PREVIOUS SELVES: BODY AND NARRATIVE IN AELIUS ARISTIDES' *HIEROI LOGOI* AND APULEIUS' *METAMORPHOSES*

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

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Abstract

Aelius Aristides' *Hieroi Logoi* and Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* have historically achieved joint mention for their unique status as non-Christian accounts documenting a personal relationship to a god. I start with a different observation. These texts stage an encounter with the failure or refusal of one's own body to function in its capacity as a vehicle for self-presentation – an especially important function to orators of the second century CE. Both texts explore the degree to which language can remake the narrator's fragmented world. Whereas Aristides' *Hieroi Logoi* contribute to the orator's healing process, Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* uses the imagined animal body to demonstrate the elusive nature of constituting a whole self. Throughout his *Hieroi Logoi*, Aristides employs metaphors to solicit his audience's participation in reconfiguring his relationship to his body and his god. Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, on the other hand, dramatizes a paradox: the protagonist, Lucius, achieves his goal of literary memorialization in the form of the book we hold, and yet the self that is on display is ultimately lost to the reader.

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Introduction: The Poetics of Self-Presentation in the Second Century CE

1. Narrating the Body

Aelius Aristides and Apuleius were contemporaries.[1] As orators of the second century CE, they lived at a time when the Emperor, Marcus Aurelius and his tutor, Fronto, were writing passionately to one another, not only about their mutual love, but also about their physical state and health. In one letter, for example, Fronto writes, "This is the third day that I have been troubled all night long with griping in the stomach and diarrhea. Last night, indeed, I suffered so much that I have not been able to go out, but am keeping my bed…"[2] They lived at a time when Galen was treating patients publicly in more or less formal contests with other doctors, and performing dissections and vivisections on animals.[3] As Judith Perkins explains, "Galen's practice of his medical method was making visible the interior of the individual, opening space for an inner life—one that was not mental but physical…Galen's method …allowed the body to be a signifier of internal depths."[4] In the previous century, as Catherine Edwards argues, the Stoic philosopher Seneca "[translated] the violent and spectacular into the internal world of

[1] Apuleius was born in 125 CE and Aristides in 117 CE. Both died around 180 CE. The second century CE flourishing of Greek oratory is often referred to (via Flavius Philostratus) as the "second sophistic." This oratory was a vibrant form of elite male self-fashioning under the Roman Empire and was marked by the strict usage of Attic Greek in epideictic speeches and the demonstration of *paideia*. On the second sophistic, see, Bowersock (1969), Anderson (1993), Schmitz (1997), Whitmarsh (2005). More recently Whitmarsh (2013) opts for "postclassical," rather than "second sophistic," in an effort to reorient scholarly attention to writers and texts that do not fit this paradigm of elite self-fashioning. On Apuleius as a figure of the second sophistic, see, Sandy (1997) and Harrison (2000). For an alternative perspective, see Bradley (2012), who suggests that the second sophistic is not real (13n.19).

[2] Naber, 91. Trans., Haines.

[3] Galen, *On Anatomical Procedures*. See Gleason (2009) on the performative aspects of Galen's work.

[4] Cf. Perkins (1994) "Galen's practice of his medical method was making visible the interior of the individual, opening space for an inner life—one that was not mental, but physical" (154); "The entire structure of the *Prognosis* … functioned to offer the body as an object of knowledge" (155).

writer and reader."[5] According to Edwards, he did so by making "the body an arena in which bravery can be exercised, displayed, and observed."[6] They lived at a time, in other words, when the body was becoming an exposed and explored interiority.[7] Bodily afflictions among the elite, moreover, were not merely suffered in this period, they were documented, communicated, and performed.

Oratory provided the means for a different kind of bodily exposure. Whereas in the Stoicism of Seneca, the body was a staging ground for ethical struggle, in sophistic oratory, the body on stage was a presentation of the self as an integral whole: a real, Greek speaking man. The orator's very bodily presence was a revelatory drama.[8] However, the body was more than a vehicle—via gesture, posture, facial expression, language, breath—for the presentation of self-mastery. Orators also incorporated *diegeseis* about ailments and illnesses into their speeches: their bodies became subjects of narrative.

In this dissertation, I focus on two works that are written from within the perspective of a body whose ailments prevent the performance of such dramas. As we will see, in a context where performance and spectacle are ubiquitous, this will mean writing not from a position of hindsight—as a whole or healed self—but from within the

[5] Edwards (1999) 263-4. See also Nussbaum (1994) who argues that letter writing aided this internalization process: "Situating both his own fictional persona and that of the interlocutor Lucilius very concretely, in relation to their ages, to the seasons of the year, to events of many kinds, showing the teacher's intimate responsiveness to the pupil's thought and feeling, Seneca shows the reader what it is like for philosophy to be an 'inside' business" (337).
[6] Ibid., 262-263.
[7] Brooke Holmes (2010) traces the emergence of the body, *to sōma*, to fifth century BCE intellectual's "inquiry into nature." As Holmes explains the central intellectual concern of these thinkers was to "conceptualize the forces underlying the visible world as impersonal." For medical writers, the invisible was the interior: "This 'inside' in Greek medicine is the physical body, where life processes take place and disease unfolds, *often below the threshold of consciousness*" (3, italics my own).
[8] Of course, this revelatory drama obscures the training and exercise (*askēsis*) that went into embodying skills of comportment and speech. Bourdieu's theories about how ideologies are internalized through bodily practice (*habitus* and *hexis*) fit very well in a world where masculinities are so explicitly performed. See, Gleason (1995) and Porter (2006); and in the Roman context Richlin (1997) and Connolly (1998).

encumbered body and as a fragmented or divided self. Aelius Aristides' *Hieroi Logoi (HL*) and Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* (*Met*) each represent a prolonged excursus into past affliction in which the narrator is kept from occupying his rightful social position on account of his bodily condition. The 'experiencing I' almost entirely subsumes the 'narrating I'. The past self is confined. What will become the restored self, that is, the future writing self, rarely emerges to comment on the 'experiencing-I'.

These two works are diametrically opposed in genre and tone. The *HL* is a first person narrative account of the author's experience.[9] It consists of a series of six orations, written in Greek, which chronicle Aristides' sickness and the god Asclepius' healing intervention.[10] Aristides relates the details of his illnesses, which have prevented him from performing. The orations are written a-chronologically and without an explicit argumentative thread. Apuleius' Latin *Metamorphoses* is a first person fictional work that interweaves a Greek novel, folk stories, and an initiation narrative. The core plot revolves around the narrator's transformation into an ass. The highly episodic novel traces Lucius' repeated (and humorous) inability to access his own human agency. This inability is represented again and again as either the failure to produce speech or as

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[9] These orations may be autobiographical, but they are not an example of "autobiography" (which emerges with Augustine as a form of confession). Autobiography is a famously "underdeveloped" genre in Ancient Greece. For an overview, see Misch (1950). Glenn Most writes (1989), "constraint seems to have tended to limit the production of autobiographical discourses in Classical Greece and to confine them to laments about misfortune or self-defenses under attack" (126). He explains that this is a product of Greek selfhood: "The self was a matter of no less intense interest to the Greeks than to us: but whereas we are concerned above all to plumb its depths the Greeks were preoccupied especially with preserving its integrity" (127). Greeks resisted an autobiographical mode because of the high value they put on *autarkeia*. For Most, Aristides' *Sacred Tales* constitutes "some of the most detailed and pathetic autobiographical laments that Greek literature has to offer" (124). Pace Most, the *HL* are not lamentations, but *logoi* of praise in which, as Misch writes, "the glorification of the god" first resided in "the emotional presentation of his own *ego*" (500).

[10] Only a fragment of the last oration exists. Behr (1981) rejects the previous explanation that Aristides died before he could complete the oration and argues that the leaves of the rest of the manuscript were lost (445). Behr postulates that this oration would have described his oratorical successes from 155-165 CE. As Downie suggests (2014), the opening lines have a "summary feel" (46).

outright silence. The efficacy of human speech so prized by orators like Apuleius is reduced to the braying of an ass.

