sup> The Peloponnesian War embodies this model closely, particularly in regards to the Peloponnesian League providing defense for Corinth at the outset of the First Peloponnesian War against the Athenian Empire. I examine the events of this incident in greater detail in the section on the Corcyra Incident. While the ability of the Peloponnesian League to check the ambitions of Athens caused the war to escalate into a polarized balance-of-power struggle, one should not make the realist assumption that this balance-of-power condition was a natural state within an anarchical system. Rather, balance-of-power is one of several processes that can arise from the collective meanings that states form in their interactions with one another.

#### SPARTA, THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE, AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Understanding Sparta's delayed but eventual decision to go to war requires understanding how Sparta perceived signals and perceptions from its domestic environment, from its Peloponnesian allies, and from Athens in the escalation of hostilities between the two powers during the Pentecontaetia. Sparta's decision for war was by no means a retaliatory action for a single event but rather the product of a process in which it was constantly reevaluating the nature and severity of the threat Athens posed to both Spartan hegemony and the stability of the cooperative Peloponnesian security system.

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12 Wendt, "Anarchy," 25.

13 Ibid., 26.

14 Ibid., 26-27.

Beginning in the sixth century BC, Sparta started forming a collective security block called the Peloponnesian League that grew until it was able to field a land army of hoplites<sup>15</sup> so large and well organized that it effectively made Sparta the strongest city-state within Greece. Historian G.E.M. de Ste. Croix describes Sparta as a “hegemon” in his seminal work on the period entitled *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, saying that “Sparta was thus able, from the very beginning of the [Peloponnesian] League, to oblige her allies to follow her into war on demand.”<sup>16</sup> While the power of Sparta seems obvious from these descriptions, scholars should hesitate before jumping to the conclusion that as a regional hegemon, Sparta would or could pursue strategies that consolidated and expanded her power into the rest of the Greek peninsula. Such a hegemon fits the offensive realist balance-of-power paradigm, in which the “ultimate aim is to be the hegemon – that is, the only great power in the system.”<sup>17</sup>

This offensive realist description, however, fails to explain the nuanced history behind Sparta’s hegemonic power in two very important and related ways. Firstly, after the conquest of Messenia in the sixth century BC, Sparta largely ended its modest conquest of the Peloponnese and instead opted for the formation of a series of military alliances that would become the Peloponnesian League. It did so partially to preserve the incredibly unstable economic system it set up at home, in which a military state of full Spartiates lorded over a large group of Messenian Helots that cultivated the land.<sup>18</sup> G.M.E de Ste. Croix describes the Spartan domestic security predicament as follows:

...The conquest of Messenia gave Sparta some of the most fertile land in Greece and an ample supply of State serfs to till it. But because of the refusal of the Messenians to submit quietly, the Spartans were driven to organize themselves as a community of professional soldiers, dedicated not (like many militaristic peoples) to foreign conquest—which might prove highly dangerous if it extended Spartan commitments too far—but above all to maintaining strict internal discipline and harmony, so that a united body of Spartiates could ruthlessly dominate their numerous Helots...<sup>19</sup>

Secondly, due to the brutal and militaristic nature of the Spartan state apparatus, Sparta could not implement its hegemonic power far from the Peloponnese because full Spartiates were prohibited from traveling beyond Sparta unless on campaign or given permission by the Spartan Assembly. Even full campaigns against Athens rarely went beyond Attica for fear of leaving the Helots unattended back at home, and exposing young Spartan soldiers to the “corruptions” of the

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15 Hoplites were heavy infantry citizen-soldiers of the ancient Greek city-states.

16 Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 96-110.

17 Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 2.

18 Helots served as what Ste. Croix calls “State serfs” since they were tied to the land they worked and were owned by the Spartan polis. Controlling the Messenian Helots was particularly difficult because unlike the slaves of other Greek city-states, this group was largely homogeneous in its ethnicity and hatred of the Spartans (See Ste. Croix’s *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, page 91, for more information on slavery in Sparta).

19 Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 91.

undisciplined foreign Greek city-states.<sup>20</sup> Thus the offensive realist definition of hegemonic power struggle inadequately captures the Spartan experience during the Pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian War.

If a realist model does not accurately capture Spartan hegemonic considerations going into the War, then scholars need to use a model that takes both domestic considerations and external perceptions into account when describing the calculus behind Sparta's foreign policy. Wendt's constructivist framework acknowledges Sparta's various identities, both domestic and international, within the context of a constructed inter-city-state system.<sup>21</sup> Realist theory constrains Sparta's foreign policy considerations to the realm of relative power calculations when the domestic Spartan environment described above clearly indicates that Spartan war considerations largely defy the limitations of realist logic. In the following two sections, we will examine how Sparta's allies and Athens itself sent signals to Sparta, from which the Peloponnesian hegemon formed the social perceptions that influenced its decision to go to war.

### *The Influence of the Peloponnesian League on Spartan Foreign Policy*

Sparta had to keep its allies content, not only to ensure that they sent forces in the case of a Helot uprising but also to control the strategic isthmus connecting the Peloponnese to Attica. The collective security arrangement established by the Peloponnesian League thus placed Sparta at the mercy of her more aggressive allies' foreign policies.<sup>22</sup> Realist theory fails to acknowledge the relevance of institutions like the Peloponnesian "security concert" in great power foreign policy. At the very least, it would dismiss Sparta's membership in the Peloponnesian League as a temporary means of consolidating its control over the isthmus and Messenian Helot populations. However, this argument makes little sense since Sparta limited its conquests in the Peloponnese in the sixth century BC to the region of Laconia. This period preceded the formation of the League, when offensive realism would expect Sparta to expand at the expense of weaker adversaries in the region, like Argos, which never joined the Peloponnesian League and remained Sparta's enemy throughout the Classical Period. Furthermore, when Sparta's expansionist ally Corinth became embroiled with Athens over its hostilities with Corcyra and Potidaea, the Spartans allowed a Corinthian delegation, various allied delegations, and even an Athenian delegation to present their respective cases in the disputes before the Spartan Assembly and ephors.<sup>23</sup> "Self-help," merely a social construction according to Wendt, does not appear to be the main objective in Sparta's war deliberations. Rather, as Wendt predicts, Sparta takes into consideration the direction and consequences of other actors' gestures to formulate its own identity in relation to them.<sup>24</sup> In this case, Sparta decided that Athens had broken previous treaties and should thus be treated as an enemy, a social con-

20 Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 91.

21 Wendt, "Anarchy," 23.

22 Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 100.

23 Sparta was ruled by five annually elected ephors that shared power with the two Spartan kings. Warner, *Thucydides*, 73-86.

24 Wendt, "Anarchy," 25.

struction that resulted from the various inputs of Sparta's allies.

*Athens' Long Walls and the Signaling of Hostility Toward Sparta:*

Sparta's reactions to Athenian expansionism during the Pentecontaetia best illustrate Wendt's concept of how state inferences are made from observations of states' gestures toward one another. Thucydides describes how, in the period immediately after the Greco-Persian Wars, Sparta became concerned with the Athenian construction of the Long Walls.<sup>25</sup> The Peloponnesian League was concerned that Athens, which already dominated the seas with its navy, would be invulnerable behind its walls to infantry assaults, in which the Spartans and their allies were superior. Thucydides describes in his account of the war how Sparta sent a delegation to encourage Athens to cease construction of the walls, writing, ...In making this suggestion to the Athenians they concealed their real meaning and their real fears; the idea was, they said, that if there was another Persian invasion, the Persians would have no strong base from which to operate...and that the Peloponnesians was capable of serving the needs of everyone, both as a place of refuge and as a place from which to attack.<sup>26</sup>

One should note the diplomatic language the Spartan delegation uses in expressing its concerns: Sparta clearly gives import to gestures, as it attempts to carefully mask its own intentions from Athens in order to prevent the escalation of hostilities over the request to stop construction on the walls. One must remember that these negotiations over the Long Walls occurred early in the Pentecontaetia when Sparta and Athens were still on relatively amicable terms. Hence, Sparta attempts to construct a friendly identity for itself in the eyes of Athens by invoking the recent memory of the Greco-Persian Wars in its request for the deconstruction of the walls. However, Sparta clearly perceives the construction of the walls to be a threatening gesture from Athens, which is evidenced by Thucydides' mention of "their real fears." As described by de Ste. Croix, Athens deprived Sparta of its hegemony after the building of the Long Walls.<sup>27</sup> Thus, in determining Athens' disposition toward Sparta, the Spartans deduced from Athens' wall and its self-portrayed image as a naval empire that the Athenians were sending increasingly hostile signals.

A realist might argue that, in this case, both Athens and Sparta were acting according to the logic of self-help, and that in an anarchical world each would seek to advance their own goals without subordinating their own interests to the other's.<sup>28</sup> This argument appears to hold true when one considers Athens, since this city-state continued to build its walls despite Spartan requests and the obvious provocations these walls would cause. However, this realist model struggles to accurately describe Sparta's actions during and after the delegation. During the

25 The Long Walls connected Athens to her port at Piraeus, effectively making her invulnerable to a land-based siege.

26 Warner, *Thucydides*, 88.

27 Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 171.

28 Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1979).

delegation, the emissaries attempted to mask Sparta's true hegemonic concerns rather than make forceful demands upon Athens to subordinate its ambitions to a system in which Spartan hegemony offered protection. At this point, the Athenians had not completed the walls and Themistocles had yet to deceive the Spartan Assembly of their rate of completion (discussed later in the section on Athens). As such, Sparta and its allies were in a position, with their superior land forces, to coerce Athens into halting construction. This hesitance to use force does not make much sense under a realist model while on the other hand, constructivism, once again, offers useful insights into Sparta's actions. Athens' increasingly hostile gestures constituted unprecedented situations to which Sparta had yet to adapt its interests. Wendt observed a similar ambiguity in the formation of individual interests following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the absence of Cold War identity-forming mutual attributions of threat and hostility made the US and former Soviet Union unsure of their "interests."<sup>29</sup> In the case of Sparta and Athens, the quick transition from stalwart allies in the Greco-Persian Wars to hegemonic rivals during Pentecontaetia initially left Sparta unsure about its official foreign policy toward Athens.

Two final cases during the war help to illustrate how Sparta's self-identity helped shape its later foreign policy. The first event occurred during 447-6 BC, when Sparta and its allies dealt Athens several defeats and were able to openly raid Attica while Athens was weak and several of its allies were revolting against it. However, Pericles, Athens' legendary leader at the time, was able to bribe Cleandridas, advisor to the Spartan king Pleistoanax, into orchestrating a Spartan withdrawal from the region.<sup>30</sup> The Spartan Gerousia later prosecuted both men for the failure of the campaign<sup>31</sup>, but what is interesting to note from this story is the role that sub-state actors played in affecting the foreign policy of the main actors. A realist model cannot account for such individualistic internal forces within a state's foreign policy apparatus except to say that human nature in an anarchical world will always seek to promote its own selfish interests. The constructivist takeaway from this event is far more comprehensive and meaningful: Cleandridas' treason constitutes an input into Sparta's perception of self and the image it conveys to other actors. Cleandridas' actions shook Spartan confidence in the invulnerability of its own internal structure while exposing the idea of Spartan incorruptibility as a myth to Athens and its allies.

The second case similarly demonstrates how shifts in identity, both self-identity and the identity of one's adversary, can shape the foreign policy of actors. In 425 BC, a contingent of Spartan soldiers was trapped on the island of Sphacteria by surrounding Athenian forces. The lighter Athenian troops were able to deal high casualties to the heavy Spartan infantry and, at the end of the day, the Spartan commander surrendered. This surrender, according to historian Lawrence Tritle, sent a shock wave throughout the Greek world, which had held the belief

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29 Wendt, "Anarchy," 23.

30 Lawrence A. Tritle, *A New History of the Peloponnesian War* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 13.

31 The Gerousia was the Spartan senate, but it also fulfilled the role of Supreme Court. Pleistoanax was sent into exile while Cleandridas was condemned to death.

that Spartans would die to the last man before surrendering. Furthermore, the surrender complicated Spartan foreign relations incredibly as the emboldened city-state of Argos, Sparta's old enemy and neighbor, began signaling that as soon as the Thirty Years Peace with Sparta ended, it would be in a position to claim hegemony in the Peloponnese.<sup>32</sup> The identity of invincibility that Sparta had heretofore been able to construct and convey to other actors now shifted in the direction of vulnerability. Other actors changed their perceptions of Sparta in response to this shift in identity and constructed new collective meanings from which to organize their actions. In addition to the rise of an increasingly hostile Argos, the Spartan defeat also emboldened the Athenians to resist Spartan attempts at peace negotiations. According to the outlined constructivist model, Athens interpreted these Spartan supplications for peace as signals of weakened resolve and as testaments to Athens' competitiveness as a hegemon. Athens' hubris and misinterpretation of Sparta's gestures would be its undoing at the end of the war.

#### ATHENS: THE PREDATOR STATE

Athens' considerations going into the Peloponnesian War were very different from those of Sparta, but they were still constructed from a combination of allied interests, adversary gestures, and domestic movements. In particular, Athens' expansionist policies during the Pentecontaetia contributed significantly to its self-identity as a regional hegemon and its perception of the Peloponnesian League as a viable check to its power. As a predator city-state, Athens' expansionist policies created a system in which balance-of-power security dilemmas arose from the process of city-state identity formation.

Following the retreat of Persian forces from Greece at the end of the Greco-Persian wars, the Athenians returned to Athens from their sanctuaries in Salamis and began rebuilding their city. It was at this time that the Athenians began construction on the Long Walls and Themistocles, the Athenian hero who had destroyed the Persian navy at the battle of Salamis, enjoined the Athenians to peacefully detain the delegates sent by Sparta to advise against their construction. Themistocles' detainment of the Spartan delegates bought Athens time to complete the walls while he addressed the Spartan Assembly explaining that "they [the Athenians] thought it better that their city should be fortified; it was better for their own citizens and also would be an advantage to the whole alliance; for it was only on the basis of equal strength that equal and fair discussion on the common interest could be held."<sup>33</sup> As mentioned earlier, this period was one of rather amicable relations between the Spartans and the Athenians, and Themistocles accordingly identified that common interests existed between the two city-states. These common interests represent an institution that both city-states (at least at this time) bought into and more importantly, to which they subjugated some of their personal interests. Realists would argue that Athens was acting purely from power politics considerations and used deception to advance its own hegemonic aspirations at the expense of the Peloponnesian League. I would argue, however,

32 Tritle, *New History*, 89-90.

33 Warner, *Thucydides*, 87.

that power politics were just one set of many constructed processes that went into the decision to build the Long Walls and that the Athenians' primary concern was not the consolidation of hegemonic power, but rather the protection of their people from another Persian invasion. The fact that Themistocles made it a point to personally travel to Sparta and notify the Spartan Assembly of the walls' completion rather than allowing the Spartan delegates to do so indicates that the Athenian leadership genuinely respected the common security interests shared by Athens and Sparta at this time.