These texts are outliers in the corpus of the respective orators[11] and I read their experimental narratives against more common, contemporaneous examples of self-presentation. Both Apuleius and Aristides imaginatively (re)inhabit a (previously) suffering body. As we saw above, interest in ailments and organs were not a rarity among orators and intellectuals. But while these orators employ the subject of their own bodies in order to highlight the revelatory nature of their performances, in the *Hieroi Logoi* and in the *Metamorphoses*, the body is problem that threatens to wrest the narrative from the narrator's control. The loss of bodily control represents a threat to the narrator's identity. Both texts, therefore, represent an ongoing struggle for reembodiment—here, the fundamental reintegration of the body to the self. The lack of narrative control is indicative of the fragmentation that the narrator experiences in terms of his identity and the impulse to narrate represents the effort to regain this identity.

Recently, the role narrative plays in shaping the self has become a particular concern for scholars not only in the social sciences and humanities but also in medicine.[12] In what follows, I discuss contemporary theories of the relationship between self or identity and narrative that relate directly to my reading of the *HL* and the *Met*.

Stephen Greenblatt's personal accounts of his scholarly work give a modern voice to a desire that, I will argue, is expressed and dramatized in Apuleius' novel. For

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[11] Apuleius was a philosopher (his epithet is *Plantonicus*) and orator. He certainly wrote tracts meant to be read—as would this novel have been (even if aloud). But he was also an orator who declaimed on topics both philosophical (*De Deo Socratis*) and epideictic.

[12] See Linde (1993) for a sociolinguistic study of how narratives create coherence in people's lives. Strawson (2004) pushes against this view. The importance of narrative in medical practice has been championed by Dr. Rita Charon, who directs the Program in Narrative Medicine at Columbia University.

Greenblatt, the impulse to tell stories is integral to his own self-understanding and identification.[13] Jan Veenstra helpfully summarizes Greenblatt's ideas about the relationship between identity and narrative: "[Narratives and historical anecdotes] are expressed by the authoritative voice of the narrator *who in the act of telling is in a quest of a solid foundation for the self*, but *who is also in constant peril of losing the object of his search*. Greenblatt explains that story-telling is something *obsessive and compulsive*, an unquenchable urge in the human psyche."[14] Greenblatt writes that "[t]his sense of compulsiveness in the telling of stories…is a quality that attaches to narrative itself, a quality thematized in *Arabian Nights* and the *Ancient Mariner.*"[15] As Veenstra suggests, the "urge" to tell stories in these works "is actually an urge for survival, certainly in the case of Scheherazade."[16] As we will see, Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* links the urge for survival and the threat to one's selfhood in Lucius' storytelling itself. The stories he tells are a solace and give his experience meaning, but they also threaten to subsume him.

If storytelling is central to the search for the self at the psychological level, narrative structures are likewise imperative for the "quest for a solid foundation for the self" at the bodily level. Cheryl Mattingly interprets the healing work of occupational therapists in Ricoeur's terms as action in quest of narrative.[17] For individuals who have suffered debilitating accidents, and feel disconnected from their bodies, the therapist's

[13] Greenblatt (1990) 6.
[14] Veenstra (1995) 182; italics my own.
[15] Greenblatt (1990) 7.
[16] Veenstra (1995) 182. When Greenblatt describes the imperative of storytelling and its attendant risk, he is talking about his father's telling and retelling of the his persistent struggles with a nephew whose name was so similar to his (J. Harry vs. Harry J.) that he was often detrimentally mistaken for him. He writes, "My father's impulse, we can say, was a strategic way of turning disappointment, anger, rivalry, and a sense of menace into comic pleasure, a way of reestablishing the self on the site of its threatened loss" (7); its obsessiveness, however, has to do with the fact that "the stories in some sense *were* the loss of identity which they were meant to ward off…" (7).
[17] Mattingly (1998) quoting Ricoeur (1984) 74.

central task is to create a narrative structure that gives the patient hope—a diachronic structure for the immediate moment and for their lives. Mattingly calls these "story-like structures" therapeutic emplotments. According to Mattingly, the homology between narrative and lived experience depends primarily not on the coherence, but on the drama they effect.[18] Mattingly locates the drama in the body itself: "In therapeutic context, time is narrative when the body as lived and experienced, as called upon by the actor, is central to the intervention."[19] Ideally, these dramas can transform a patient's relationship to his or her body and self: "therapeutic plots…help patients transition from illness reality to new reality and, even, a new self."[20] Narrative in this case connects the body to the self, by linking the immediate exercise (physical or otherwise) to an imagined independent future self.

If occupational therapists must imbue their patients with a sense of diachronic time, patients who face diagnoses that limit their life-expectancy (or even diagnoses which project a future cured self) are left with a different temporal problem. These diagnoses can impose an unwanted narrative on the body. In this case, storytelling might resist, correct, or simply create an alternative. For example, in his work on contemporary illness narratives, Arthur Frank identifies narrative as central to living *with* disease.[21] Frank experienced often impersonal and exclusively outcome-oriented (concerned with

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[18] Ibid., 154. See Linde (1993) for a sociological study of how narratives create coherence in people's lives. For an opposing view on the role of narrative in constructing the self, see, Strawson (2004). Kermode (1981) argues that narrative is "the product of two intertwined processes, the presentation of a fable and its progressive interpretation (which of course alters it)." He continues, "The first process tends toward clarity and propriety…, the second toward secrecy, toward distortions which cover secrets" (82). Cf. Greenblatt (1990) on the anecdote, which is less "an explanatory illustration than a disturbance," a contingency (5). It is probably not controversial that narratives both create and resist coherence. I am primarily concerned with the distortions in these texts, and will argue that they are directly related to the role of the divine.
[19] Ibid., 141.
[20] Ibid., 164. Here Mattingly draws from anthropological work on rituals of transformation and conversion, including, Csordas (1983, 1994), Danforth (1989) and Turner (1992).
[21] Frank (1995).

cure) medical diagnoses as fate imposed from the outside. "Accepting fate" results in a sense of alienation from one's own body; it means accepting someone else's story about one's own life. Instead of encountering diagnosis as something final and imposed from the outside, Frank asserts that illness can be lived with in a way that is productive of self. Frank explains, "How I lived with illness became the measure of how well I could craft a life, whether I was ill or healthy."[22] The ability to integrate illness into one's life depends on the ability to relate one's story. Frank writes that "[t]he ill person who turns illness into story transforms fate into experience."[23] Moreover, Frank argues that speaking about one's illness compels recognition—from friends and family, from the medical establishment (about one's *particular* case), and from the public (who might not know about a certain condition, or, more generally may be in denial about their own mortality).

Frank's use of the term "recognition" is informed by contemporary "recognition struggles."[24] But the term has had a longer history of use in the social sciences, especially among sociologists in the American pragmatist tradition. Within this tradition, sociologists of "interactionism" [25] used the term "recognition" to indicate a process by which an individual identifies an object or action by comparing it to known instances of a similar type. The anthropologist Webb Keane rescues the term from Bourdieu's criticism that the schema presupposes an unproblematized shared reality by marrying the "identification" usage of the term "recognition" to a dialectical understanding of self and world.[26] In this sense, "interaction [not only] presupposes social knowledge but [it is]

[22] Ibid., xv.
[23] Ibid., xix
[24] Frank (1995) 207 cites Honneth (2008). See McNay (2008) for a full treatment of the criticism around Honneth's conceptualization.
[25] In particular George Herbert Mead (1934) and Alfred Schutz ([1932] 1967).
[26] Keane (1997) 14-15. Bourdieu's (1977) writes, "To describe the process of objectification and orchestration in the language of *interaction* and mutual adjustment is to forget that the interaction itself

also…mediated by relations of authority."[27] Keane continues, "In this light, 'recognition' as a known type becomes involved with the social and political dynamics of 'recognition' as acknowledgement or affirmation."[28] The term is helpful, in other words, because it can explain a range of interactions in which selfhood is (mutually) constituted, from identification of an individual as a known entity, to the acknowledgement of an individual's talent, to an audience's assent, and to claims made by an individual that he is inspired by a divine authority.

Narratives thus reconfigure the relationship between body and self and self and identity. In Aristides' case, his narrative reintegrates his body into his self-understanding as an orator. Apuleius, on the other hand, dramatizes the desire for lasting selfhood by staging a man's encounter with an inconsequential, alien self. Recognition, I will show, is the mechanism that accomplishes (or fails to accomplish) the reconfiguration of selfhood. But before I move on to explore the role of recognition among the sophist elites of the second century CE, I discuss the relevance of these theories to the *Logoi* and *Metamorphoses*.

Aristides' *Hieroi Logoi* is a quest for a selfhood that is threatened by his body's frailty. The rituals Aristides describes help him transform his overwhelming experience of illness into dramatic plots that promise a new self; they thus correspond to Mattingly's ideas about the importance for action to resemble narrative, perhaps especially in therapeutic

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owes its form to the objective structures which have produced the dispositions of the interacting agents and which allot them their relative positions in the interaction and elsewhere" (81). Bourdieu is interested instead in "misrecognition" as will become clearer below.

[27] Keane (1997) 15.

[28] Ibid. It is in the latter sense that "recognition" is employed in identity politics and "recognition struggles."

contexts. The *Logoi* as a whole correspond to Frank's effort to transform his relationship to his illness. Frank, speaking out of what he calls "postmodern times,"[29] is interested in wresting his experience from the teleological discourse of the medical establishment. Total submission to medical discourse, Frank claims, amounts to "narrative surrender."[30] Aristides' narrative also pivots away from doctors, who are unable either to diagnose or to make him feel better. But for Aristides, a religious man, the pivot entails actively inscribing his experience onto a discourse of fate.

Apuleius' novel is about a man's struggle to reclaim a former self. But Lucius' struggle as an ass is framed by two discursive encounters: one in the prologue, and one in the opening encounter with the passersby Aristomenes and his companion. These encounters shape Lucius' desire for radical contact with *fabula*—story.

Stephen Greenblatt articulates a perhaps not entirely dissimilar desire. He laments the use of historical anecdote to explain texts (rather than to subject the text to disturbance and contingency), because, he argues, these interpretations are "the enemy of wonder."[31] He continues, "I do not want history to enable me to escape the effect of the literary but to deepen it by making it touch the effect of the real…"[32] But because his identity is entirely implicated in narrative,[33] interpretation—literary criticism—is ultimately, as Veestra puts it, a "quest for a solid foundation [for] the self." Greenblatt provides an anecdote: referring to a time when he could not help but to narrate his own every action back to himself, he writes, "I could not endure the compulsive estrangement

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[29] Frank (2013) 4.
[30] Ibid. 6.
[31] Greenblatt (1990) 5.
[32] Ibid. 5-6. Greenblatt's desire will be provide a model for my discussion of Lucius' desire in Part II.
[33] "My earliest recollections of "having an identity" or "being a self" are bound up with story-telling" (Ibid. 6).

of my own life, as if it belonged to someone else, but I could perhaps understand the uncanny otherness of my own voice, make it comprehensible and bring it under rational control by trying to understand the way in which all voices come to be woven out of strands of alien experiences."[34] It is not only storytelling, but encounter with narratives that help to reconstitute one's sense of self. Here Greenblatt describes an attempt to recognize in others' voices his own alienation, and, through that process of recognition, regain his identity. Apuleius' novel dramatizes the failed attempt "to understand the uncanny otherness of [his own[35]] voice." Both others' experiences *and his own* remain alien to him, as becomes clear in the final book. The problem of recognition, as we will see below, is for Lucius fundamentally a problem of *mis*recognition. Lucius' inability to attain social recognition becomes symbolically encapsulated by his bodily transformation.

2. Recognition in the *Hieroi Logoi* and *Metamorphoses*

In the agonistic contests that were so ubiquitous in the second century, recognition—in its various forms—was the currency to be won. In the *HL* and *Met* failed performance or the inability to perform is a central threat to the narrator's subjectivity. Here, by recognition, I refer to the symbolic or acclamatory modes by which an audience confirms the success of a performance, and thus affirms the work and personal worth of the orator. By

[34] Ibid., 8.

[35] Who the antecedent of this "his" is, is problematized by the novel itself. The prologue famously ventriloquizes a third interlocutor (the narrator and reader/audience being the first two) with the question, *quis ille*?—"who is he?"—referring back to the narrator. As we will see, the (intradiegetic) narrator Lucius is physically alienated from his own voice throughout the novel. His pendulous donkey lips literally cannot sustain the taught forms of consonants. But his repeated refusal to identify with his own story as a human being (both at Milo's home and in book 11) suggests that his alienation from his own voice is also psychological.

subjectivity, I mean, the internalization of recognition—the sense of self that arises at the moments of recognition and/or misrecognition.[36] What makes the *HL* and *Met* so unique is that they are emotional accounts of the difficulties that come with not being able to perform.

Consider, for example, Aristides' worry, expressed in the fifth speech, that he is being kept from Smyrna:

> ἀναλογιζομένῳ δέ μοι τόν τε χρόνον ὁπόσον τινὰ ἀπείην τῆς Σμύρνης, καὶ ταῦτα ψηφισμάτων ἡκόντων, καὶ ὅτι καὶ ἡλικίας ἤδη μέσως ἔχοιμι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῶν ἄνω χρόνων τὸ πλῆθος, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν, εἴ τις ἔρρωτο, ἐπελθεῖν τὰς πόλεις, καὶ ὅτι καὶ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης δόξης δέος εἴη ἀφαιρεθῆναί τι διὰ τὴν πολλὴν ἡσυχίαν, ταῦτα δὲ ἐλογιζόμην μὲ οἷα εἰκὸς ἄνθρωπον, εὖ δὲ ᾔδειν ὅτι πάντα λῆρος πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ θεῷ. ἔτι δὲ οὐδ᾽ἀπόρως εἶχον ἐμαυτῷ συνεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κέρδος αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον ἐποιούμην. (V.56)
>
> I calculated how much time I had been away from Smyrna, especially at a time when honorary decrees were coming, and that I was already middle-aged, and in addition [I considered] the many former times when it was possible, if one was healthy, to tour the cities, and that I might be deprived even of my existing reputation on account of long quietude. I considered these things, as it is likely that a man would, but I knew well that everything was foolishness in comparison to obeying the god. No longer did I find it difficult to be alone, but I considered it a profit.

This passage articulates the risks involved in not appearing, in not having an audience. Aristides is not satisfied with past successes. He is worried about the progress of time and the prospect of losing his reputation (δόξα). He must travel and he must, again and again, present himself. Without public recognition, his reputation threatens to fade.

The last phrase in the quote above constitutes the sort of reorientation of priorities that define the work of the *Hieroi Logoi* as a whole (and especially the second oration,

[36] In their discussion of subjectivity, Holland and Leander (2004) talk of the "sense of self and self-world relations" (127). Both of these texts are concerned with redefining "self-world relations" by exploring a previous self that was unable to access its own agency.

which I treat in detail in Part I). Aristides submits to the god for the sake, not only of his health, but of his career. This means learning to be recognized by an authority (the divine) other than the public. In one dream, Aristides is with a group of fellow worshippers at the temple of Asclepius. The cult statue is three-headed and ablaze. The statue seems to indicate to the worshipers to leave. They all turn to go, but Aristides is "told" to stay. Aristides exclaims, "The one!" And the god replies, "It is you." Here we see the dynamics of interpersonal recognition at play at the level of the divine. Aristides is seemingly recognized by a higher authority, but it is a private scene—both within his dream (it occurs after everyone has left) and *as* a dream.[37]

The orations that comprise the *HL* make public his hitherto private recognition by the divine. In order to transfer the god's signs to the public sphere, Aristides' audience must recognize those signs as indications of divine favor. To assert as much himself would be hubristic, but it would also cut off the audience from the exchange. In the *HL*, then, it is only in the reported speech of another orator that any "sense" is made of his illness: "[Pardalas] dared to say to me that he believed that I had become ill through some divine good fortune, so that by my association with the god, I might make this improvement [in oratory]" (IV.27). In orations written after the *Hieroi Logoi,* Aristides will himself assert the very same. But first, it seems, he must transform divine favor into public acclaim.