One of the strongest arguments realists can make about the centrality of offensive realism in Athenian foreign policy during this period regards the expansion of its maritime empire. Following the reconstruction of Athens, the Athenians used their naval power to take over most of the Aegean and bind their allies in a series of tributary alliances in which each city-state had to contribute either ships or money to Athens' expansionary missions. Most city-states, not wanting to contribute their own men or ships, paid Athens in talents of gold. Athens increased its power at the expense of its allies by using this money to increase the size of its navy, and thus tributary members found it increasingly difficult to resist direct control from Athens as its tactics became increasingly brutal.<sup>34</sup> Offensive realism seems to accurately account for this expansion and one would not be unreasonable in suggesting that Athens was seeking to become the sole hegemon in the Greek system. Nevertheless, Wendt's previously discussed "predator state" model offers additional and more complex explanations for Athens' expansion because it takes into account both power politics and the construction of identities. Athens' initial reason for expanding control into the Aegean was to protect precious grain supplies to Attica, which had relatively poor soil. These initial economic objectives expanded to include other coercive missions to acquire wealth to support the increasingly lavish lifestyle of the Athenians. City-states outside the realm of Athens' empire interpreted these economic pursuits as hostile measures and accordingly began to attribute the identity of "aggressor" to Athens rather than the previous identity of "savior of Greece."<sup>35</sup>

#### *The Corcyra Incident and the Influence of Athens' Allies on Its Foreign Policy*

De Ste. Croix explains that both Sparta, in relation to the Peloponnesian League, and Athens, in relation to its empire, operated these alliances by maintaining complaisant governments in their satellite city-states rather than winning over the total populations. These hegemonies only used coercion when all-out revolution within one of these city-states required an invasion to bring the city back into the fold of the alliance.<sup>36</sup> However, as Athens and Sparta's perceptions of one another became more hostile, the entire Greek system likewise became increasingly polarized and volatile. During the Pentecontaetia, this polarization only further exacerbated existing rivalries between the proxy city-states of each

<sup>34</sup> Warner, *Thucydides*, 89-100.

<sup>35</sup> This identity refers to the Greco-Persian Wars, where Athens' immense sacrifices and victory at Salamis garnered it the respect of many Greek city-states.

<sup>36</sup> Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 99.

hegemon. These proxy conflicts, in turn, made it increasingly difficult for Athens and Sparta to maintain direct and amicable diplomatic relations with one another. As constructivism would predict, the actions of allies constitute both objects within the system (in this case Greece serves as our international system) to which the hegemons assign strategic value as well as mediums through which the hegemons convey gestures to one another.

The events surrounding the conflict between Corcyra and Corinth clearly illustrate the importance of alliances in the inter-city-state system that existed during the Pentecontaetia. Beginning in 435 BC, Corcyra, a neutral western Greek city-state, and Corinth, a member of the Peloponnesian League, engaged in a series of wars over control of the city of Epidamus. As the conflict dragged on, both Corcyra and Corinth sent delegations to Athens to convince it to choose a side in the conflict. Corcyra made the compelling case that its extensive navy would add considerable strength to Athens' maritime power if the hegemon defended it against Corinthian attacks and that this combined navy would be invaluable in checking the power of Sparta.<sup>37</sup> The choice presented before Athens not only had considerable security implications for the city of Athens itself, but would also establish a precedent that would allow hegemons to interfere in the affairs of neutral city-states. Athens clearly knew that Sparta would perceive this interference as a provocation and it certainly did not want Sparta to reciprocate its actions by becoming involved in the neutral cities of Attica. However, Athens also had to consider the benefits of having the Corcyraean navy join its fleet and the security this navy would provide against the Corinthian fleet, which was the only Greek fleet that came close to rivaling that of Athens. Actors (Athens, its allies, and Corinth) constructed this security dilemma and Athens would only make its decision after it had considered the likelihood of a retaliatory response from the Peloponnesian League. Athens could have decided not to become involved in the conflict based on the worst-case scenario assumption that the Peloponnesian League would launch a full-scale retaliatory response if it sided with Corcyra. However, states rarely act on the basis of worst-case assumptions and Athens made its decision to side with Corcyra after weighing the probability of a Spartan response. Athens constructed this probability from the previous peaceful interactions it had shared with Sparta during the Pentecontaetia.

While the Corcyra Incident was one of many ally-induced impetuses for the greater Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens, the Spartan ultimatum regarding the Megarian decree tipped the Greek system from the Pentecontaetia into an environment of bipolar hegemonic war. Athens enacted the Megarian Decree in 433 BC, effectively strangling the city of Megara's economy by blocking its merchants from any ports within the Athenian Empire. Athens imposed this set of sanctions both as retribution for past Megarian offences against Athens and as a provocation by Pericles against the Spartans.<sup>38</sup> In 431 BC, Sparta sent its last peacetime embassy to Athens, demanding that they revoke the Megarian decree or else face open warfare with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. While the

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37 John Wilson, *Athens and Corcyra: Strategy and Tactics in the Peloponnesian War* (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1987), 121.

38 Warner, *Thucydides*, 118.



Megarian Decree ultimatum was not the single cause of the Peloponnesian War, it served as a synecdoche for the Peloponnesian League's overall frustration with Athens' predatory behavior during the Pentecontaetia. Even Pericles acknowledged the symbolism behind the Spartan ultimatum and addressed the Athenians with the following words:

Do not, I repeat, blame yourselves that you went to war for a piffle. This so-called small thing tests your entire determination and your strategy. If you give in, straightway something else greater will be demanded, since you yielded out of fear. A firm refusal should make it clear to them that they are to approach you as equals...For whether a demand from one's equal is the greatest or the most insignificant, if it is imposed without arbitration it amounts to slavery.<sup>39</sup>

Pericles words indicate that both actors, Athens and Sparta, identified each other as equal threats and that Athens' refusal of the Spartan ultimatum constituted an unambiguous gesture of hostility. Sparta and Athens could now openly act as enemies towards one another, shifting the international system toward a process of bipolar hegemonic power struggle. Under our constructivist model, this power struggle is not natural, but rather constructed from the process of city-state identity formation in the Pentecontaetia period.

*Pericles: Strategies of Limitation and Escalation*

During the Peloponnesian war, Pericles clearly outlined a foreign policy for Athens that was both unambiguously bellicose toward Sparta yet cautionary in regards to Athens' expansionary ambitions. In his strategy, Pericles advised the Athenians to (1) stay within the walls and rely on the fleet to supply the city, (2) abandon the countryside of Attica while avoiding land battles with the Spartans, (3) rely on the resources of the empire to wear down what essentially was an adversary with an agrarian society and little cash reserves, and (4) not attempt to add to the empire while at war.<sup>40</sup> This strategy clearly does not align with the prescription of great power politics and offensive realism, which would expect Athens to expand its power at any opportunity and actively seek to reduce Sparta's military capabilities. Furthermore, Pericles' sensitivity to Spartan economics indicates an understanding of the institutional and societal limitations facing Sparta. A constructivist argument allows for this sort of calculation when an actor forms its perceptions of an adversary while an offensive realist model would predict that Pericles would try to expand during empire during war as Sparta's cash reserves, and thus relative power, diminished.

Interestingly, Pericles' security prescription also demonstrates certain elements of strategy straight out of a game theory exercise. In his study on Athenian military tactics during the Peloponnesian War, historian John Wilson explains how offensive fortification operations, a strategy of establishing forward bases from which to conduct raids into the enemy's territories, was not originally part of Pericles' military plan for Athens. Rather, Pericles only described this strategy

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39 Stephen V. Tracy, *Pericles: A Sourcebook and Reader* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 52-53.

40 Tracy, *Pericles*, 50.

as a retaliatory possibility in the event that the Peloponnesians began employing these types of attacks.<sup>41</sup> This tit-for-tat game theory approach to offensive fortification tactics demonstrates that the Athenians were initially unwilling to escalate the scale of the war<sup>42</sup> unless compelled to do so by the Peloponnesians. The length and brutality of the Peloponnesian war can be explained in large part by this tit-for-tat strategy as each hegemon continued to signal to the other its willingness to escalate its side of the war. This cycle of escalation continued throughout the war until the destruction of Athenian expeditionary forces during the Sicilian Campaign in 413 BC.<sup>43</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The application of constructivist frameworks to the Peloponnesian War creates a basic historical foundation from which to examine more recent global hegemonic conflicts. Some scholars may argue that the ancient Greek city-states shared too many similarities in language and culture for political theorists to transpose a model based on an essentially Greek conflict to more heterogeneous international conflicts. Such scholars would treat the Peloponnesian War as a regional conflict based on municipal rivalries and as one lacking the dynamics of a truly international hegemonic war. However, as demonstrated by the various examples of identity formation and the escalation of signals sent between Sparta and Athens, the scale of the Peloponnesian War in relation to the economic and political complexity of its participants remains remarkable in comparison to any modern war. The similarities to the Cold War are incredible, and while a comparison of these two wars is beyond the scope of this study, a brief perusal of a few of their parallels will help to demonstrate the universality of the outlined constructivist model.

Firstly, just as the respective military strengths of Sparta and Athens – the first a superior land force, the second a naval power – affected the security considerations of each hegemon, so too did the military capabilities of the United States, with command of the seas, contrast with the vast land armies of the Soviet Union. Additionally, just as Sparta and Athens established puppet regimes in their allied city-states that mirrored their personal political systems, the United States and Soviet Union also sought to establish political spheres of influence amongst third-world proxy states. Lastly, Athens' building of the Long Walls and the Peloponnesians' participation in a collective security concert expanded the scale of the war and increased the two hegemons' fear of each other. In a similar fashion, the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States in-

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41 Wilson, *Athens and Corcyra*, 123.

42 In hoplite-based warfare, the raiding campaigns usually lasted only several weeks, after which time the citizen soldiers would return to attend to their estates. Offensive fortifications would allow for extended periods of combat, thus increasing casualties and property damage.

43 The Athenians sought to expand the war beyond Greece by conquering the kingdom of Syracuse in Sicily and gaining control of its vast grain resources at the expense of the Peloponnesian League. The expedition experienced numerous setbacks, including delayed reinforcements, and the Syracusans eventually destroyed the entire expeditionary force.

creased hostilities between the two hegemonies just short of provoking open warfare. Thus, the heretofore-underappreciated significance of the Peloponnesian War in understanding the construction of hegemonic conflict should receive new scholarly attention in light of its unique yet universal embodiment of Wendt's constructivism.

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## A RETURN TO THE MOS MAIORUM? Contextualizing the Augustan Legislation on Manumission

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### ABSTRACT

This paper considers the Augustan legislation on manumission – the *lex Fufia Caninia* of 2 BCE and the *lex Aelia Sentia* of 4 CE – within the wider context of the Augustan legislative program and restorative agenda. After I discuss the Roman understanding of servile, libertine, and free natures within Roman social hierarchy, I will move on to explain the background of social turmoil that gave rise to this agenda. I will then go over the content of the legislation. Finally, I will expand on how the Fufian-Caninian and Aelian-Sentian laws were meant to work in conjunction with the Julian laws and the *lex Papia Poppaea* to limit what Augustus considered the threats to proper Roman social hierarchy and morality.

### INTRODUCTION

The Augustan period was a time of prosperity and change for Rome and the wider empire. Following the suicide of his rival Marcus Antonius in 30 BCE and the consolidation of his powers as Princeps in the 20s with his First and Second Settlements, Augustus was at liberty to do what he saw fit for the betterment of the city and her people. According to his very own *Res Gestae*, this included bringing peace to the empire,<sup>1</sup> as well as the refurbishment of temples.<sup>2</sup> In keeping with his strategic maneuvering to construct the appearance of a revival of early Republican values – the method by which he distracted focus from the disproportion of power he had seized for himself – he also sponsored new legislation that served to restore Roman ancestral tradition as well as to provide a guide for posterity.<sup>3</sup>

Among the laws passed in the Augustan period were two laws concerning the manumission of slaves. The first, the *lex Fufia Caninia*, passed in 2 BCE, imposed a sliding limit on the number of slaves a Roman could possibly manumit by will (*manumissio testamento*), whereas the second, the *lex Aelia Sentia* of 4 CE, regulated the ages of manumitter and manumitted, thus also imposing control upon the creation and quality of new citizens.

It is easy to make the exceedingly simplistic claim that the Augustan legislation was established to limit manumission and thus the number of freedmen and freedwomen entering Roman society. These laws should not, however, be considered in isolation in determining their fundamental purpose, for these were not the only laws for which Augustus was responsible. Measures concerning luxury, marriage, family, and morality (or lack thereof) were also implemented, and it is in conjunction with these that the manumission laws must be considered.

This project primarily engages in a contextualization of the Fufian-Caninian and Aelian-Sentian laws and questions how the Augustan legislative pro-

1 Augustus, *Res Gestae*, 13.

2 Ibid., 19-20.

3 Ibid., 8.

grams fit into his wider restorative agenda. The general societal frivolity of the later Republican era as well as some typically-held conceptions of free, freed, and unfree persons necessitated and manipulated the creation of the laws in focus. The notions and issues surrounding the understanding of the place of the free-born, the libertine, and the enslaved within a typically and traditionally Roman hierarchical power structure will first be examined, followed by a exposé on the supposed decline of social mores in the death throes of the Republic. Summaries and details of the legislation on manumission, adultery, proper marriage, and childbearing will be provided. Next will follow discussion of the complementary nature of these two groups of legislation and, finally, consideration of what the intended practical outcomes of their interconnectivity were. Such an ideological and legal analysis will provide some insight into what Augustus wished to uphold and restore.