Like the *HL*, Lucius in Apuleius' *Met* is concerned with fame. He seeks glory and hopes that his experiences will be chronicled in book form. Moreover, it is an experience of profound *misrecognition* that motivates his pusuit of magical transformation. At the Risus festival, Lucius gives a wonderful defense speech, but later

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[37] The episode will be discussed at greater length in Part I, Section 6.

finds that he has mustered it under false pretenses. His speech is highly successful according to the audience, but for Lucius it is a devastating *personal* humiliation. He gains social recognition not only with verbal accolade (for example, by the magistrates who run up to him after the speech and promise him fame), but also with the promise of a statue to be produced in his likeness: *nam et patronem scripsit et ut in aere staret imago tua decrevit* (3.11). However, Lucius cannot accept these accolades because they represent a *misrecognition* of his personhood insofar as they assign to him a role in a socially constructed hierarchy (where he plays the unwitting dupe in the Festival of Laughter) that fails to account for his own needs and experiences. The operational paradox of the novel is that this misrecognition becomes the primary condition of his social reality once he achieves his fictional status as the object of magic's power—once he takes on his asinine form. Thus Lucius' transformation into an ass contains an argument structure: accurate identification is a precondition for acknowledgement and misrecognition entails a loss of identity.

When Lucius returns to human form he consents to yet another narrative imposed from the outside (at least in the interpretation I follow of the controversial final book). After undergoing a series of initiations, he is presented to a crowd in his new garb: *sic ad instar Solis exornato me et in vicem simulacri constituto, repente velis reductis, in aspectum populus errabat*—"Thus adorned in the likeness of the Sun and set up in place of a statue, when the curtains were suddenly pulled back, the people wandered about to look" (11.24). Lucius is standing next to Isis' *simulacrum* in this scene. In this way, the scene resembles one aspect of Aristides' oneiric encounter with the statue of Asclepius. Both men are accepted by divine authority via encounters with their icons. The statue is

a site for the exchange of recognition. Standing with or before the image is a way of participating in its authority. In Aristides' case, the god announces his recognition: "You are [the one]." In Lucius' case, he is compared to the sun god and takes the place of a statue. If Lucius had accepted a transformation into bronze after the Risus festival, he would have been submitting to the narrative of his own humiliation. Now, Lucius happily assumes a lapidary pose and accepts (although never explicitly) the apparently divinely authorized narrative that the priest has told. In the *Metamorphoses*, statues represent paradigms of social recognition.

Despite the seeming authorization of Lucius' social recognition, some readers remain skeptical. Niall Slater, for example, interprets Lucius' integration into the Isis statue group as his "final objectification…under the gaze of Isis."[38] Thus we feel that Lucius misunderstands the recognition granted by his social world. Such "misunderstanding" accords with Bourdieu's usage of the term (in French, *méconnaissance*), which he defines as "an alienated cognition that looks at the world through categories the world imposes, and apprehends the social world as a natural world."[39] In other words, for Bourdieu, misrecognition explains the individual's failure to understand the conditions of his own habituation. When Lucius recovers his form, he consents to the categories imposed upon him by a social order that now asserts that his trials were meant to happen—they were sanctioned by Isis in order to reform him. Now, we encounter a man with an alienated cognition; a subject with whom we identified more strongly as an alien body.

[38] Slater (1998) 46. He is more explicit about his personal reading earlier, "Aware as I am of the dangers of projecting my own reactions onto the text, I nonetheless find the pattern that transforms Lucius from a curious if over-eager explorer of his world into a virtually inanimate thing at the end less appealing than appalling" (40).
[39] (1990) 140-41, cited in McNay (2008).

3. Recognition among the Orators

Kendra Eshleman has recently argued that identity as a sophist in the second century was largely a product of recognition by fellow *pepaideumenoi*.[40] Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists* (*VS*) relates innumerable instances in which two orators meet, come recognize one another and in so doing either affirm or deny the other's claim to the occupation. With a deliberate nod both to Homer and to Aristotle, we can refer to these interactions as "recognition scenes."[41]

Consider, for example, the encounter that Philostratus describes between Marcus of Byzantium and Polemo. When Marcus shows up at Polemo's school a few pupils recognize the famous (ὀνομαστὸς ἤδη ὢν) orator. Word spreads among the crowd and when Polemo asks for a theme on which to declaim, the pupils look to Marcus. Polemo dismisses the scruffy-looking man. But the man replies, "I will propose a theme and I will declaim." After he does so, Polemo comes to a realization: ἔνθεν ἑλὼν ὁ Πολέμων καὶ ξυνιεὶς δωριάζοντος διελέχθη ἐς τὸν ἄδρα πολλά τε καὶ θαυμάσια ἐφιεὶς τῷ καιρῷ, μελετήσας δὲ καὶ μελετῶντος ἀκροασάμενος καὶ ἐθαυμάσθη καὶ ἐθαύμασεν—"From this he understood and taking note of his Doric speech, he gave a long and marvelous speech on the spur of the moment, and so he declaimed and listened to the man declaim and he

[40] Eshleman (2012).

[41] On Aristotle, see below. Odysseus' return to Ithaca is structured around a serious of well-timed recognition scenes. Odysseus was a model for the orators of the second century as a storyteller, as a traveler and seeker of wisdom, but also as a man of self-revelation. In one episode that Philostratus recounts, Dio Chrysostom quells a mutiny by stripping himself of his rags and reciting a line from the *Odyssey* (*VS,* 488).

was marveled at and marveled in turn."[42] Revelation is a recurring theme in the *VS* and in other sophistic texts. The act of revealing oneself highlights the abilities of a sophist by creating a contrast between an audience's expectations and the performer's skills. In such a way it compels recognition in a heightened form.[43] This anecdote ends with the satisfaction of mutual recognition, which is traceable in the root *thauma*: admiration is exchanged and becomes an indication of in-group acceptance and by extension of worthiness of the orator's inclusion in his work.

Polemo is an apt case study for unpacking these dynamics of recognition. Polemo, it seems, was not a particularly humble man. "He was so haughty," Philostratus writes, "that he spoke to cities from a position of superiority, to Emperors as if he were not inferior, to gods from a position of equality."[44] Philostratus offers this proof: when reciting to an Athenian audience, he did not present *encomia* to the city, nor did he talk about his own reputation, "although such modes profit sophists in *epideixis*" (καίτοι καὶ τῆς τοιᾶσδε ἰδέας ὠφελούσης τοὺς σοφιστὰς ἐν ταῖς ἐπιδείξεσιν).[45] Instead, Polemo said, "They say that you, Athenians, are wise listeners of speeches. I will see." Polemo has reached such a pitch of excellence that it is not for even the Athenians to judge him, but rather for him to judge the Athenians on how they judge him.[46]

Philostratus continues his synopsis of Polemo by citing Herodes' letters. Herodes writes that he listened to Polemo's first speech as a jurist, his second as a lover and the third as an admirer (ἀκροᾶσθαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν μὲν πρώτην, ὡς οἱ δικάζοντες, τὴν δὲ

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[42] *VS* 529.
[43] The model for such recognition is Odysseus—a special hero for Greek elites living under the Roman Empire, some of whom may have felt estranged from their rightful status.
[44] *VS* 535; translation my own.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Eshleman (2012) 72.

ἐφεξῆς, ὡς οἱ ἐρῶντες, τὴν τρίτην, ὡς οἱ θαυμάζοντες).[47] When Herodes is later himself praised, he deflects: "Read the declamation of Polemos and you will recognize and know a man" ("τὴν Πολέμωνος μελέτην ἀνάγνωτε καὶ εἴσεσθε ἄνδρα).[48] When Herodes is acclaimed as the equal of Demosthenes, he counters that he would prefer to be Polemo's equal.

These scenes are not unlike Aristotle's discussion of recognition in tragedy.[49] Recognition scenes involve cognitive processes (the decipherment of signs and (self-) representations); they reveal identities and reconfigure relationships; they have repercussions for one's wellbeing, leading either to success (εὐτυχία) or failure ("bad luck," δυστυχία). These were men who not only performed as a Demosthenes or Odysseus in *meletai*, but who figured their lives as dramas of self-revelation.[50]

4. The Body in Performance

In contexts in which performance is a major site of self-fashioning, the body is not only medium, it is message. Among educated elites living in the second century CE under the Roman Empire, this was very much the case. As Maud Gleason has demonstrated, "rhetoric was a calisthenics of manhood;" in other words,

> the art of self-presentation through rhetoric entailed much more than mastery of words: physical control of one's voice, carriage, facial expression, and gesture, control of one's emotions under conditions of competitive stress—in a word, all the arts of deportment necessary in a face-to-face society where one's adequacy as a man was always under suspicion and one's performance was constantly being judged.[51]

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[47] Ibid., 538.
[48] Ibid., 539. Note the gendered nature of his recognition.
[49] Arist. *Poet.*1452a-1452b, 1454b-1455a.
[50] For theatricality in the second sophistic as a form of "micro-resistance," see Connolly (2001).
[51] Gleason (1995) xxii.