#### FREE-UNFREE IDEOLOGY AND MANUMISSION

According to the second century CE jurist Gaius, the “law of persons” places every individual in a specific status category, stipulating that “all human beings are either free men or slaves”.<sup>4</sup> The treatise goes on to explain the subsets within this dichotomy, dividing “free” persons into *ingenui* (free-born) and *libertini* (freed), and then further separating *libertini* into three types, which were dependent upon their method of manumission.<sup>5</sup>

The inclusion of *libertini* among free persons in spite of the fact that they had once been categorized entirely differently, as among the enslaved, highlights the fluid, unfixed character of status in slavery in contrast to status in freedom within a legal context; this fluidity, however, was highly problematic within Rome’s strongly hierarchical society, which could only retain its hierarchy through the maintenance of sharp status distinctions.<sup>6</sup> Thus manumission as an institution was inherently a challenge to Roman social, cultural, and economic structures; this tension caused a great deal of status anxiety and ideological conflict.<sup>7</sup> The liberation of a slave called into question the meaning of what it was to be “free” and what it was to be “unfree” because it opened the possibility of transitional movement between the two, despite the slave’s induction into this system of hierarchy at the lowest level possible.<sup>8</sup>

The condition of servility, of having a servile mind (*servilis animus*) and a servile character (*servile ingenium*), made the unfree morally inferior, according to the Romans. Although they could be intelligent and witty, persons of a servile

4 Gaius, *Institutes*, 1.1.9; cf. Justinian, *Institutes*, 1.3.1.

5 Gaius, *Institutes*, 1.1.10-12; Justinian, *Institutes*, 1.3.5, 1.5.3; Ulpian 1.5.

6 Susan Treggiari, “Social Status and Social Legislation,” in *The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 10: The Augustan Empire, 43 B.C.-A.D. 69* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 875; Neville Morley, “Slavery Under the Empire,” in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Volume 1: the Ancient Mediterranean World*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 280.

7 Morley, “Slavery under the Empire,” 280; Henrik Mouritsen, *The Freedman in the Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6.

8 Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 7, 11.

nature did not act on moral principle; the complete psychological, physical, and material dependency of existence upon the owner (who exerted absolute authority over the slave) prevented moral, principled thinking.<sup>9</sup> The complete physical surrender of the slave body to the owner played into this; the servile body was violable and subject to the master's every whim, and a degradation of the body meant a degradation of personality and morality, regardless of status or moral standing prior to enslavement.<sup>10</sup> The free-unfree polarity and hierarchy of authority were built upon and reinforced by the assignment of this set of traits to enslaved persons, but manumission destabilized these systems by allowing individuals with the "stain of slavery" into free citizen society.<sup>11</sup>

For this reason, it was necessary that regulations be imposed upon the manumission process, to ensure that only the most eligible and least servile be manumitted; the ability of unfree persons of any character to cross the boundary between slavery and liberty without discrimination or limitation would too excessively undermine concepts of slavery and freedom.<sup>12</sup> As it was, even those who did fit the requirements of regulations would never be equal to an *ingenuus*, as evidenced by Gaius' separation of *ingenui* from *libertini*; the servile nature of a former slave was innate and unchangeable and could never be expunged.<sup>13</sup>

The freed person's obligation of *obsequium*, a system of honour and respect afforded to his or her former master in the role of patron, was an exercise in reclaiming what could be salvaged of the free-unfree polarity post-manumission. Such a system emphasized the social differences between ex-master and ex-slave, even if they had become legal equals; by this, the superiority of one more moral individual over another with a servile character was renegotiated and reinforced.<sup>14</sup> This was, however, dependent upon the former slave's adherence to the obligation; defying *obsequium* subverted the system by which the upset of the social hierarchy, caused by the shift in status from unfree to free, was at least partially mitigated. Free Romans feared that this defiance (*ingratia*) would lead the freedman to commit further transgressions and refuse to acknowledge the societal limitations imposed upon him by his servile past.<sup>15</sup>

Even those freedmen who did pay proper *obsequium* to their patrons could endanger the Roman social order if they became too successful as new citizens. The upward mobility and acquisition of wealth of many freedmen exacerbated status anxiety in the *ingenui* and challenged stereotypical conceptions of free and servile as *libertini* infiltrated Roman economy and rank.<sup>16</sup> Upon the expansion of Roman citizenship to include other parts of Italy and areas further northward, there occurred a shift from a citizenship-based elite social stratification

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9 Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 18-19, 23, 26.

10 Ibid., 27.

11 Ibid., 29; cf. 12 for more on the "stain of slavery" (*macula servitatis*).

12 Ibid., 30, 32.

13 Ibid., 32.

14 Ibid., 59.

15 Ibid., 58-59.

16 Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, *Rome's Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 351; Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 6, 10.

to a wealth-based one, and the existence of significantly wealthy freedmen made this problematic.<sup>17</sup> There was meant to be a connection between morality and wealth, as the ownership of the latter was supposed to encourage the pursuit of the former by excusing those who possessed it from distraction and menial laborious tasks, but those once enslaved were, because of their previous condition, unable to act as moral beings.<sup>18</sup> Freedmen, free Romans assumed, would spend their money frivolously in garish ostentation, which angered the freeborn persons among whom they lived.<sup>19</sup> It was not wealth that made an *ingenuus*, however, and no amount of money, property, or other wealth could negate the enduring servile character.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, the existence of the manumitted slave was itself anomalous, and manumission in its most basic function subverted the traditional relationship between those born into and living in liberty, and those born or brought into enslavement. Legislative measures had to be established to discipline those guilty of ingratiat, lest freedmen lacking discipline and a sense of his own inferior social standing run rampant undermining the Roman structure of hierarchy. Likewise, something had to be done to encourage as moral a set of principles a freedman could adopt despite his history of degradation and servitude, especially in the case of those who, upon being granted freedom, rose to match the Roman middle and even elite classes in wealth and success.

#### LATE REPUBLICAN “SOCIAL DECAY”

Before there can be a proper discussion of Augustus’ legislation, its purposes, or its results, time must be taken to consider the context within which the laws were established. Augustus himself claimed that Rome’s ancestral ways of life had been compromised, hence his intervention.<sup>21</sup> Livy emphatically wrote that the Roman national character was in decline and going to ruin in a gradually quickening plummet into an indulgent, wanton, opulent cesspool of vice.<sup>22</sup> A look at what contributed to this societal condition of decay, immorality, and excess is necessary for a better understanding not only of the laws proposed and passed by the Princesps, but also of Augustus’ overall aims in forging a new image of himself and of Rome in accordance with his personal agenda.

#### *More Slaves, Fewer Citizens*

The increased expansionism and warfare of the Middle Republican era had a startling impact on quantities of free and unfree persons within the Roman population - for example, the selling of 150,000 people into slavery by Aemilius

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17 Neville Morley, “Slavery Under the Empire,” in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Volume 1: the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 280; Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 109, 112.

18 Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 110.

19 Martial, *Epigrams*, 5.70, 10.76; Seneca the Younger, *Epistulae*, 27.5, 86.7; Cicero, *pro Q. Roscio*, 133-135.

20 Martial, *Epigrams*, 10.27; Horace, *Epodes*, 4.1-6.

21 Augustus, *Res Gestae*, 8.5.

22 Livy, *Ab urbe condita*, 1.pr.

Paullus after the Macedonian War.<sup>23</sup> Successive Roman victories meant that the defeated peoples were captured in droves and forced into the slave markets.<sup>24</sup> Wars of the later Republic, such as Marius' against proto-Germanic tribal peoples (60,000 Cimbri and 90,000 Teutones captured)<sup>25</sup> and Caesar's in Gaul (one million captured),<sup>26</sup> also resulted in mass enslavement of the conquered. There is no real consensus on population totals of slaves in any part of the empire, for it is hard to trace their presence due to their lack of independent identity while enslaved and the misleading nature of freedman epitaphs,<sup>27</sup> but Bradley suggests that there were between one and one and a half million slaves in Italy after the Early and Middle Republican increases, between 15% and 25% of Italy's total population.<sup>28</sup> It is likewise difficult to concretely quantify the number of *libertini* within any one community, but Mouritsen proposes the presence of 100,000 freedmen in and around the city of Rome during the late Republic and early Principate, accounting for about one third of the adult male population here.<sup>29</sup> An approximation of the large-scale influx of slaves is outlined in the graphic below:<sup>30</sup>

Table 1. *Reported Enslavements of War Captives, 297-167 BC*

Third Samnite War (297-293 BC)	58,000-77,000
First Punic War (264-241 BC)	107,000-133,000
Gallic War (225-222 BC)	32,000
Second Punic War (218-202 BC)	172,000-186,000
Various wars (201-168 BC)	153,000
Sack of Epirus (167 BC)	150,000
Total	672,000-731,000

The increased availability of sources of cheap labour piqued the interest of Roman elites, who took the opportunity to drive the poorest people from their farmland and seize it. Many of those who had employed themselves in agricultural pursuits had perished in the wars, so many crops failed due to lack of proper care, and, further, those men who did return, because they had found themselves suddenly dispossessed, grew so despondent that they were not even inclined to

23 Polybius, 30.15 in Strabo, 7.7.3

24 K. R. Bradley, "Slavery in the Roman Republic," in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Volume 1: the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 246.

25 Livy, *Periplus*, 68.

26 Plutarch, *Life of Caesar*, 15.3; Velleius Paterculus, 2.47.1.

27 Susan Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen During the Late Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 33. Freedmen who had financial help from patrons were not only wealthier than poor *ingenui* (who would not have been able to afford to set up epitaphs for themselves or loved ones) but also more likely to be inclined to emphasize and advertise their social climb after death.

28 Bradley, "Slavery in the Roman Republic," 251; Walter Scheidel, "The Roman Slave Supply," in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Volume 1: the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 289.


29 Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 121.

30 Adapted from Scheidel, "Roman Slave Supply," 295.



procreate and raise children.<sup>31</sup> Taking their places instead were hundreds of thousands of slaves purchased by the elites, whose ever-sprawling estates prospered under the unfree, unpaid toil of the enslaved. This resulted in an increase not only in the personal wealth of the Roman elite, but also the wealth of the local aristocracy in the surrounding areas. The interconnectivity of this system of conquest, enslavement, displacement, slave labour, increased surplus of profit, and increasing luxury is illustrated by the following graphic.<sup>32</sup>

Figure 1. *The growth of slavery in Roman Italy: A scheme of interdependence*



Hopkins, *Conquerors and Slaves*, 12.

### Luxury and Ostentation

The influx of wealth from these imperialistic enterprises was a further corrupting element in society. Wealth from tribute and plunder poured into Rome, filling the city treasury and the personal coffers of the Roman aristocrats, as well as of those soldiers who were rewarded with portions of the treasure. Sallust attributes the rise of avarice and idleness to the fall of Carthage, Rome's main rival in the Mediterranean;<sup>33</sup> without as desperate a military and political situation, elite Romans settled into what was in general a leisurely, pleasure-filled exist-

31 Plutarch, *Life of Tiberius Gracchus*, 8.

32 Adapted from Keith Hopkins, *Conquerors and Slaves* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 12.

33 Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*, 10.

tence, their only battles those of popularity and ambition within the city itself. It was especially after the return of Sulla at the conclusion of his campaigns in the East with vast hoards of stolen coin and significant cultural, religious, and artistic items that greed and pecuniary recklessness developed, especially among elite youths<sup>34</sup> and among provincial governors (see Cicero, *In Verrem*, among other texts), to name just two groups. Those who spent until they were bankrupt, though, or who lusted after more wealth than they had (due to how much value was now placed on ostentatious luxury as a means of exhibiting and exerting social power)<sup>35</sup> became restless, and it is within this context that plots like Catiline's arose. It is for this reason that Cicero declared to Caesar that, by legislation, credit had to be restored and license suppressed before the chaos that had taken over Rome could be abated;<sup>36</sup> Cicero knew well that "[i]n a city, luxury is engendered; avarice is inevitably produced by luxury; audacity must spring from avarice, and out of audacity arises every wickedness and every crime"<sup>37</sup>

This societal condition was disastrous for family life, for many wealthy upper-class individuals chose not to have children, as they hindered the enjoyment of material indulgences,<sup>38</sup> while, at the same time, the exploited lower classes had more children than they could raise due to the poverty that followed the loss of their land.<sup>39</sup> What were in high demand, however, were slaves, for having many was a sign of power and prosperity, and their labour was also necessary for many pursuits and business endeavors of those with increasing wealth.<sup>40</sup>

The servile life was almost always a trying one, but times of luxury were also the best times for freedmen.<sup>41</sup> Masters who had more money might have allowed freedmen to accumulate a bigger *peculium*<sup>42</sup> while enslaved and also likely provided well for them at the time of and after manumission; the epitaph of M. Aurelius Zosimus, freedman of M. Aurelius Cotta Maximus, is a classic example of such provisions,<sup>43</sup> although it dates from the reign of Tiberius, not Augustus.<sup>44</sup> Newfound freedman wealth, if significant enough, allowed for a greater degree of social mobility, which, as mentioned above, caused an ideological dilemma, and, in the chaos of the civil wars and assassinations of the late Republic, some freedmen, among other low-born individuals, managed to sneak into positions from which they were normally barred.<sup>45</sup>

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34 Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*, 11-13.

35 Wallace-Hadrill, *Rome's Cultural Revolution*, 335.

36 Cicero, *pro Marcello*, 23.

37 Cicero, *pro Q. Roscio*, 75 (trans. C. D. Yonge).

38 R. H. Barrow, *Slavery in the Roman Empire* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968), 181.

39 Plutarch, *Life of Tiberius Gracchus*, 8.

40 Barrow, *Slavery*, 182.

41 Wallace-Hadrill, *Rome's Cultural Revolution*, 335.

42 A sort of allowance given to slaves, usually by the master; although slaves were often allowed to accumulate funds for their *peculium*, this and anything else they had in their possession ultimately belonged to their masters.

43 CIL 14.2298.

44 Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 354 n. 7 (written as ILS 1949).