Performances demonstrated one's *paideia*—education—and as such failure was particularly risky. Failure in performance was not contained to the immediate context. As we saw in the previous section, it extended to one's identity as an orator and as a man.

In his work on failure in performance, Edward Schieffelin explains that success is a function of risk: "Successful mastery of the risks of performing is a necessary condition for the creation of performative authority."[52] Authority is indispensable for the successful performer: "The assertion of a domain of authority is…an inherent condition for any performance if it is to work and be at all effective."[53] And while performance is limited by time and place, the performative authority generated within the event itself often extends beyond those limits. This transferable quality is what performance theorists call "emergence." According to Schieffelin, emergence "refers to an irreducible change in the quality of experience or situation of the participants that comes about when the performance 'works'."[54] Schieffelin does not use the term recognition. But if we grant agency to the audience,[55] recognition fits well into this scheme. Authority must be recognized. The ability of authority to extend outside of the performance, Schieffelin, explains, allows for "performances [to] become politically potent or socially creative."[56] In the second century, oratory imbued its practitioners with personal authority, led to leadership roles in city-states and promised lasting glory and fame. Recognition can helpfully explain the mechanism that transforms a successful performance into tangible accolades that perpetuate an orator's reputation.

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[52] Schieffelin 1996, 64.
[53] Ibid., 80.
[54] Ibid., 64.
[55] Cf. Plut. *de Auditu*.
[56] Ibid., 81.

One particularly important and tangible form of recognition was the erection of a statue in the orator's honor. As we have seen, statues featured in both the *Hieroi Logoi* and the *Metamorphoses*. In both works, statues actively mediate the relationship between the narrator and his god(dess). Statues endow their subjects—Aristides and Lucius—with a sense that their experience has been meaningful. This is not just a byproduct of the ubiquity of sculpture; it is a product of the semiotics of self-presentation in the second century. Statuary represented the ideal of an orator's self-presentation. It represented the ephemeral event of performance at its least contingent—at least ideally.

In fact, statues were not stable signs of the orator they were meant to represent. In what follows, I will discuss two speeches that attempts to correct this instability—an instability which troublingly reduplicates the body's own contingency. First, I analyze two speeches that attempt to regulate the tradition of honoring orators with statues: Dio Chrysostom's *31st Discourse* and Favorinus' *Corinthian Oration*. Then, I will analyze the discourse about illnesses or physical debilitation. In both cases, the speech restores, or attempts to restore, a rupture or threat to the orator's immanent presence. The previously ill body and the statue are referents that compel an audience's recognition of (ideally) transcendent presence of the orator.

Statues stood in for their absent referent. And not only that: ideally they continued to hold sway over the people who looked upon it. Orators drew students to the city where they worked. Philostratus repeatedly reports that a given sophist has attracted young followers from afar. Of Herodes he writes that: "youths from all parts of the world hung on his lips, and they flocked to Athens in their desire to hear his eloquence;"[57] of Heracleides, "Now the fact that the youth of Ionia, Lydia, Phrygia, and Caria flocked to

[57] Philostr. *VS* 162.

Ionia to study with him is not so wonderful, seeing that Smyrna is next door to all these countries, but he attracted thither the Hellenes from Europe, he attracted the youth of the Orient, and he attracted many from Egypt who had already heard him, because in Egypt he had contended for the prize of learning against Ptolemy of Naucratis."[58] But an orator could only be in so many places at once. As we will see, Dio Chrysostom imagines statues as inspiring young students of rhetoric in their referent's absence.[59]

Dio Chrysostom's 31st Discourse is supremely concerned with rectifying a compromised economy of honor-giving. Men, he explains, "require crowns, images, the rights of precedence, and being kept in remembrance." Furthermore, men have "given up their lives just in order that they might get a statue and have their name announced by the herald or receive some other honor and leave to succeeding generations a fair name and remembrance of themselves." He considers recognition and remembrance not as a byproduct of courageous action, but as its primary goal. He begs his audience to consider whether they think so many men would have acted so bravely if there were no such honors bestowed.[60] He sums up,

> πλὴν ἐκεῖνό γε δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι μήτε ὑμεῖς μήτε ἄλλοι τινές, οἳ δοκοῦσιν Ἑλλήνων ἢ βαρβάρων μεγάλοι γενέσθαι, δι' ἄλλο τι προῆλθον εἰς δόξαν καὶ δύναμιν ἢ τῶν κατὰ μέρος φιλοτίμων τυχόντες καὶ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ ζῆν ἡγουμένων τὴν ὕστερον εὐφημίαν. ἡ γὰρ στήλη καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα καὶ τὸ χαλκοῦν ἑστάναι μέγα δοκεῖ τοῖς γενναίος ἀνδράσι, καὶ μισθὸς οὗτος ἄξιος τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ μὴ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἀνῃρῆσθαι τὸ ὄνομα μηδ' εἰς ἴσονκαταστῆωαι τοῖς μὴ γενομένοις, ἀλλὰ ἴχνος τι λιπέσθαι καὶ σημεῖον, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, τῆς ἀνδραγαθίας. (20)

…this much is clear, that neither you nor any others…advanced to glory

[58] Ibid., 613.

[59] They had the potential, then, to work on people as religious statues did. As Jas Elsner (1996) has argued, the "represented is not just in the image, the represented *is* the image" 529.

[60] Cf. *VS* 589, where Philostratus clarifies, "by grant (*dōrea*) I mean the right to dine at the expense of the state, immunity from taxes (*ateleia*) priestly offices and all else that sheds luster on men; and by gifts I mean gold and silver, horses, slaves and all the outwards signs of wealth with which he lavishly endowed not only Hadrian but his family also, one and all."

> and power for any other reason than because fortune gave to each in succession men who were jealous of honour and regarded their fame in after times as more precious than life. For the pillar, the inscription, and being set up in bronze are regarded as a high honour by noble men, and they deem it a reward worthy of their virtue not to have their name destroyed along with their body and to be brought level with those who have never lived at all, but rather to leave an imprint and a token, so to speak, of their manly prowess. (20)

Why risk your wellbeing if you will end up nameless and bodiless like everyone else? Dio calls the erection of a statue the greatest honor a city can give (22) and his concern in the oration is a breach in the honorific economy. The permanence which the statues index is being erased with flagrant abandon. Old statues are being appropriated for new dedicatee; the names of old men etched under the bodies of the young. Honors risk being meaningless. When the fame of individuals dies, the chances increase that the currency itself will die and then people will stop acting nobly altogether.[61]

Dio Chrysostom was not alone in his concern. The consensus is now that his 37th oration was written by his student Favorinus. Favorinus makes explicit reference to the practice of reinscribing statues, but his main goal is to defend himself against the dismantling of *his own* statue at Corinth. Thus whereas Chrysostom sets up his speech as a lesson for the Rhodians' moral improvement,[62] Favorinus' performance has the pragmatic goal of his statue's reinstatement.

Favorinus begins by listing the legendary figures whom the Corinthians declined to honor with an honorific in stone. In contrast:

> Ἡμᾶς δὲ δὶς ἐπιδημήσαντας οὕτως ἀσμένως ἐπείδετε ὥστε μάλιστα μὲν ἐπειρᾶσθε κατέχειν, ὁρῶντες δὲ ἀδύνατον ὄν, ἀλλά γε τὴν εἰκὼ τοῦ σώματος ἐποιήσασθε καὶ ταύτην φέροντες ἀνεθήκατε εἰς τὰ βιβλία, εἰς προεδρίαν, οὗ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ᾤεσθε τοὺς νέους προκαλέσασθαι τῶν αὐτῶν

[61] For Greeks under the Roman Empire this might ultimately mean the destruction of their culture at large.
[62] Although Favorinus also makes the case that the preservation of honors granted benefits the city (37).

> ἡμῖν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἔχεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἕνα τῶν πολλῶν καὶ κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν καταιρόντων εἰς Κεγχρεὰς ἔμπορον ἢ θεωρὸν ἢ πρεσβευτὴν ἢ διερχόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς μόλις διὰ μακρῶν χρόνων ἀγαπητὸν ἐπιφαινόμενον, οὕτως ἐτιμήσατε. (8)
>
> …[I]n my own case, upon my second visit to Corinth you were so glad to see me that you did your best to get me to stay with you, but seeing that to be impossible, you did have a likeness made of my body…and set it up in your library…where you felt it would most effectively stimulate the youth to persevere in the same pursuits as myself. For you accorded me this honor, not as one of the many who each year put in at Cenchreae…but as to a cherished friend, who at last, after a long absence, puts in an appearance.[63]

Here Favorinus echoes the pragmatic function that Dio posited. His statue represents the culmination of his efforts (and sacrifices) not only to "seem Greek but to be Greek" (25). The statue is a stand-in for his permanent residency and for the effects that such a presence would have on the citizen body, for he inspires not only Greeks to pursue *philosophia* but also barbarians (27). The ideal system as posited here is self-perpetuating: the effectiveness of his living exemplum of Greekness is worthy to be cast in bronze so that he can serve as a permanent model. The onlooker encounters the statue, remembers the man and seeks to emulate him. His presence is persistent.

He goes on to explain that statues are sacrosanct (28). He insists that by taking down his statue the Corinthians are despicably reversing the proper economy of honors: "What answer will you give to those who demand of you the reason why the honors in your city are mortal but the dishonors immortal?" (30). But then, towards the end of the speech, Favorinus seems to concede that in fact, there is no immortality, even in sculpture: Although "erected as if to last forever, still they perish by this fate or that" (37). He describes the kinds of perversions statues undergo and then bids farewell to the

[63] Trans. modified.

derivative arts—to the work of Daedalus, Prometheus. He then takes the argument a step further and suggests that the body itself is foreign to the soul (44).[64] Thus all materiality is summarily rejected.

But then, in his final rhetorical move, recalling his characterization of the statue as beloved of the city (ἀγαπητόν), he proclaims that he cannot abandon a friend. The statue is restored as a potential intermediary between him and the city. He addresses his own statue as a sentient being (βούλομαι οὖν αὐτὸν ὡς αἰσθανόμενον παραμυθήσασθαι (47)). Then, he ends the oration with an enigmatic image:

> ἐγώ σε ἀναστήσω παρὰ τῇ θεῷ, ὅθεν οὐδείς σε μὴ καθέλῃ, οὐ σεισμός, οὐκ ἄνεμος, οὐ νιφετός, οὐκ ὄμβρος, οὐ φθόνος, οὐκ ἐχθρός, ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν σε καταλαμβάνω ἑστηκότα. λάθα μὲν γὰρ ἤδη τινὰς καὶ ἑτέρους ἔσφηλε καὶ ἐψεύσατο, γνώμη δ’ ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα, ᾗ κατ’ἄνδρα μοι ὀρθὸς ἕστηκας.
>
> I will set you up by the god, where nothing will take you down, not an earthquake, not wind, not snow, not rain, not envy or hatred, but even now I find you standing. Forgetfulness has already tripped up and fooled some others, but judgment fools no good man, by which you stand upright for me, like a man.

Jason König explains, “His response, struggling against [the statue’s] impermanence and mortality, is to assert an unchanged essence of himself which can survive beyond the destruction of his physical image, and in illustration of this he concludes the speech by summoning his statue back from the dead with an imaginary description of its reappearance.”[65] But I suggest that Favorinus does more than summon the statue—he subsumes it. At first he relegates the action to the future (ἀναστήσω) and beyond the here and now of the speech. But then, abruptly, that future is upon us: ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν σε

[64] καίτοι καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῶν γενναίων φασὶν ἀλλότριον εἶναι (44)
[65] König (2001) 166.

καταλαμβάνω ἑστηκότα. The statue is standing. And so are men with good judgment—the mark of an audience who is playing their actively discerning role well. They see that the statue stands upright, like a man. With the placement of μοι in the phrase κατ' ἄνδρα μοι ὀρθός, Favorinus inserts himself between the manliness and the erectness of the statue. He is more than just the "interested" party. He is the possessor of this manhood. He embodies this uprightness. We might imagine that Favorinus, with these last words, would have stood particularly straight, chest out—perhaps he would have adopted the precise posture of the dismantled statue. He has subsumed the derivative image of himself, back into himself, both transcending and embodying its materiality.

And he has done so by explicitly describing and thus eliciting the audience's recognition with the γνώμη clause: "but judgment (γνώμη) fools no good man." Without that recognition, his promise to his statue fails and so does his speech.

The mere fact that performances regulating honors were needed demonstrates the diachronic nature of the risks of performance. Just as Aristides feared that his inability to perform would lead to the withering of his fame, Favorinus was compelled to return to Corinth to safeguard his reputation. Any sense of finality was elusive. The orator had to *re*-forge a connection between his work and image in order to ensure the persistence of his reputation.[66] The effort was not only concerned with preserving his own fame, but with preserving Greek culture broadly-speaking, as we saw in Dio's speech. As Maud Gleason writes, "A successful extempore performer was worshiped as an epiphany of the collective past, Hellenic culture made to live again with every re-creation" (53). What makes Favorinus' speech so powerful is not his case for his statue's restitution, but the

[66] A young student who knew nothing of Polemo and saw his statue would likely not be moved by the image. A young man who had taken Herodes' advice and read Polemo's speech and then stepped in front of a statue of the orator might very well have felt the man's words immanent in the likeness.

way that he performatively replaces the statue with his presence. He replaces his statuary replacement. He becomes the very quiddity that imbues sculpture with the essence of what it represents. Gleason calls this process of "elevating his statue by means of words alone" transcendental.[67] Transcendence is here attained through the reanimation of a material whose signification had been erased.

In what follows, I posit an analogy between the way the ailing body and the memorialized body operate in speeches. Both "materialities" require the animation of the speaker. What makes this "animation" work is the audience's own ability to participate in the creative act of recognition. Thus, in these speeches, the orator points to a version of himself outside of the given moment in order to highlight the *hic-et-nunc* of his performance—of his immanent presence. In other words, narratives of the previous self highlight the present self. Very often the self to which the orator points is in some way broken or incapacitated. It is left to the audience to make a judgment about the degree of contrast between the described self and the present self. An exceptional performance would surely have made the contrast self-evident.

In the speeches discussed above, Dio and Favorinus defend the practice of making images in a model orator's likeness. Interestingly, in a speech of thanksgiving to the Carthaginian senate for approving the erection of a statue in his honor, Apuleius begins with a narrative account of a broken ankle and subsequent fever. The first words of his oration address his absence when the erection of the statue was voted upon: "Before I begin, chief citizens of Africa, to thank you for the statue which you honorably proposed for me in my presence and which you kindly decided on in my absence, I wish to explain

[67] Gleason (1995) 167.

the reason why I have not appeared in this hall for quite a few days…"[68] He continues with a story about the playwright Philemon who had to curtail a reading because of rain and promised to return the next day. When he failed to turn up before his eager audience a few members thereof went to check on him and found that he had died in a studious pose with his text open. As the messengers reported to the audience, while "he was expected to finish his fictitious plot at the theater, [he] had concluded the real story at home" (16.17). Apuleius goes on to illustrate how Philemon's story was similar to his own: his recitation was also interrupted by the rain, and he also promised to return the next day. But that same day he twisted his ankle so badly that he "almost sundered the joint from the leg;" he realigned it himself; but the pain caused a spasm and sweating; "next" he continues, "an acute pain of the intestines began, which eased off just before it finished me off with its virulence and forced me, like Philemon, to be dead before I had read, to meet my death before my deadline, to come to my end rather than the end of my story" (21).