45 Suetonius, *Divus Augustus*, 35.1; Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 92.

The wealth- and beneficence-based popularity contests among the elite were also to the advantage of unfree persons in some respects. In a clamour to seem the most generous and to show off large clienteles, some aristocrats manumitted their *familiae* wholesale in their wills so that there would be dozens of freedmen in attendance at their funerals.<sup>46</sup> Such an action showed little forethought, however. No time was taken to decide whether the slaves being manumitted deserved freedom or citizenship. Those without heirs left droves of freedmen without any patron and thus without any obligation of *obsequium*,<sup>47</sup> thereby removing the practice which enforced the social differences between *ingenuus* and *libertinus*, and flooded the citizenry with those of a servile nature without reproducing themselves and adding to the population of *ingenui*.<sup>48</sup> Those with heirs, by manumitting so many slaves at once, contributed to the erosion of the upper orders as they fragmented their estates and dispersed their property, instead of ensuring that their property-based status passed down to their children further destabilized the Roman social hierarchy, while freedmen were simultaneously becoming increasingly more prosperous on the whole.<sup>49</sup>

### *Sexual Impropriety*

The capability of behaving morally by which the elite justified their position in society was weakened by this extravagance, not only because it was contrary to early Roman *mores* to indulge to such an extent and to value material wealth, but also because, in Roman thinking, *luxuria* was part of the same societal corruption as *licentia* and sexual impropriety. Those who were slaves to their physical appetites for food, drink, and material wealth were also inclined to indulge in scandalous sexual behaviour.<sup>50</sup>

Roman moralists made connections between adultery, persistent bachelorhood, and childlessness and the upheaval that arose during the late Republican era.<sup>51</sup> The abandonment of sexual morality meant the breakdown of social order, the decline of Roman religious and ritual belief, and the absence of personal virtues upon which early Roman success was dependent.<sup>52</sup> In this new world of luxury and license, elite women were doing as the men did, revelling in material and sexual pleasure outside what was proper for their gender and their station, and their husbands could not stop them, since their masculine authority was

46 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Antiquitates Romanae*, 4.24.4-6; Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen*, 14; Jane E. Gardner, "The Purpose of the Lex Fufia Caninia," *Echoes du Monde Classique* Vol.35, No. 10 (1991), 24-25.

47 Gardner, "Lex Fufia Caninia," 28.

48 Treggiari, "Social Status," 887.

49 Gardner, "Lex Fufia Caninia," 26.

50 Catharine Edwards, *The Politics of Immorality in ancient Rome* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5, 24-6.

51 Edwards, *Politics of Immorality*, 34, 36.

52 *Ibid.*, 43-6.

completely compromised. Sallust criticized this behavior in his descriptions of Sempronia and her female peers.<sup>53</sup>

There was especially concern about the public crime<sup>54</sup> of adulterous liaisons between aristocratic women and men of the lower classes (including freedmen).<sup>55</sup> A sexual affair between two people of these different social backgrounds threatened the Roman hierarchy and was “viewed with horror”, for children of these unions were born *ingenui*,<sup>56</sup> and these instances made elite men question their own place within that hierarchy, if elite women were becoming involved with non-elite men. Furthermore, it also caused concern for family stability and the production of heirs with confirmable and legitimate paternity.<sup>57</sup> The fact that this was the main concern when it came to adultery is evidenced in the Digest (“Properly speaking, adultery is committed with a married woman, the name being derived from children conceived from another”)<sup>58</sup> as well as in Quintilian’s *Institutes* (“If an adulteress pleads in a poisoning case, does she not seem condemned by the judgment of M. Cato, who said that there was no adulteress who was not a poisoner as well?”).<sup>59</sup> This latter quote equates adultery with poisoning, implying that an adulteress was poisoning her husband’s family line with the blood and offspring of another. Adulterous unions between elite women and poor *ingenui* or *libertini* simply could not be permitted, lest the upper orders be infiltrated by the rabble.

### *Slaves and Civil War*

The late Republic was most often characterized by internal strife and civil war than by anything else. The conflicts between the opposing sides caused significant problems for the citizen population, as many men died in war or were proscribed by the victorious general or group, something of which Augustus himself was guilty in 43 BCE. To make matters worse, the warring parties did not stop at recruitment from the Roman and Italian (and sometimes Eastern) populations, but also went as far as to involve the slaves in the conflict.

There are numerous examples within ancient sources of this occurring. Sulla freed and gave citizenship to 10,000 slaves, whom he called Corneli and always had at his disposal.<sup>60</sup> Marius, once his conflict with Sulla had come to a head, proclaimed that any slaves to join his cause would be freed<sup>61</sup> and, later, upon landing at Telamon, won the local population’s support, declaring freedom for the slaves there.<sup>62</sup> Cinna also tried to get support from the slaves with the

53 Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*, 24-25; cf. Edwards, *Politics of Immorality*, 43, 46.

54 *Theodosian Code*. 9.7.2.

55 Edwards, *Politics of Immorality*, 49. Also see *Theodosian Code* 9.9 for the later severity of punishment against women who were engaging in intercourse with their slaves.

56 Justinian, *Institutes*, 1.4.

57 Edwards, *Politics of Immorality*, 53; Treggiari, “Social Status,” 891.

58 Digest 48.5.6.1 Papinian in Edwards, *Politics of Immorality*, 49.

59 Quintilian, *Institutes*, 5.11.39.

60 Appian, *Bellum civile*, 1.100, 104.

61 Plutarch, *Life of Marius*, 35.5.

62 *Ibid.*, 41.2.

promise of manumission,<sup>63</sup> although, unlike Marius, Octavian made a point of not doing this out of principle and concern for the integrity of citizenship.<sup>64</sup> Caesar and Cato too did this during their own tumultuous times.<sup>65</sup>

At a time when so many Roman and Italian citizens were perishing by the thousands, cutting each other down, friend against friend, brother against brother, large-scale instances of manumission without control or care for the characters of these new freedmen was endangering not only the social hierarchy but also damaging the dignity of the citizenship.<sup>66</sup> The proscriptions, too, skewed the free master-unfree slave polarity to an horrible extent through the subversive, government-encouraged act of a slave informing against his proscribed master in return for the allotted bounty; as Bradley puts it, “in this period of upheaval the fragility of the master-slave relationship was quickly exposed[.]”<sup>67</sup>

It is within the context of these pressing issues that Augustus seized power and began his attempts to fix all the damage of the leaders who came before him. The legislation on manumission was certainly meant to help along this enterprise, as was other legislation he instituted concerning marriage, childbearing, and sexual immorality. It is to the legislation that we now turn.

#### THE AUGUSTAN LEGISLATION ON MANUMISSION

By the time the Augustus’ legislative changes concerning manumission were set in motion, he had enjoyed sole rule for a few decades and must have noticed the problems plaguing the city and the empire. As the Princeps and the pater patriae, it was his responsibility to bring order to society in the wake of decades of intestine strife, to restore moral standards, and to enforce laws.<sup>68</sup> Due to the high incidence and indiscriminate nature of manumission in the late Republic,<sup>69</sup> during his reign he established two new measures concerning this institution - the *lex Fufia Caninia* of 2 BCE, and the *lex Aelia Sentia* of 4 CE.

#### *The Lex Fufia Caninia*

The *lex Fufia Caninia* established a limit on the proportion of slaves from a master’s *familia* that could be manumitted testamento after his death. Those who had more slaves could manumit more individuals, but a smaller proportion of the overall total of slaves owned. Further, the slaves to be liberated had to be named very specifically in linear fashion, or else no one would be freed, nor would be any listed in excess of the set proportion.<sup>70</sup> Slaves who had run away were also included in this number,<sup>71</sup> but those bequeathed to friends through a

63 Appian, *Bellum civile*, 1.65, 69.

64 Plutarch, *Life of Marius*, 42.2.

65 Caesar, *Bellum civile*, 1.14; *Bellum africanum*, 88.

66 Bradley, “Slavery in the Roman Republic,” 253.

67 *Ibid.*, 254.

68 Horace, *Odes*, 3.24.25-36.

69 Suetonius, *Divus Augustus*, 40.3-4; Cassius Dio, 55.13.7.

70 Gaius, *Institutes*, 1.1.42-46.

71 William Warwick Buckland, *The Roman Law of Slavery: the Condition of the Slave in Private Law from Augustus to Justinian* (New York: AMS Press, 1908), 547.

fideicommissum with the instruction that they be freed were not.<sup>72</sup> Early in Roman history, law had stipulated that wills be read publicly and approved twice a year at the *comitia calata*, with the people as a witness, so that there would not be any disputes about wills after the death of their makers, but this had fallen out of practice, and thus there was no regulation on wills and no way to know what was being instructed within them.<sup>73</sup>

### *The Lex Aelia Sentia*

The *lex Aelia Sentia* contained restrictions on the status of slaves after their manumission, whether by *manumissio vindicta*, *manumissio censu*, or *manumissio testamento*. Certain requirements had to be fulfilled at the time of manumission in order for a slave to become a full citizen upon being granted his freedom.

Among other details stipulated by this law, the slave being manumitted had to be at least thirty years of age at the time of manumission, and his master had to be at least twenty years of age, unless it was determined at a *consilium* that there was proper *causa* for an exception from these rules.<sup>74</sup> Appropriate *causae* were if the person being freed was a blood relative, nurse, *paedagogus*, or intended agent or spouse<sup>75</sup> of the master,<sup>76</sup> for which there are scores of epitaphs as evidence. A freedwoman could not, however, marry anyone else if the marriage did not come about after all,<sup>77</sup> nor could she divorce her husband if he did not allow it.<sup>78</sup>

Regardless of whether or not these rules were followed, however, the *lex Aelia Sentia* denied citizen status to a certain group of people upon their manumission. Any slave who had ever been chained, branded, sent to prison, interrogated under torture, sent to be a gladiator, or made to fight wild beasts were likened to subject foreigners who had capitulated in battle, the *peregrini dediticii*; these people could never become full citizens.<sup>79</sup> They were also forbidden from inheriting or making a will,<sup>80</sup> and upon their deaths everything they owned was given back to the former owner.<sup>81</sup> These individuals were not permitted to reside in Rome, nor within one hundred miles of it, and if they were caught in contravention of this rule, their belongings would be sold and they would be re-enslaved and set to serve outside of that one hundred mile radius.<sup>82</sup>

72 Gardner, "Lex Fufia Caninia," 33.

73 Gaius, *Institutes*, 2.101, 103; Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, 15.27.1-3; Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen*, 28.

74 Gaius, *Institutes*, 1.1.17, 18, 38.

75 A freedwoman might also marry the son of her master, as evidenced by the epitaph of one Larcia Horaea, who married a man called Publius Larcus Brocchus; the master and his wife, Brocchus' parents, were also of libertine status (*CIL* I<sup>2</sup> 1570).

76 Gaius, *Institutes*, 1.1.19, 39; Justinian, *Institutes*, 1.6.5; Ulpian 1.13.

77 Digest, 23.2.51 pr., Licinius Rufinus.

78 Digest, 23.2.45 pr. Ulpian.

79 Gaius, *Institutes*, 13-15; Justinian, *Institutes*, 1.5.3.

80 Gaius, *Institutes*, 25.

81 Ulpian, 3.74.

82 Gaius, *Institutes*, 1.1.27.

*A Note on Junian Latins and the Lex Iunia*

Slaves manumitted in contravention of the rules of the *lex Aelia Sentia* or in an informal fashion (in a letter, *inter amicos*)<sup>83</sup> were not given full citizenship status.<sup>84</sup> These people were still considered legally enslaved; their freedom could be revoked at any time, and their goods reverted to the patron's ownership upon their deaths.<sup>85</sup> At some point, a *lex Iunia* which expanded on the *lex Aelia Sentia* was passed which formalized this status and all it entailed and gave these individuals a path to full manumission (namely, by a repetition of the manumission once they fulfilled the established requirements, or by approval from the praetor which was gained by marrying a Roman citizen, a Latin from a colony, or a fellow Junian Latin and presenting a child that had reached one year of age)<sup>86</sup>. It is, however, unclear when this occurred. Some scholars suggest a date during Augustus' rule (usually 17 BCE), but there is no evidence suggesting so, other than the fact that those informally freed are always referred to as *Latini Iuniani* by later jurists, even in their discussion of the *lex Aelia Sentia*, which is undisputedly an Augustan measure. It seems more likely, however, that Junian Latin status was formally legislated during Tiberius' reign, in 19 CE, in the consulship of M. Junius Silanus Torquatus and L. Norbanus Balbus (hence some references to the law as the *lex Iunia Norbana*). Since by the times in which these jurists were writing the law had already been passed, they retrojected the contemporary nomenclature of this status onto a time in which it did not officially exist enshrined in law.

## RELATED AUGUSTAN MEASURES

While the above two *leges* are the only ones of Augustan provenance that dealt with manumission, they did not exist within a legal vacuum. The late first century BCE and early first century CE saw the establishment of other measures, meant to address issues concerning chastity, morality, marriage, child-rearing, and luxury.<sup>87</sup> Some of these laws were put into place before those on manumission, and, thus, to adequately discuss the functionality and the result of the manumission legislation, consideration must be given to the legislative context in which they were conceived and in which they existed.

Two issues (among many) addressed by the *lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus* (passed in 18 BCE) and the later (9 CE) *lex Papia Poppaea*, which expanded upon its stipulations, are relevant to this discussion. The first relevant selection is that freeborn Roman men, excluding those of the senatorial order, were allowed to marry freedwomen,<sup>88</sup> although marriages between senators and *libertinae*

83 Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen*, 29.

84 Gaius, *Institutes*, 1.1.22.

85 A. M. Duff, *Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), 75, 78.

86 Gaius, *Institutes*, 1.1.29, 32a, 35

87 Suetonius, *Divus Augustus*, 34.1-2; Dio Cassius, 54.16.2, 56.1-10; Tacitus, *Annales*, 3.25, 28, 52-55.

88 *Digest* 23.2.44 pr. Paul; Dio Cassius, 54.16.2. For wealthier *ingenui*, however, taking a freedwoman as a concubine might have been in better taste under the recommendations of the *lex Papia Poppaea* - see Thomas A. J. McGinn, "Concubinage and the Lex Iulia on

probably would have been punished for the flouting of *conubium* but not necessarily voided.<sup>89</sup> Free women not of a senatorial family could manumit a male slave in order to marry him, but these women were scornfully thought of as base and degraded.<sup>90</sup>

The second, which is more complicated and has more of a history of conflict, are the set of rules, penalties, and rewards imposed to curb bachelorhood and childlessness.<sup>91</sup> While men who married and had children were given more political opportunities,<sup>92</sup> unmarried men (between the ages of twenty-five and sixty) and women (between the ages of twenty and fifty) were not allowed to inherit from other people<sup>93</sup> and those who were married but childless lost half of what was bequeathed to them.<sup>94</sup> There were also limits placed on what childless couples could inherit from each other, and the difference was inherited by the treasury.<sup>95</sup> The *lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus* was not a popular or very effective law amongst the senators and knights, and Augustus had to admonish them for putting the survival of Rome and her people at risk before the *lex Papia Poppaea* was drawn up to renew the rules of the first law,<sup>96</sup> ironically under two consuls who were both unmarried and childless.<sup>97</sup> The *lex Papia Poppaea* also allowed the patron to receive part of his freedman's estate upon his death if he had fewer than three children - one third if he had two, one half if he had one, or everything if he had none.<sup>98</sup>

17 BCE saw the passage of the *lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis*, a law criminalizing adultery, for there had been an uproar about the licentious behaviour of married Roman women, which was labelled a public crime.<sup>99</sup> Men who discovered that their wives were having an inappropriate affair were obligated to divorce and prosecute them,<sup>100</sup> or else be themselves prosecuted for being a *leno*, a pimp, especially if he accepted hush money from his wife's lover.<sup>101</sup> A husband could actually kill the lover if he caught the adulterers in the act,<sup>102</sup> especially if the lover

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Adultery," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, Vol. 121 (1991): 335-375.