In an interesting inversion of Favorinus' tactics, it is precisely when he is being honored that Apuleius narrates his bodily failure. As it turns out, the narrative gives Apuleius' audience a central role in his presence: "I came to you to deliver what I promised, while in the mean time you not only took away my disability by your kindness, but even gave me agility as well" (24). Here, Apuleius creates a meaningful narrative chronology: he was sick, a statue was voted for in his honor, he was healed and was able to appear and perform a speech of thanksgiving. Recognition by the audience heals the orator and allows him to answer this acknowledgement with his presence. By witnessing his resurgence the audience makes him whole again. Just as the audience is responsible

[68] *Florida*, 16, trans., Hilton.

for his immortalization, it is also responsible for his physical well-being.

The idea that oratory heals occurs again and again in the second sophistic and is especially important to Aelius Aristides, as will become clear in Part I. Specifically, oratory represents a process of reembodiment. Just as physical therapists learn to frame recuperative exercises in terms of narrative in order to invest the patient in their therapy, similarly, talking about the incapacitated body was a way to create a therapeutic relationship between orator and audience. This framing operates on the analogy between honor and health, status and wellbeing.

The analogy is operative not only in oratory, but in other contexts as well, for example, exchanges between student and teacher. In these contexts, recognition bestowed on the student by the teacher, becomes a mode of self-recognition[69] as the student embodies the master's teachings. Consider the letters between Fronto and Marcus Aurelius. The ideal of the paideutic relationship was (if their pining is any indication) co-presence;[70] the letters record their separation. They record and construct the fragmentation of this ideal. They articulate this fragmentation through discourse on their bodily incapacitation. Their bodily health is mutually constitutive. Fronto, for one, insists that his wellness is contingent on Marcus Aurelius' *eloquentia*. In other words, he is well to the extent that his teachings are fully embodied by his pupil.[71] Thus the one

[69] These assertions were not a special feature of this very special correspondence. Seneca, for example, writes, "I claim you for myself; you are my handiwork" (*adsero te mihi; meum opus es*) (*Ep*., 34).
[70] Marcus Aurelius, for example, signs off with the following prayer for Fronto to the gods in one letter: *valeat semper integro inlibato incolumi corpore: valeat et mecum esse possit* ("let him be well always with whole, unimpaired, sound body: let him be well and able to be with me") (*Ad M* i.2)
[71] Again, cf. Seneca. Letter 35 is particularly relevant here. It begins: *cum te tam valde rogo, ut studeas, meum negotium ago. habere te amicum volo, quod contingere mihi, nisi pergis ut coepisti excolere te, non potest.* He explains that they cannot yet be friends because he has not yet perfected himself. *Ego quidem percipio iam fructum, cum mihi fingo uno nos animo futuros et quicquid aetati meae vigoris abscessit, id ad me ex tua, quamquam non multum abest, rediturum. Sed tamen re quoque ipsa esse laetus volo. Venit ad nos ex iis, quos amamus, etiam absentibus gaudium, sed id leve et evanidum ; conspectus et praesentia et*

feels the other's body. As Yasuko Taoka suggests, the culmination of the felt body of the other is accomplished through oratory: "Fronto inhabits Marcus' body and uses his appendages as his own: 'you lent me your visage, your voice, your gestures and above all your mind.'" (427). Taoka argues that their correspondence is built around a metaphor in which the one *is* the other. They become more whole individually through a unified identity. The pains that they share with one another build a bond through which they feel greater than their isolated selves.

The "oneness" of the two only exists on the page. It is only by recording the body's gauging of their separation that their oneness can be expressed and felt. Their mutual co-constitution in these letters is a form of transcendence (registered in the elation expressed at receiving one another's words) that approximates the ideal of performance—an ideal which compels Trajan to tell Dio, "I do not know what you are saying, but I love you as myself" (τί μὲν λέγεις, οὐκ οἶδα, φιλῶ δέ σε ὡς ἐμαυτόν) (488).[72]

5. Fragmentation in the *Hieroi Logoi* and *Metamorphoses*

I have tried to demonstrate the role that recognition plays in the poetics of oratory in the second century. Contemporary theories about the importance of narrative in constituting the self led me to consider the particular strategies orators used to solicit recognition in the development of their narratives in a performance contexts. I argued that references to the physical manifestations of the orators—their bodies or statues of their likeness—

conversatio habet aliquid vivae voluptatis, utique si non tantum quem velis, sed qualem velis, videas. Seneca articulates the ideal of co-presence. But this is an impossibility: not because of their physical distance, but because of their distance in terms of moral development. Imagining Lucilius as being "of one mind" in the future, profits Seneca. It is not only a solace, it will return his strength to him. The relationship with another, therefore, rejuvenates Seneca.

[72] Philostr. *VS*, 488.

would have effectively solicited such recognition.

If we keep in mind the centrality of recognition in effective oratory, then the *HL* and *Met* not only record the failure to achieve ideal recognition, they actively resist it. The texts' speakers narrate from within the experience of having a body that is beyond their control, from within the experience of not being able to narrate "themselves" synchronously. The texts thus dramatize the inability of their narrators to inhabit narrative time and the time of narrative performance,[73] the ideal of self-presentation for orators of the second century. In both cases writing—text—stands in for the inability of the experiencing-I to capture his experience in words.

In the *HL*, as we will see in Part I, Aristides' effort to reintegrate his body into the bodily work of oratorical performance begins with a transcript of the journals he kept during his illness. But even when he breaks free from the transcript in the second oration, the narrative remains disjointed, paratactic and repetitious—although in differently so. These formal aspects are iconic of his experience in the sense that they resemble his illness and the therapies he employed against it.[74] But they are also performative. The disjunctures create spaces within his performance for the god himself to emerge as a presence. Aristides resists the paradigm of ideal performance explored above in order to suspend time and reenter the time of healing. He can only embody the authoritative orator once the god becomes an externalized authority. This will take the duration of the orations.[75]

The *Metamorphoses*, which I take up in Part II, presents a more complex case. First of

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[73] Crapanzano 1981,134.
[74] Korenjak (2005).
[75] The sixth oration is lost but for the opening sentences. As Behr writes, "The loss is a pity, since it is apparent from the opening dream that in this *Tale* Aristides would have given an account of his great oratorical triumphs between the years 155-165 A.D." (1981, 445). See, Downie (2013) 46.

all, whereas the *HL* is performative and autobiographical, the *Met* is a fiction that *dramatizes* the struggle for recognition. In the *Met*, the body becomes a trope through which Apuleius thematizes the quest for an integral self. Ultimately, he fails to achieve this goal. Instead of integrating, stories *replace*, or play an agonistic role with the subject. Lucius' goal is to achieve the recognition that produces immortality—he wants to become a *fabula* (story). He wants direct contact with this transcendent principle. But his strategy to achieve trascendence—to pursue magic—is misguided. Instead of becoming a *fabula*, he becomes no more than the vessel for immortalizing the *fabulae* of others.

Lucius' experience is the triumph of contingency. The body's contingency replicates at the level of his experience of story, which depends on the randomness of his masters' lives and interests. He loses his ability to transform his passive experience as the object of fate into his own active narrative. This occurs, at first, in a straightforward way. Without speech to integrate his self into an external social structure, his mind is contained in his body. Lucius can comment to his readers about what he has seen, but he cannot dialogically influence or participate in his immediate social surroundings. Thus his encounters preclude the possibility for recognition.

In the *Metamorphoses* the ideal of communion with one's audience, or with the divine is impossible. Instead, Apuleius demonstrates that communion can only be obtained in the discursive relationship between speaker and listener. I will discuss this in greater detail in Part II, but I will summarize briefly what I mean here. Lucius' body precludes his masters from recognizing him as a human. In the final scene of the novel, we are precluded from sharing in his exaltation by the suspicious image of a bald man

walking the streets of Rome. If we return to prologue,[76] we see that the narrator has warned us not to spurn the Egyptian papyrus on which we read. In each of these cases, the body—text, hide, human skin—fails to give us access to whatever it contains; it fails to mediate. Instead it hides what it holds.