89 Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen*, 85.

90 *Digest* 23.2.13 Ulpian

91 Dio Cassius, 10; Tacitus, *Annales*, 3.25

92 Richard I. Frank, "Augustus' Legislation on Marriage and Children," *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* Vol. 8 (1975), 45.

93 Ulpian, 16.1-2; 22.3.

94 *Ibid.*, 17.1.

95 Tacitus, *Annales*, 3.28.

96 Dio Cassius, 56.1, 4-9; Tacitus, *Annales*, 3.25.

97 Tacitus, *Annales*, 3.28.

98 Pedro López Barja de Quiroga, "Freedmen Social Mobility in Roman Italy," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* Vol. 44, No. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1995), 329; Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 41.

99 Dio Cassius, 54.16.3; *Theodosian Code*, 9.70.2

100 *Digest*, 48.5.25.1 Macer, 48.5.30 pr. Ulpian

101 *Digest*, 48.5.2.2, 6; 48.5.21; 48.5.23.5; 48.5.30. pr.

102 *Digest*, 48.5.23.5.



was a slave,<sup>103</sup> or, as some legal sources assert, a family freedman.<sup>104</sup> A father, if his daughter was still under his *patria potestas*, could kill both if he discovered them, although he would have to make sure to indeed kill both immediately upon his discovery or else be punished.<sup>105</sup> Women convicted of adultery in court lost parts of their dowry and property,<sup>106</sup> were forbidden from getting remarried and receiving inheritance,<sup>107</sup> and were made to wear as visual indicators of their guilt.<sup>108</sup>

There is also some evidence of legislation against luxury, for spending and ostentation had been spiralling out of control, and, especially in the post-civil war era, many Romans (including aristocrats) and the treasury were suffering losses.<sup>109</sup> Like the laws on marriage and child rearing, however, this law does not seem to have been very effective, for Tiberius comments that it, along with other sumptuary laws, had “become obsolete through contempt, and this [had] made luxury bolder than ever.”<sup>110</sup>

### INTERCONNECTIVITY

Augustus, as he said himself, instated these legislative programs in order to bring back ancestral traditions and values while guiding his successors and future Romans<sup>111</sup> by showing them how to preserve these and, ultimately, themselves. The legislation was a response to a set of problems that had been plaguing the Republic and causing much objection and uproar. By taking action to remedy the original problems, Augustus intended to induce a moral and religious<sup>112</sup> return to early Roman values and ideals, or at least the appearance of such.<sup>113</sup>

Many scholars of past centuries, including those of the early twentieth century, have claimed that Augustus’ measures regulating manumission, encouraging citizen marriage, curbing luxury, and punishing adultery and childlessness were racially- or ethnically-motivated, as Augustus worried about the influx of Eastern and other barbarian peoples.<sup>114</sup> This suggestion, however, is incorrect and anachronistic to a serious degree. These scholars were influenced by the times in which they themselves lived, and also did not critically evaluate Suetonius’ assertions;<sup>115</sup> Rome had been a very ethnically heterogenous city for centuries, and these legislative programs were not meant to keep certain ethnicities away

103 Paul, *Sententiae*, 2.26.4.

104 *Digest*, 48.5.25. pr. Macer; *Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum*, 4.3.1-5 Paul

105 *Digest*, 48.5.21, 48.5.24 pr.-4 Papinian, 48.5.33 pr. Macer; Paul, *Sententiae*, 2.26.1 (cf. Edwards, *Politics of Immorality*, 38).

106 Paul, *Sententiae*, 2.26.14.

107 Ulpian, 13; *Digest*, 23.2.43.10-13 Ulpian.

108 cf. Martial, *Epigrams*, 2.39, 10.52

109 Aulus Gellius, *Noctes atticae*, 2.24.14.

110 Tacitus, *Annales*, 3.54 (trans. A. J. Church and W. J. Brodribb).

111 Augustus, *Res Gestae*, 8.5.

112 But not clearly political, considering his own position.

113 Edwards, *Politics of Immorality*, 36, 42, 58-59; Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 85, 273.

114 Duff, *Freedmen*, 30-31; James A. Field, Jr, “The Purpose of the *Lex Iulia et Papia Poppaea*,” *The Classical Journal* Vol. 40, No. 7 (1945): 399, 414.

115 Suetonius, *Divus Augustus*, 40.3.

from the citizenship.<sup>116</sup>

One of Augustus' primary aims was to increase the birth rate among Roman citizens. The legislation encouraged people to be married almost constantly from when they were young adults to when they were middle-aged, but also did not require marriage at too young an age, lest there be risks of frequent miscarriage or death in childbirth, which would be counterproductive to these intentions.<sup>117</sup> Since there was apparently a disparity between the number of *ingenui* and *ingenuae*, instead of allowing scores of free Roman men to go unmarried, the laws permitted these men to marry freedwomen, as long as the men were not senators. This policy, along with promising rewards and advantages for parents, would ensure an increase in birthrate.<sup>118</sup> Stipulations in the *lex Papia Poppaea* surely encouraged *libertini* to reproduce as well, for if they had fewer than three children, their patrons would take part of their estates upon their deaths.<sup>119</sup>

Augustus was also concerned with eliminating status ambiguity.<sup>120</sup> Persistent and widespread adulterous behaviour had threatened the stability of the family and cast doubt on the legitimacy of heirs, which was problematic in a time when there was a push for the elite classes, especially senators, to reproduce and raise legally-recognized children to replenish the upper orders and keep the status hierarchy somewhat numerically balanced.<sup>121</sup> Those with unclear heritage and social standing should not be allowed to have legitimacy, and this was the reason for the instatement of the laws against adultery, including the requirement that convicted adulteresses be divorced and never remarried, so that they might not continue to cause this ambiguity with their scandalous behaviour.<sup>122</sup>

Certain other allowances in the *lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis* and, more broadly, the other laws in question, reflected a desire to also preserve aristocratic wealth and hierarchy. By this Julian law, a man could kill another man of inferior status who dared to sleep with his wife and sully the bloodline, reinforcing the distinctions within this hierarchy; there *were* acceptable methods of transition between status levels, but this was not one of them.<sup>123</sup> Those who jeopardized the survival of this hierarchy and, more generally, the Roman character should not be allowed to have property, wealth, opportunities, or rewards, but these should instead be given to those who did maintain these things.<sup>124</sup> Likewise, however, the *lex Fufia Caninia* discouraged those at the top of this hierarchy from depleting their own wealth and that of their family by manumitting too many slaves in their wills for the sake of an impressive funeral, while the *lex Aelia Sentia* forbade men

116 Treggiari, "Social Status," 896; Jane F. Gardner, "Slavery and Roman Law," in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery, Volume 1: the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 426; Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 86.

117 Treggiari, "Social Status," 892.

118 Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen*, 86.

119 López Barja de Quiroga, "Freedmen Social Mobility," 329.

120 Frank, "Augustus' Legislation," 48.

121 Treggiari, "Social Status," 891.

122 *Ibid.*, 890.

123 Edwards, *Politics of Immorality*, 53.

124 Field, "Lex Iulia et Papia Poppaea," 404.

who were too young (under age twenty) and reckless from manumitting slaves simply in order to boost their clientele and popularity.<sup>125</sup>

The preservation of this hierarchy was at the expense of freedmen at times, both ideologically and financially. A freedman or freedwoman who had been given full citizenship would have to be at least thirty years of age, and it was not likely he or she would live for an exceedingly long time after this. There was, therefore, less opportunity for reproduction and a higher chance of libertine families having only one or two children, if any at all, resulting in a larger share of the estate for the patron after the libertine's death in accordance with the *lex Papia Poppaea*. This simultaneously limited the opportunity of social mobility for the children of the freedman and reduced their material wealth.<sup>126</sup> Even the name taken upon manumission was a reminder of the status hierarchy; regardless of this partial reversal of the social death slavery entailed (although there was no erasure of the servile character), the taking of the *praenomen* and/ or *nomen* of the now-patron emphasized the dependence of the libertine upon him, and the retention of what was most often a slave name given to the individual by the master was a reminder of the servile past.<sup>127</sup>

To Roman citizens in the late Republic, the necessity of maintaining the sharp status distinctions between patron and freedman was obvious, at a time when many elite men were childless and manumitted far too many slaves through their wills. Freedmen without patrons were called *orcini*, and this status was problematic both for the Roman system of class dominance as well as for the social and economic survival of the *libertinus*. The *orcinus* owed *obsequium* to no freeborn Roman, nor *pietas* to a family if the master had had no children, and he owed no one a fraction of his estate should he not have three children (or four, in the case of a freedwoman); thus, there was no obvious social difference between the *libertinus* and the *ingenuus*, a situation which could not be permitted, due to the presence of the persistent servile character and the threat to Roman ideology.<sup>128</sup>

Although manumission was being regulated, this did not translate into a wish for freedmen to be destitute, but *orcini* suffered serious disadvantages not faced by freedmen with living patrons. Due to this very servile character they could never purge, they were morally dependent on the patron, for the stigma of their former status was a social issue and manifested in relations between freedmen and free society, but, in going about life being able to claim a free man as a patron, this stigma was at least partially negated.<sup>129</sup> This was not the case for *orcini*. Without claiming protection from a patron, it was difficult for a freedman to do honourable business with free Romans, and thus they were sometimes hard-

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125 Duff, *Freedmen*, 34; T. E. J. Wiedemann, "The Regularity of Manumission at Rome," *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1985):168; K. R. Bradley, *Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire: A Study in Social Control* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 91; Gardner, "Lex Fufia Caninia," 24, 38.

126 Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen*, 35; López Barja de Quiroga, "Freedmen Social Mobility," 329.

127 Bradley, "Slavery in the Roman Republic," 257; Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 38.

128 Gardner, "Lex Fufia Caninia," 27-29.

129 Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 42, 46, 49, 50, 52.

put to survive on their own. The wealthier freedmen were those who had patrons to watch over them, as was required by law,<sup>130</sup> or whose patrons had at least lived a little while after the manumission occurred, allowing them a good start.<sup>131</sup>

Combined, the *leges Iulia de maritandis ordinibus*, *Fufia Caninia*, and *Papia Poppaea* could solve these problems, as they addressed the aversion to raising children and the habit of manumitting too many slaves through *manumissio testamento*. The allowance of manumission exceeding the allotted proportion through *fideicommissa* (instructions to other individuals given in a will) in the *lex Fufia Caninia* was related to this, for the friend or family member who followed any instructions to manumit specific slaves would be considered the patron, and thus the freedman would not be an *orcinus*.<sup>132</sup> Enforcing the rules of the *lex Fufia Caninia* only upon the childless to avoid a high incidence of *orcini* would have been ineffective, for some wills might have been written before children were born, while others might have been written by men who ultimately ended up outliving their offspring.<sup>133</sup>

Lastly, and most importantly, admission to the citizenship was being controlled not based on ethnicity or race, but based on quality of character, on adoption and obedience to Roman values. Numerical restrictions encouraged slave owners to consider who of their *familiae* were most worthy of the reward of full citizenship - and it was indeed a reward, the possibility of which further encouraged good behaviour and hard work amongst the slaves as they competed with each other for the most favour.<sup>134</sup>

The quality of character of those being manumitted was much more important than the numbers, and it was dangerous to manumit without having considered this.<sup>135</sup> The moral character of the Roman citizenship had to be protected, and only those who seemed most capable of behaving based on their actions as slaves and who most often acted on moral principles in spite of having once been enslaved should be set free.<sup>136</sup> Since *ingenui* and *libertinae* were allowed to marry and beget citizen children, selectivity of manumission was crucial, so that mothers of new citizens would be good women who would teach their children the appropriate Roman values, especially as they would be on the same legal and often social level as other free Romans who had no servile background.<sup>137</sup> Children of potential adultery might inherit immoral inclinations from their mother or from an unknown father, and this could not be allowed, hence the penalties of the *lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis*.

130 *Digest*, 31.1.1.18: "A freedman must provide services and supply his own food and clothing. But if he cannot support himself, food must be provided to him by his patron." Trans. J. Shelton.

131 Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 242-243, 246.

132 Gardner, "Lex Fufia Caninia," 37.

133 *Ibid.*

134 Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen*, 13, 18; Bradley, *Slaves and Masters*, 91.

135 Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen*, 30, 74; Gardner, "Lex Fufia Caninia," 23.

136 Frank, "Augustus' Legislation," 48; Bradley, *Slaves and Masters*, 89, 92.

137 Thomas A. J. McGinn "Missing Females? Augustus' Encouragement of Marriage Between Freeborn Males and Freedwomen," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2004), 200, 202; Mouritsen, *Freedman*, 265.

Finally, slaves that had proven either through their behaviour (*lex Fufia Caninia*) or the length of time they had spent living within Roman society (*lex Aelia Sentia*) that they were prepared to and capable of fitting in well with this society were the most deserving of freedom and civitas. It had to be clear that these people had been assimilated to the dominant local culture and adopted a Roman identity, so that when they raised free citizen children, these children would be Romans in every way, and have no connection to a foreign culture or system of values.<sup>138</sup> The forbidding of marriage between a senator and a freedwoman likely had a role to play here, as the legitimate children of the topmost rank of Roman society had to have the most ability to live and act according to traditional values in Augustus' Rome.

## CONCLUSION

As the man with the most power within the Empire, it fell to Augustus to set things right after at least a century of moral and social decline in Rome. In light of how unusual his level of authority truly was, he decided to take the opportunity to legitimize his reign and solve the problems plaguing society at the same time. In the aftermath of bloody civil wars, the Roman People must have welcomed the implication that there would be a return to the old ways, even if the legislation drawn up was less an actual regression into early Roman custom and more the creation of a system that would allow for the preservation of contemporary Roman culture and society far into the future.

The laws on manumission fit perfectly within this program. Manumission was not, as a result, being restricted numerically, but had controls placed upon it, upon what sort of people were given civitas, and upon how these newly freed citizens should go about living their lives. The concern was not for ethnic purity, but for that of character, values, and Roman tradition, hence the need for quality control. These freed people, along with free people, were encouraged by other laws of Augustus' to live modestly, to get married, to be faithful to husbands, and to produce legitimate children of a Roman character and belief system, an ideal established and encouraged by Augustus himself. All of these laws worked in tandem to ensure that these children would be worthy inheritors of the future glory of the Empire. The level of effectiveness of these laws is entirely another matter, as this is hard to trace, and it is already known that there was quite a negative reaction to the *lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus*. Regardless of reality, Augustus has gone down in history as having introduced a Golden Age, brought peace to the empire, and restored Rome.

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## ANTONY'S FUNERAL ORATION FOR CAESAR IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT

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### ABSTRACT

In his play *Julius Caesar*, Shakespeare adheres largely to historical fact while also straying from history for the purpose of drama. This occurs, to some extent, in Mark Antony's funeral oration for Caesar in III.ii of the play. On the one hand, the two documented sources of the eulogy, Cassius Dio's *Roman History* and Appian's *Civil War*, were written well after Caesar's death and are not considered to be accurate representations of the specific words spoken. However, they prove that historical records of the themes of the speech did exist, as well as accounts of the situation surrounding its delivery. How factual did Shakespeare intend to make his fictitious eulogy, and, in cases where he likely diverged from the historical sources, why did he do so? In this paper, I compare the funeral oration of Mark Antony as written by Shakespeare to Cassius Dio's and Appian's. Further, I identify the discrepancies between the literary and historical sources, and aim to prove that Shakespeare diverged from fact in the structure and aim of the speech. He did this in order to reveal more about Antony's character and set up the emotional turnaround in his second eulogy, for Brutus, at the end of the play.

In all the different ancient sources that describe the funeral of Julius Caesar, not one is exactly like another, and none portray an event exactly like the one depicted in Act III, Scene ii of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*. While Shakespeare likely based much of the play and the characters within it upon Plutarch's *Lives*,<sup>1</sup> there were numerous other sources available, two of which—Cassius Dio's *Roman History* and Appian's *Civil War*—provide detailed accounts of Mark Antony's funeral oration. Shakespeare's version of the eulogy differs significantly from these two reports. Because the audience just heard a rousing speech from Brutus, Shakespeare's Antony must address a crowd predisposed to scorn him. His oration, consequently, takes a sarcastic tone and uses skillful rhetoric as a tool of persuasion. According to Dio and Appian, however, the historical Mark Antony speaks to an audience with a favorable opinion of Caesar, having recently learned of the contents of his will. Their accounts are serious and mournful with the intent to praise the deceased, following the form of a traditional Roman *laudatio funebris*. Shakespeare's decision to stray from the historical sources serves to reveal Antony's talent as a rhetorician and his hatred toward the conspirators. This sets up a change of heart at the end of the play, where Antony eulogizes Brutus's death with neither disdain nor irony.

Many of the discrepancies between Shakespeare's speech and the historical accounts stem from the attitudes of the audiences—historical and literary—whom Mark Antony addresses. According to Appian,<sup>2</sup> Brutus addressed the plebeians at the Capitol the day before the funeral. Caesar's will was read after

1 M.W. MacCallum, *Shakespeare's Roman Plays and their Background* (London: Macmillan, 1910), 168-186.

2 Appian, *Bell. Civ.* II.142-3, trans. by H. White.



Brutus's speech, but before Antony's; therefore, even if the people sympathized with the conspirators after Brutus's speech, by this point they were predisposed to support Antony. By the time the funeral began, according to Appian, "When Piso brought Caesar's body into the forum a countless multitude ran together with arms to guard it, and with acclamations and magnificent pageantry placed it on the rostra. Wailing and lamentation were renewed for a long time..."<sup>3</sup> This scene is fitting with the popular opinion of Caesar during most of his reign.

As a *popularis*, Caesar was devoted to reforms on behalf of the public.<sup>4</sup> According to Yavetz, "Caesar was a popular leader because the basic needs of the people were his primary consideration."<sup>5</sup> This earned him many political opponents, especially senators, but it generally made him popular among the people. Even if he had ulterior motives for his popular reforms, he was still doing more for the plebeians than the *optimates*. According to Parenti, "In any case, if Caesar was intensely hated as a usurper, it was not by most. While the plebs overwhelmingly opposed a kingship for him, they still supported much else he had done or was trying to do, including the very policies that moved assassins toward their deed."<sup>6</sup> It makes sense, then, that the historians' accounts of Antony's eulogy depicted him addressing a supportive audience.

The speeches documented in Dio and Appian follow the formula of a traditional Roman panegyric, or *laudatio funebris*, with a serious, mournful tone, with the aim of praising the life of the deceased. Polybius describes the *laudatio* as follows:

Then with all the people standing round, his son, if he has left one of full age and he is there, or, failing him, one of his relations, mounts the Rostra and delivers a speech concerning the virtues of the deceased, and the successful exploits performed by him in his lifetime. By these means the people are reminded of what has been done, and made to see it with their own eyes,—not only such as were engaged in the actual transactions but those also who were not;—and their sympathies are so deeply moved, that the loss appears not to be confined to the actual mourners, but to be a public one affecting the whole people.

(*Histories*, 6.53)

Since Caesar had no son, Mark Antony, a relative and close friend, was a logical candidate for the eulogy. Before the speaker began commemorating the deeds of the departed, however, he usually gave a brief history of the family. According to Crawford, "The *laudatio funebris* consisted of two parts, each taking up about half the oration. It was at once a eulogy of the individual and of his ancestors."<sup>7</sup> If the family was illustrious, there was talk of how the individual hon-

3 Appian, *Bell. Civ.* II.143.

4 For a summary of his reforms, cf. Michael Parenti, *The Assassination of Julius Caesar: A People's History of Ancient Rome* (New York: The New Press, 2003), 149-166.

5 Zwi Yavetz, *Julius Caesar and his Public Image* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 211.

6 Parenti, *Assassination*, 179.

7 O.C. Crawford, "Laudatio Funebris," *The Classical Journal* 37.1 (1941): 23.

ored the family name; if not, he is said to have surpassed his humble origins.<sup>8</sup> There was some exaggeration of the family's past deeds, but this was accepted as such.

Dio's and Appian's panegyrics follow this formula for the most part. Dio's Antony begins his speech by expressing his intent to praise Caesar. He extols Caesar's lineage, as well as Caesar's own virtue and upbringing. Several times, he mentions that there are so many possible honors to bestow upon Caesar that he cannot possibly mention them all, though the audience, as Roman citizens, is presumed to be familiar with them. He enumerates Caesar's military and political successes and titles, briefly insults his enemy Pompey, and finishes by relating the tragedy of Caesar's death.<sup>9</sup>

Appian's version, while much shorter than Dio's, follows a similar format, although it omits the traditional references to the lineage of the deceased. Appian's Antony begins by enumerating the honors bestowed upon Caesar by the Senate and people, and he recites the oaths which were taken to protect Caesar's life. He invokes Jupiter, avowing his desire to avenge Caesar's death; however, because of the Senatorial decree to pardon the conspirators, he would refrain from doing so. He gives funeral lamentations and lauds Caesar as a divine being, and afterwards recounts all of his military victories. Then he shifts the focus of the speech towards mourning and grieving, showing the people Caesar's corpse and recounting his deeds and death once again.<sup>10</sup>

According to Cicero, Roman panegyrics generally "have brevity of testimony, simple and unadorned."<sup>11</sup> All three of the eulogies discussed here seem to agree, however, that Antony's speech was not typical in all regards. Caesar himself, not to mention the occasion of his death, warranted a divergence from the norm. Dio acknowledges that Antony's speech was "very ornate and brilliant, to be sure, but out of place on that occasion,"<sup>12</sup> though its structure and content ensure that it still fits well within the realm of the *laudatio funebris*. Before Appian's Antony speaks, Appian notes that he "resumed his artful design, and spoke as follows."<sup>13</sup> The Greek word used here is *ἐτέχναζεν*, which, according to Liddell Scott, means, "to employ art, contrive; use art or cunning; deal subtly, use subterfuges."<sup>14</sup> Appian believed that Antony was not simply eulogizing—he was speaking with another purpose in mind. He did overly dramatize, according to Appian: "Many other things Antony said in a kind of divine frenzy, and then lowered his voice from its high pitch to a sorrowful tone, and mourned and wept as for a friend who had suffered unjustly, and solemnly vowed that he was willing to give his own life in exchange for Caesar's."<sup>15</sup> As he continued, waving Caesar's bloody robe on the point of his spear, "the people like a chorus" (ὁ δῆμος οἶα χορὸς) responded; this

8 Crawford, "Laudatio," 23-25.

9 Dio Cass. *Hist. Rom.* XV.36-49, trans. by E. Cary.

10 Appian. *Bell. Civ.* II.144-146.

11 Cicero. *De Orat.* II.84.

12 Dio Cass. *Hist. Rom.* XV.35.4.

13 Appian. *Bell. Civ.* II.143.

14 "τέχναζω, v." LSJ Online. December 2012. Perseus Project. 19 Dec. 2012.

15 Appian. *Bell. Civ.* II.146.

is the Greek word for chorus that describes the band of singers in dramatic plays. This connotes that the people have some sort of externality from the main action, like a Greek chorus, and are therefore able to comment on the event of the funeral beyond what Antony and Brutus can.

Whether or not this reference to the *χορός* inspired Shakespeare is impossible to know; however, the collective group of The People certainly plays a central role in the speech of Shakespeare's Antony. Unlike a traditional Roman orator, Shakespeare's Antony does not address a sympathetic crowd with his ready praise of the deceased. Rather, he faces the challenge of following Brutus's strong, convincing speech. He must remind the people, "You all did love him [Caesar] once, not without cause:/ What cause withhold you then to mourn for him?" (III.ii.102-103). He asserts, therefore, that the intention of his speech is not to praise Caesar—"I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him" (III.ii.74). Shakespeare's Antony communicates in a tone opposite to Dio's and Appian's: where the historians are serious, he is ironic and sarcastic; where they aim simply to commemorate and laud, he attempts to undermine and persuade.

The famous adjective "honourable," with which Antony undermines Brutus's speech, reveals his own emotions and Brutus as a traitor, appearing ten times in Antony's oration as written by Shakespeare. It is not until after the eighth mention of the conspirators as "honourable" that the people finally catch on: after Antony proclaims that "I fear I wrong the honourable men/ Whose daggers have stabbd Caesar; I do fear it" (III.ii.151-2), the Fourth Citizen responds, "They were traitors: honourable men!" (III.ii.153). The effect of the sarcasm lies in the anaphora; were the word not repeated so many times, the effect would be lost. Antony exhibits more irony throughout his panegyric, often saying the exact opposite of what he means. Early in the speech, he asserts: "I speak not to disprove what Brutus spoke" (III.ii.100) and later that "I rather choose/ to wrong the dead, to wrong myself and you/ than I will wrong such honourable men" (III.ii.124-6). His irony works: he successfully convinces the mob that Brutus and Cassius were anything but honorable, and he does disprove what Brutus said. This is not, however, historically accurate. In Dio's and Appian's orations, Brutus has already been proven dishonorable, so Antony does not need to persuade the crowd that the conspirators did wrong.

Shakespeare's Antony also uses powerful *praeteritio* in the moments prior to the reading of Caesar's will. At his first mention of the will, he says: "Let but the commons hear this testament—/ which, pardon me, I do not mean to read—" (III.ii.129-30). Naturally, the audience, easily manipulated by Antony's dexterous words, begs him to read it. This allows him to "deny" them once more: "Have patience, gentle friends. I must not read it" (III.ii.139). As they chomp at the bit, he tosses in one final bait, casually mentioning, "'Tis good you know not that you are his heirs" (III.ii.144). His use of *praeteritio* makes it seem that it is the people who are asking to see Caesar's will, and not Antony wanting to show it to them. It works effectively, and is further proof of Antony's rhetorical powers; however, historically this was not necessary, since the will was read to the people before Antony began his eulogy.

In the second half of the panegyric, Antony continues to use language with dexterity to create drama and pathos amongst the people. He laments: "But yes-

terday the word of Caesar might/ have stood against the world; now he lies there” (III.ii.118-9). The similarity in sound between “word” and “world,” as well as their equal footing as the sixth syllable in their respective lines, begs a comparison between the two—after all, the word of a dictator has the power to alter his people’s world. The position of the phrase “Caesar might” in the terminal position of the line brings to mind the idea of “Caesar’s might.” This stands in contrast to the end of the next line, “now he lies there,” which also follows a semicolon and breaks meter, creating a strong emphasis that draws attention to Caesar’s corpse. Whereas yesterday, the word of Caesar stood against the world, today it is the word of Antony which is doing just that.

He continues to dramatize Caesar’s death, using ascending tricolons to forge a connection between the fall of Caesar into the fall of Rome: “...great Caesar fell./ O, what a fall was there, my countrymen!/ Then I, and you, and all of us fell down,/ Whilst bloody treason flourish’d over us” (III.ii.188-91). These theatrical statements are effectively pathetic: the citizens respond with a series of parallel exclamations of their distress: “O piteous spectacle!/ O noble Caesar!/ O woeful day!/ O traitors, villains!/ O most bloody sight!” (III.ii.197-201). Antony has the audience right where he wants them.

He closes his speech with the line “Here was a Caesar! Whence comes such another?” (III.ii.242). His choice to use the indefinite article here makes Caesar into a general, rather than specific, person; Caesar becomes simply a title. The powerful dramatic irony here comes from the fact that we know “whence comes such another”: from Caesar’s own family, his grandnephew Octavius. As revealed in his will, Caesar adopts Octavius, and the boy eventually assumes his great-uncle’s name, himself going by Caesar. This name-swap first occurs in the play in Act V, Scene i when Octavius defies Mark Antony’s order to lead his troops from the left wing at Philippi. Antony asks Octavius “Why do you cross me in this exigent?” to which the young commander replies, “I do not cross you; but I will do so” (V.i.19-20). A few lines down, when Octavius asks if they should strike the enemy first, Antony addresses him not as Octavius but as Caesar: “No, Caesar, we will answer on their charge” (V.i.24). Here, then, does the word of Caesar once more stand against the world, directing an army to stand against an enemy.

The persuasive rhetorical tactics that Shakespeare’s Antony uses in his funeral oration—sarcasm and irony, *praeteritio*, dramatic speech to create pathos—are effective in convincing the people of his righteousness and the conspirators’ dishonor. They are not, however, necessary according to the historical sources, which were available at the time. According to Crawford, “Appian’s account of Antony’s discourse at the funeral of Julius Caesar, which follows the formula of the *laudatio funebris* in all essential details, is familiar to all.”<sup>16</sup> The people already considered the killers traitors, the will had already been read, and the audience was already mourning Caesar’s death. Why, then, did Shakespeare let Antony deliver this rhetorical masterpiece?

The panegyric makes clear both Antony’s talent as an orator and his feelings towards the conspirators. Although his speech is melodramatic, the emo-

16 Crawford, “Laudatio,” 26.

tions behind it are genuine. Before the funeral, he laments to himself, "O, pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth,/ That I am meek and gentle with these butchers!" (III.i.255-6). According to Mooney, "It is thus important to remember that Antony uses his deepest feelings to suborn the commoners. He is simultaneously acting and not acting...Perhaps the most genuine example of cold-blooded calculation in all literature, Antony's speech seems absolutely heartfelt because he gets to perform a role he actually feels, gets to use his deepest feelings for political purposes."<sup>17</sup> Antony had the luck—bad or good—of being emotionally attached to his political leader, and this devotion comes through in his oration, as well as in the actions he takes afterwards against the murderers.

That devotion is what makes his final speech all the more surprising. In the final scene of the play, Antony and Octavius enter to find Brutus dead by his own hand. Antony speaks only once in the scene, to deliver this brief panegyric over Brutus:

This was the noblest Roman of them all:  
All the conspirators save only he  
Did that they did in envy of great Caesar;  
He only, in a general honest thought  
And common good to all, made one of them.  
His life was gentle, and the elements  
So mix'd in him that Nature might stand up  
And say to all the world "This was a man!"

(V.v.68-75)

These eight lines more closely resemble a *laudatio funebris* than any part of the entirety of Antony's oratory over Caesar. The tone is genuine, rather than sarcastic, and Antony speaks simply, without aggrandized accounts of Brutus's deeds or death. He mentions that "His life was gentle," and he calls Brutus, bluntly, "the noblest Roman of them all"—a large divergence from the original, scathingly sarcastic "Brutus was an honourable man." Although he was among the conspirators, he was only "made one of them"; the passive voice indicates a lack of agency and absolves Brutus of some of the guilt of murdering Caesar. The pronoun "them" at the end of l.72 is separated from its antecedent, "the conspirators," by three and a half lines, further distancing Brutus from the enemy.

Antony's words reveal his change in emotion. Whereas in his earlier eulogy, his rhetoric let his anger and hatred show through, here his simple speech showcases the genuine sadness he feels due to Brutus's death. He honors Brutus after all—this is evident in the contrast between the tones and rhetorical styles in the two speeches. Antony made conscious decisions in Caesar's panegyric to use specific rhetorical styles to create a certain tone; he does the same here. His final speech would not wield the same power if it did not exist in contrast to the earlier speech and earlier opinions of Brutus. Antony's first funeral oration makes his change of heart evident in his second.

The final idea that "Nature might stand up/ And say to all the world 'This

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17 Michael Mooney, "'Passion, I See, is Catching:' The Rhetoric of 'Julius Caesar,'" *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 90.1 (1991): 40.

was a man!” echoes the line from Caesar’s eulogy “But yesterday the word of Caesar might/ have stood against the world.” Whereas the word of Caesar held power yesterday, today Nature herself is backing Brutus. It is clear from the last scene, however, that words do not hold all of the power. Antony’s speech roused the people to action, but it did not bring Caesar back, and his final words will not bring Brutus back. Caesar, Brutus, and Cassius all die not from the effects of words, but of deeds—a murder and suicides. Antony’s words in Caesar’s eulogy did not save the Republic, but led to another civil war. By the time his words expressed his change of heart towards Brutus, it was too late for them to have any effect on the events that had already unfolded. They do have effect, however, on us as readers, as we witness the powerful emotional shift that occurs for Mark Antony in the play, all displayed by his rhetoric. His speeches may not have been historically accurate, but they served their literary purpose well.

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## MYCENAEANS AT LATE MINOAN IIIC HALASMENOS, EAST CRETE

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## ABSTRACT

This paper examines the Late Minoan IIIC (c.1200-1070) refuge settlement Halasmenos. Cretan refuge settlements in general provide valuable evidence for the poorly evidenced and little understood period of history just after the collapse of the Bronze Age palatial civilisations. This settlement in particular has been the focus of much debate as a result of its interesting mix of Mycenaean and local, post-Minoan material culture. This material has been used to support theories that Halasmenos was a mixed community of Mycenaean and post-Minoans, thus going part of the way to explain how distinctly Minoan, Bronze Age Crete became a part of the more general Greek cultural *koine* at some point between this and the Archaic period, where evidence becomes more plentiful and the picture is less obscure. Two pieces of evidence vital to this theory, the presence of the *megaron* shrine and of *tholos* tombs, ought to be re-examined, focussing on the extent of Minoan precedent, current theories about ethnicity and the date of the tombs. This re-examination shows that the argument rests on uncertain grounds and that many of the Mycenaean aspects ascribed to 12<sup>th</sup> century immigrants to Crete can instead be explained by the influence of the earlier LM I/II (15-14<sup>th</sup> centuries) visitors.

The decades surrounding c.1200 BC saw widespread turmoil and societal collapse all over the eastern Mediterranean. The island of Crete was no exception, and in this period, in conventional Cretan chronological terms the end of Late Minoan IIIB and beginning of Late Minoan IIIC (c.1200-1150<sup>1</sup>), there were radical shifts in settlement patterns, with few places other than former palatial centres such as Knossos and Chania surviving the upheaval.<sup>2</sup> One of the symptoms of this upheaval of settlement patterns was the appearance of the refuge settlements.<sup>3</sup> The refuge settlements of Crete are a class of site that appeared briefly in the Late Minoan (LM) IIIB and IIIC period (c.1200-1070), broadly identified by their small size and location in generally inaccessible, and therefore defensible, areas on mountains and hills. More than 100 have been identified so far, though this must only be a fraction of their true number, indicating their great significance as a mode of living on Crete in that period.<sup>4</sup>

This paper will focus on the refuge settlement Halasmenos, bringing in two others, Karphi and Kavousi Vronda, for comparisons. However, before looking at the site it is important to lay out the debate into which it fits, and also to look at the broader issues surrounding refuge settlements and the end of the Bronze Age.

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1 The chronology here follows that set out by Prent; see note 3.

2 Krzyszttof Nowicki, "Settlement in Crisis: The End of the LM/LH IIIB and Early IIIC in Crete and other South Aegean Islands," in *The Dark Ages Revisited*, ed. Alexander Marazakis Ainian (Volos: University of Thessaly Press, 2011), 1.

3 Mieke Prent, *Cretan Sanctuaries and Cults. Continuity and Change from Late Minoan IIIC to the Archaic Period* (Boston: Brill, 2005), 9.

4 Krzyszttof Nowicki, "A Dark Age Refuge Centre near Pefki, East Crete," *The Annual of the British School at Athens* (1994): 235-9.



The refuge settlements were first investigated in 1900, when Harriet Boyd Hawes undertook some excavations at the site of Kavousi Vronda, though these were overshadowed by the excavations at Knossos which also began in that year. It was not until some time later that the value of these sites, remote and unspectacular as they seemed in comparison to the coastal palaces, was realised. Their importance stems from the fact that they date to the end of the post-palatial Bronze Age. This is a mysterious period of history, not only in Crete but in the entire area now considered to be part of Greece, and there are very few settlement remains, meaning that these sites are some of the only evidence of how people lived at this time. This has made them significant factors in many discussions. As settlements, they are a source of materials that are for every day use, rather than consciously buried or placed as gifts to the gods, and therefore they have been used in several debates on the ethnicity of people living in post-Minoan Crete. One early example of this is the treatment of Karphi. This site, the largest and most extensively published refuge settlement, was not excavated until the 1930s, when Pendlebury undertook the investigation. It was, until fairly recently, interpreted as a bastion of indigenous Minoan culture, holding off waves of Mycenaean immigrants who were fleeing the upheavals on the mainland and who perhaps dispossessed the Minoans from the coast violently, though this is no longer a commonly held interpretation of the site.<sup>5</sup>

The debate concerning the persistence of Minoans and presence of Mycenaean on Crete at this time has a significant bearing on later history but is rooted in the period before the collapse. It is generally agreed that in the Bronze Age mainland, Mycenaean Greece and Minoan Crete were home to very different cultures, using different languages<sup>6</sup> and having different cult practices<sup>7</sup> as just two examples. During LM IB (c. 1480-1425) sudden changes to the material culture of Minoan Crete, seen especially at Knossos but also at the palaces of Phaistos and Chania<sup>8</sup> indicated the arrival of Mycenaean at these palaces and their adoption of roles expected of a ruling elite, such as the administration of the surrounding land. This Mycenaean control seems to have lasted until LM IIIA (1390-1330) when Knossos was destroyed by fire, though the use of Linear B tablets in early LM IIIB (c.1300) at Chania indicate that they could have kept a measure of control elsewhere on the island for a longer period.<sup>9</sup> It was the loss of this Mycenaean administration, rather than a straightforward 'Minoan Collapse' that led to the changes to settlement patterns alluded to above. The confusion of this period has resulted in a lack of understanding of where the Mycenaean, both those already

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5 Prent, *Cretan Sanctuaries and Cults*, 122.

6 See for example Geraldine Gesell, *Town, Palace and House Cult in Minoan Crete* (Göteborg: Åströms Förlag, 1985), 41 for the shift in LM I/II from Minoan Linear A to Mycenaean Linear B in official palace documents.

7 Helene Whittaker, *Mycenaean Cult Buildings: A study of their Architecture and Function in the Context of the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean* (Bergen: The Norwegian Institute at Athens, 1997).

8 The adoption of Linear B – see note 4 – but also the appearance of warrior graves and the custom of burying infants under the floors; Prent, *Cretan Sanctuaries and Cults*, 106.

9 Prent, *Cretan Sanctuaries and Cults*, 108.

present on the island and ones that many think to have immigrated in LM IIIC, fit into later events.

The Minoans and Mycenaeans were culturally very different; yet when both Crete and the mainland emerged from this period of turbulence and entered into the Archaic period they had a shared language – Greek –, shared gods, a shared script and many other attributes to show that they had become part of the same cultural *koine*. Though Crete had seen previous Mycenaean contact and control, as detailed above, this fact alone does not seem to be enough to explain such a thorough cultural amalgamation of Crete and Greece, especially since Mycenaean control on the island, whatever extent it had reached, subsided by the 13<sup>th</sup> century. Therefore an understanding of the respective roles of the Mycenaeans and the local post-Minoan inhabitants in this turbulent period of LM III and the following Sub-Mycenaean period are vital to determining, with more precision and understanding, how Crete became Greek. Halasmenos has featured heavily in this debate due to the mixed Minoan and Mycenaean character of its material culture. The site has been used to show that during LM IIIC there were Mycenaeans living in a mixed community with non-Mycenaean local inhabitants in East Crete, using an argument that seems to have been tacitly accepted by many.<sup>10</sup> However, a re-examination of the evidence from Halasmenos demonstrates that this conclusion is extremely problematic.

Halasmenos is situated on a hill overlooking the Ierapetra Isthmus<sup>11</sup>, close to many other important refuge settlements such as Kavousi Vronda, which was only a few kilometres away. Despite only existing from the middle to the end of LM IIIC, it was quite a large settlement, perhaps the largest on the Isthmus at the time and therefore probably a significant site in its time.<sup>12</sup> At least 27 buildings have been identified, separated into three different sectors, A, B and G.<sup>13</sup> The finds from these buildings have been used to indicate Mycenaean presence, such as the presence of the Mycenaean style of *tholos* tombs<sup>14</sup> found associated with the settlement. This form was a late Mycenaean import and, though the contents of the tombs do not contain Mycenaean-type artifacts, this is explained through possible later plundering. Equally significant is the presence of five *megara*, three of which, in sector A, seem to have been for public dining and one of which, in Sector G, has been interpreted as a cult site, as *megara* are a style of building that were not found in Minoan Crete but that were found on the mainland in this earlier period. Though the rooms that have been interpreted as domestic quarters

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10 Metaxia Tsiopoulou, "Mycenoans at the Isthmus of Ierapetra," *Ariadne's Threads: connections between Crete and the Greek Mainland in Late Minoan III*, ed. D'Agata and Moody (Scuola archeologica italiana di Atene, 2005), 306-7, supported by D'Agata's interpretation of the Mycenaean features of Cretan cult as implying a deliberate linking to the Mainland (2001) and by Whittaker's concerns over the widespread use of Mycenaean-style graves as evidence for a LM III Mycenaean immigration ("Response to Tsiopoulou" in *Ariadne's Threads*, 340).

11 Prent, *Cretan Sanctuaries and Cults*, 150.

12 Tsiopoulou, "Mycenoans at the Isthmus of Ierapetra," 318.

13 Prent, *Cretan Sanctuaries and Cults*, 151.

14 Tsiopoulou, "Mycenoans at the Isthmus of Ierapetra," 308.

are built in a Minoan style, with aggregate rooms and courtyards in which individual housing units are not easy to discern, the public buildings of this settlement are not, as the three *megara* are all arranged carefully to be on the same axis and to be similar in size.<sup>15</sup> These *megara* also contain raised hearths in a central location, as would be found in Mycenaean buildings. Movable finds also seem to indicate Mycenaean influence such as the predominance of Mycenaean types of legless cooking pots, deep bowls and *kylikes*, all of which, significantly, had Minoan counterparts that were perfectly serviceable, indicating that the adoption of these Mycenaean vessels was not simply to fill a gap in requirements but as a conscious act of some sort. Similarly, Halasmenos has evidence of the use of Mycenaean-style loom weights not found on Crete before the end of the Bronze Age.<sup>16</sup> At face value, these do seem to form a strong argument. There was an influx of Mycenaean customs in all areas of life, from public buildings and shrine plans down to styles of loom weights, implying very intense influence and thus contact, and the Minoan elements of the settlement seem to show that this was indeed a mixed community.

This has led some scholars to be very confident in interpreting the settlement and extrapolating a very strong Mycenaean influence,<sup>17</sup> and to go so far as to claim the presence of some of the earliest *andreia*, interpreting the *megara* from sector A as clan-based gathering places.<sup>18</sup> The presence of these material facets of Mycenaean culture are indeed striking and there is not space to address them all. However, a focus on two in particular – the *megaron* shrine in Sector G and the nearby *tholos* tombs, demonstrates that to interpret the finds as far as has sometimes been done and construct a mixed, nearly proto-Greek settlement is to interpret the evidence with more certainty than is reasonable.

The *megaron* shrine was on the north-eastern edge of the settlement in Section G. To its north and east were large open areas for gatherings.<sup>19</sup> Its designation as a *megaron* rests fairly conclusively on its rectangular, two-room layout and the location of its external doorway on the middle of the north-west wall.<sup>20</sup> The two rooms contained five benches with associated Goddesses with Upraised Arms, snake tubes and terracotta plaques, along with *kalathoi* and *pithoi*, which are also sometimes associated with the cult.<sup>21</sup> These benches contained six largely complete goddess figures along with the fragments of 10 more. The shrine also contained 6 *pithoi*. As the shrine was quite small, with external dimensions of 5.5x13m<sup>22</sup>, these *pithoi* would have severely limited the amount of free space

15 Whittaker, "Response to Tsipopoulou," 336.

16 Tsipopoulou, "Mycenoans at the Isthmus of Ierapetra," 320-2.

17 Ibid., 324.

18 Metaxia Tsipopoulou, "Goddess for 'Gene': the Late Minoan IIIC Shrine at Halasmenos, Ierapetra," in *Archaeologies of Cult: Essays on Ritual and Cult in Crete*, ed. D'Agata et al (American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2007), 133.

19 Tsipopoulou, "Mycenoans at the Isthmus of Ierapetra," 305.

20 N. Klein and K. Glowacki, "From Kavousi Vronda to Dreros: Architecture and Display in Cretan Cult Buildings," *Archaeologies of Cult: Essays on Ritual and Cult in Crete*, ed. D'Agata et al (American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2007), 157.

21 Prent, *Cretan Sanctuaries and Cults*, 151.

22 Glowacki, "From Kavousi Vronda to Dreros," 157.

inside the shrine, leading Tsipopoulou to surmise that the cult activities were limited to the outside courtyard and that therefore the inside of this shrine may not have been a public space, but would instead have had limited and controlled entry.<sup>23</sup>

It seems that there are several different elements here to be discussed: the Goddess figures, the associated snake tubes, plaques and *kalathoi*, the attachment to open areas and their possible usage, the benches inside the buildings and, finally, the *megaron* structure. In fact, when the cult building is broken down into these constituent parts, and each is dealt with in turn, it can be shown that only the *megaron* structure out of all of them has a Mycenaean influence and that even this is not conclusive regarding Mycenaean presence.

The Goddess with Upraised Arms (GUA), the figure of a woman, thought to be a deity, with her arms upraised, is an innovation of LM IIIB/C found in several settlements in this period, both refuge and other.<sup>24</sup> She has no direct precursors in either the Minoan or Mycenaean traditions, yet there are indications that she did in fact develop from the Minoan tradition. These were argued persuasively by Alexiou in 1958 in 'He Minoike thea meth' hypsomenon cheiron', unfortunately not translated. However, his arguments have been summarised by others. The gesture of upraising hands is seen being performed by goddesses on seals and rings from the neopalatial period (1700-1360), giving them a definite Minoan origin due to their predating the Mycenaean takeover. In addition to this, it seems likely from the association of the GUA with snakes, for example through her associated snake tubes, that she is in some way related to the MM III (1700-1600) faience snake goddesses from the Temple Repositories at Knossos. The cylindrical skirts and bare chests of the GUA also seem to have precursors in the LM IIIA (1390-1330) dancer figures found at Palaikastro which have blouses open in a deep V and skirts that, though not yet cylindrical, seem to be hooped.<sup>25</sup> In contrast, there do not seem to be many similarities between the GUA and Mycenaean female figures in pose or clothing. Therefore the deity housed in this shrine came, in appearance at least, from a fairly strong Minoan tradition.

The most distinct accoutrement of the GUA, found with it everywhere but Karphi, is the so-called snake tube, a cylindrical pottery stand for offering bowls which was often decorated with horns, birds and snakes, all of which were significant Minoan cult symbols.<sup>26</sup> Their prototypes came from Kato Symi and Pyrgos but ultimately developed from very early protopalatial objects called fruit stands.<sup>27</sup> The plaques found with the GUA find forerunners in the Animal Plaques from the Temple Repositories of Knossos dating to MM III (1700-1600) which were found with the faience goddesses, providing a further interesting parallel in the association.<sup>28</sup> The equally ubiquitous *kalathos*, a vessel for offerings,

23 Tsipopoulou, "Goddess for Gene," 125-9.

24 Prent, *Cretan Sanctuaries and Cults*, 41.

25 Gesell *Town, Palace and House Cult*, 42-7.

26 Oliver Dickinson, *The Aegean Bronze Age* (Cambridge University Press 1994), 285.

27 Prent, *Cretan Sanctuaries and Cults*, 183.

28 Geraldine Gesell, "The Function of the Plaque in the Shrines of the Goddess with Upraised Hands," in *Potnia: Deities and Religion in the Aegean Bronze Age*, ed. Laffineur

was also a Minoan form rather than a Mycenaean import. Therefore, all of the movable finds related to cult found inside the cult site can be argued to be rooted in a Minoan, rather than Mycenaean, past.

Further in support of this is the attached open area, the courtyard. Minoan cult practice, though it took place at peak sanctuaries and caves and possibly in towns such as Gournia and Mallia<sup>29</sup>, also found a very important outlet in the palaces. Knossos was full of various cult rooms as were other palaces, such as that at Mallia, where a room just west of the central court was marked with double axes, stars and tridents, indicating its cult function. Knossos also had a complex adjacent to its courtyard interpreted as a cult site due to the double axes inscribed on its walls.<sup>30</sup> The closeness of the cult rooms to the courtyard could alone indicate a cultic function for these open spaces; this seems to be confirmed by one of the miniature frescoes from Knossos which shows a massive crowd inside the courtyard in front of a shrine making gestures indicating worship. Also interesting are the social distinctions included in this fresco, as some women, seated in places of honour, are wearing gold necklaces while the other women are not.<sup>31</sup> This social differentiation seem to imply that these courtyard rituals were not confined to the palatial household or elites but were more open to other members of the community. I would argue that the courtyards attached to shrines in refuge settlements, particularly when the shrine is itself attached to a ruler's house as at Kavousi Vronda and perhaps at Karphi, show some sort of continuity with these palatial courtyards and their own cults. The centralisation of the palaces was arguably replaced by the much smaller-scale, localised centralisation of the refuge settlement itself, sometimes focussed on its ruler, so it is therefore not inconceivable that the setup of cult site, either attached to a ruler's house or not, and adjacent courtyard for gatherings is consciously modelled on the setup of cult site within a ruler's palace with a courtyard for gatherings.

To continue with the theme of palatial forerunners, the courtyards of these shrines have more in common with Minoan than Mycenaean palatial open spaces. Whereas the palatial and refuge settlement shrines on Crete are flat, open areas to house large groups, those found in Mycenaean palaces such as Pylos, Tiryns and Mycenae are not. In the case of Pylos it is because the courtyard contained a large platform, a feature not associated with any of the sites on Crete, and in the case of Mycenae and Tiryns it is because the courtyards were too small to have been used for large gatherings of the sort certainly found in the Minoan palaces and the refuge settlements.<sup>32</sup> This may seem to disregard the fact that the Minoan palaces underwent an extended period of Mycenaean control; but this can be argued to be irrelevant to the argument, using Knossos as an example. Though it is true that the Mycenaean at Knossos did make some changes to the cult areas

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and Hagg (Universite de Liege, 2008), 255-7.

29 Dickinson, *The Aegean Bronze Age*, 267-72.

30 J Graham, *The Palaces of Crete* (Princeton University Press 1992), 137-41.

31 Ellen N. Davis, "Knossos' Mini Frescoes and the Function of Central Courts," in *The Function of Minoan Palaces*, ed. Hagg and Marinatos (Svenska Institutet I Athen, 1987), 157.

32 Whittaker, *Mycenaean Cult Buildings*, 9 and 144.

of the palace, such as through converting one of the shrines into a new throne room,<sup>33</sup> it seems likely that in many other respects they did not make changes because new regimes often enhance their own legitimacy through association with official, pre-existing cult forms, which seems especially likely on Crete given the apparent close connection between cult and political power, expressed by the importance of the courtyard of the palace and its adjacent rooms in cult, and also the religious decorations on many of the frescoes.<sup>34</sup> Therefore the layout and use of the courtyard seem to have Minoan rather than Mycenaean precedent.

The interior architecture of the shrines also shows a lack of Mycenaean influence. The shrine at Halasmenos contains the bench housing the GUA figures, as described above. These are a shelf to store the cult object and it is unlikely that the benches themselves were a focus of veneration as the gathering space was outside and, in the case of this shrine, there was very little space to accommodate worshippers inside due to the *pithoi*. Mycenaean cult buildings did also contain raised areas of this sort, platforms, but these were the focus of cult rather than just a storage area, and instead of being against a wall, as in shrines on Crete, they were in the centre of the room.<sup>35</sup> This also seems to show a fundamental difference between the shrines on the mainland and those in Crete, as the focus on the mainland was much more concentrated on the interior of the shrines.

Finally; the *megaron* structure itself. Although the *megaron* as a basic building-plan is a Mycenaean feature and not a Minoan one, in this case there are several reasons that it is not conclusive evidence of Mycenaean presence here. Firstly, this is not the only *megaron* shrine found in East Crete in LM IIIC. The shrine at Kavousi Vronda contains a burnt patch that indicates a central hearth, a Mycenaean feature, and it is also split into two rooms in a way very suggestive of a *megaron*.<sup>36</sup> Karphi also contains buildings that have been designated as *megara* as they are grouped together with contiguous walls, with anterooms and smaller rear rooms, both of which are typical of Mycenaean houses.<sup>37</sup> One of these Mycenaean-style houses is the Great House, which may itself be home to a shrine to the GUA.<sup>38</sup> Therefore it is not entirely clear why a *megaron* plan for the shrine, or even the presence of *megaron*-style houses, can be used to indicate Mycenaean presence at Halasmenos when it does not hold the same connotations for the contemporary and physically close settlements of Karphi and Kavousi Vronda.

The basis of this argument for Mycenaean presence, which rests on the Mycenaean style of the finds from Halasmenos, such as the *megaron* shrine plan, is itself rooted in a fallacy. It is implicitly based on the belief that material culture is equated to ethnicity, and that the material culture of a site can tell the excavator what type of person, in this case a Mycenaean immigrant or a local post-Minoan

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33 Wolf-Dietrich Niemeier, "The Function of the Throne Room," in *The Function of Minoan Palaces*, ed. Hagg and Marinatos (Svenska Institutet I Athen, 1987), 167-8.

34 Whittaker, *Mycenaean Cult Buildings*, 32-8.

35 Ibid., 18-9.

36 Tsipopoulou, "Goddess for Gene," 135.

37 Whittaker, "Response to Tsipopoulou," 337.

38 Saro Wallace, "Last Chance to See? Karfi in the Twenty First Century," *Annual of the British School at Athens* (2005): 224.

inhabitant, lived there. This belief is problematic for several reasons. Firstly it assumes as a starting point that the person in question is trying to signal their origins accurately. However, later analogies can show that this is not always true. For example, the Achaean colonies of southern Italy all assiduously displayed a distinctive material cultural identity that set them apart from their Dorian and Ionian neighbours. However, this material cultural identity did not owe anything to the material cultural identity of Achaea itself. Though the colonies were attempting to create an identity for themselves as separate from other Greek colonies, it was not through straightforward association with their metropolis.<sup>39</sup> The argument also disregards the importance of trade for disseminating material and ideas.

There is also a problem in the fact that ethnicity is a social construct, where one collective distinguishes itself from another through actions like subscription to a myth of shared descent, and that these were subject to change.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, to an extent, for someone to be identified as a Mycenaean as opposed to a Minoan, he must identify himself as a Mycenaean. We cannot know if this happened as this was not a literate period of history and only literature or other forms of writing enable us to know explicitly how someone identifies himself, and it is furthermore questionable if a Mycenaean settler from the collapsed palatial bureaucracy, a hypothesised source of some of the Mycenaean contributions to the population of Halasmenos<sup>41</sup>, would still have identified as a Mycenaean since these people had been established in Crete for decades. Therefore the entire issue of having Mycenaeans at Halasmenos is problematic even at a theoretical stage, even if we were to disregard the practical problems that have been identified above.

These more theoretical problems are also demonstrated by the use of the *tholos* tombs as evidence of Mycenaean presence. LM IIIC did see the construction of many small *tholoi* all over this region of East Crete. However, Whittaker has pointed out an important and overlooked fact; that these LM IIIC *tholoi* are being constructed at a time when they were out of fashion on the mainland, and that they seem to recall earlier Cretan *tholoi* of a Mycenaean type, rather than being influenced directly by the mainland.<sup>42</sup> This seems to argue quite strongly against Mycenaean immigration at this time. It seems instead that these were being built by local inhabitants off the basis of the earlier, LM I influence from the mainland, as more recent immigrants would surely have brought their own contemporary practices and not those of decades before.

There quite possibly were still, in LM IIIC, people on the island who had moved from the mainland in LM I and II to take over the palace bureaucracy and who might therefore be considered to be of Mycenaean extraction. How-

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39 Jonathan Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 137.

40 Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*, 2.

41 Metaxia Tsiropoulou, "Mycenoans at the Isthmus of Ierapetra," 306. – also see Jonathan Hall, *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 46-8 for the likelihood of whether such a person would ever have ascribed to himself an identity that related to the Greek mainland as a whole

42 Whittaker, "Response to Tsiropoulou," 341.

ever, the persistent presence of these people on Crete, especially when contact with the mainland was disrupted in the collapse, does not explain the level of cultural homogenising of Crete and the mainland that took place over the next few centuries. Despite this, it seems that much of the evidence that has been interpreted as showing Mycenaean immigration to Halasmenos in LM IIIC can in fact be explained by the influence of these earlier Mycenaeans, for example in the archaising tholos tombs, and that therefore there is little evidence supporting the supposed LM IIIC immigrations that holds up under scrutiny. In this respect, this view of Halasmenos seems hardly different from the discredited belief that Karphi was a Minoan stronghold. Therefore further investigation is required before confident conclusions can be drawn about the presence of Mycenaeans in Crete in this period, and their significance to the development of the island at this time.

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## RESOURCES

### JOURNALS

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<http://brown.edu/academics/classics/undergraduate-program/brown-classics-journal>

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[http://www.yale.edu/classics/undergraduates\\_helicon.html](http://www.yale.edu/classics/undergraduates_helicon.html)

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