And yet, the prologue does offer another kind of communion. *at ego tibi* are, after all, the opening words of the novel. The reader is placed in the moment of storytelling and the reader will respond to the telling: *ut mireris* and *laetaberis*. Ahuvia Kahane refers to this communion as a "real relationship" and a "little game [which] offers us a 'real-life'."[77] In other words, as long as there is a reader or listener, that person is actually encountering another voice—the voice of the speaker. Finally, the only moment of recognition available to the reader regarding the personage whom she has been following is the flickering *sphragis* Apuleius offers us at the end of his novel when the priest is told that a man from Madauros will come to him. One the the few biographical details Lucius tell us is that he is from Corinth. Apuleius, however, hails from Madauros.

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Previous scholarship treating Aristides' and Apuleius' texts together has focused on the aspects of religious devotion and conversion. Scholars of religion like André-Jean Festugière and Ramsay MacMullen include these texts as rare instances of the narration of religious experience and conversion by non-Christians.[78] Charles Gray Weiss

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[76] Cf. Laird (2001) who suggests that we read the Prologue as a conclusion. He argues that the novel has a ring composition structure and that if we return to the prologue after reading the book through, "the prologue overtly demonstrates to the reader the mysterious communion of the worshipper with his god" (281). I argue that this similarity actively conceals the communion.
[77] Kahane (1996) 87.
[78] Festugière (1960); MacMullen (1981).

compares the two as representations of religious conversion written with Marcus Aurelius in mind and even suggests that Apuleius was imitating Aristides' account.[79] Stephen Harrison makes the stronger assertion that Apuleius is parodying Aristides.[80] I start from a different observation: both texts narrate from within an incapacitated body. I have suggested that we might understand their respective struggles in terms of an inability to attain social recognition. Recognition was the prerequisite for the immortality that fame could offer.

[79] Weiss (1998) 164.
[80] Harrison (2013).

Part One: Illness and Divine Authority in Aelius Aristides' *Hieroi Logoi*

1. Introduction

Aelius Aristides' series of orations documenting his illness and concomitant submission to the god of healing, Asclepius, [81] make for a strange and disorienting reading experience. Aristides opens the *Hieroi Logoi* (*HL*) with a dense prologue, beginning, appropriately, with Homer:

> Δοκῶ μοι κατὰ τὴν Ἑλένην τὴν Ὁμήρου τὸν λόγον ποιήσεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἐκ είνη πάντας μὲν οὐκ ἄν φησιν εἰπεῖν ὅσσοι Ὀδυσσῆος ταλασίφρονός εἰσιν ἄελθοι...κἀγὼ πάντα μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι τὰ τοῦ σωτήρος ἀγωνίσματα, ὅσων ἀπέλαυσα εἰς τήνδε τὴν ἡμέραν. καὶ οὐκέτ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου προσθήσω, Οὐδ' εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ' εἶεν· μικρὸν γὰρ τοῦτό γε. (I.1)
>
> I think it appropriate to compose a *logos* in the style of Homer's Helen. For she says that she would not recount all 'the contests of stout-hearted Odysseus'… And I myself would not recount all the exhibition pieces of the Savior (τὰ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἀγωνίσματα), as many as I have enjoyed to this day. Nor shall I add that Homeric phrase, 'not if I had ten tongues, ten mouths'. For this were too little…[82]

He then shifts from the epic register to his immediate social environment[83]:

> I have never been persuaded by any of my friends, whoever…encouraged me to speak (εἰπεῖν) or write (συγγράψαι) about these things, and so I have avoided the impossible (φεύγων τὸ ἀδύνατον). (2)

[81] Asclepius was an especially important deity in the second century when the orator lived. On Asclepius' importance: Edelstein & Edelstein (1945) 108-111 and 251-255, Bowersock (1969) 70-71, Nutton (2004). Aristides was born in 117 CE. No speeches can be dated after 180. The testimony from the ancient world is not as ambivalent about the orations as moderns scholars have been. The *HL* are praised by Philostratus in his *Lives* (581-2) as "excellent teachers of how to speak well about anything" (αἱ δὲ ἐφημερίδες ἀγαθαὶ διδάσκαλοι τοῦ περὶ παντὸς εὖ διαλέγεσθα); see Jones (2008) for the praise of a contemporary sophist, Phrynichos. Libanius (fourth century CE) calls Aristides his teacher (*Ep*. 310.3). There is disagreement about whether the *Hieroi Logoi* provided a model or at least influences Libanius' *Autobiography*. See Cribiore (2008) 268-271 with bibliography.
[82] All translations are adapted from Behr (1973).
[83] Aristides' audience has been a matter of dispute, but I agree with Quet (1993) that the audience, or at least, the audience "in mind" was comprised of Aristides' fellow worshipers and friends.

He employs an extended metaphor explaining his difficulty recording his experience.

> For it seemed to me to be the same as if after swimming through the whole sea under water (ἐδόκει γάρ μοι παραπλήσιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πελάγους ὕφαλος διεξελθών), I should then be compelled to produce an account (εἶτ' ἠναγκαζόμην ἀποδιδόναι λόγον) of the total number of the waves which I encountered, and how I found the sea at each of them, and what it was that saved me. (2)

In the face of this impossibility, he hands the work of narrating to a third presence (τις παρών).

> For each of our days, as well as our nights, has a story, if someone, being present (τις παρών), wished either to record the events or to narrate the providence of the god (τὰ συμπίπτοντα ἀπογράφειν ἐβούλετο, ἢ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν διηγεῖσθαι) …

But even as he focalizes his experience through the eyes of the anonymous τις—a more objective observer, perhaps—the perspective fails.

> ὧν τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ παρὼν, τὰ δὲ τῇ πομπῇ τῶν ἐνυπνίων ἐνεδείκνυτο, ὅσα γε δὴ καὶ ὕπνου λαχεῖν ἐξῆν· σπάνιον δ' ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τρικυμιῶν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐνθυμούμενος ἐγνώκειν παρέχειν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ τῷ θεῷ σιγῇ ποιεῖν ὅ τι βούλεται.
>
> …wherein sometimes he showed himself openly present and at others by the sending of dreams, in so far as it was possible to obtain sleep; but this was rare, due to the triple waves around the body. In view of this, I decided to submit to the god, truly as to a doctor, and to do in silence whatever he wishes.

The objective perspective devolves quickly back into his own (ὅσα γε δὴ καὶ ὕπνου λαχεῖν ἐξῆν). Aristides is drawn back into the experience of physical turmoil (σπάνιον δ' ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τρικυμιῶν), and the overwhelming nature of these hardships, his inability to maintain the perspective of one standing on the outside looking in, leads him to give his case over to the god (παρέχειν… τῷ θεῷ). The attempt to address the

body's pain results in narrative failure. Thus while he submits to the divine in order to heal, his submission also entails relinquishing narrative authority of the experience.

Instead of his own authorizing voice, Aristides relies on certain powerful metaphorical paradigms to create narrative structure.[84] Already in the prologue a central metaphorical field is activated: the sea.[85] The sea connects each thought, but it also refracts his experience. In the first image, Aristides likens himself to Helen speaking of Odysseus, the heroically suffering seafarer. But then, the sea becomes a metaphor for his qualitative experience: he is immersed in an overabundance of sensory data, which he must simultaneously relate. He is at the same time Odysseus under the waves, and Odysseus describing them. Finally, the sea turns into a traditional metaphor describing, not the challenges of narration, but his pain: he often had no access to the god's oneiric epiphanies, because the triple waves around his body (τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τρικυμιῶν) kept him from sleeping.

The sea is a container, a conveyer, and an unpredictable threat. It is uniform and unitary, but it also encompasses an almost infinite number of disparate experiences. It is, perhaps, the embodiment of time, and Aristides cannot place himself stably within what has no definition, outside of what surrounds him. The act of narration is, here, at the mercy of his experience. But as I will argue below, once the metaphor is internalized, it also clears a path for healing.

The prologue comes abruptly to an end as Aristides introduces his first topic: "But

[84] For Aristides' use of the body metaphors in landscape description and in terms of the "body politic" see Petsalis-Diomides (2008) 139, 144.

[85] I use "the sea paradigm" to refer to tropes involving the sea itself and its most prominent sailor, Odysseus. The prologue has already made it clear that the two figures were intertwined in Aristides' mind. For the importance generally of Odysseus in the second sophistic, see Anderson (1993) 75-77. For Favorinus' use of Odysseus, see Gleason (1995) 145-158. See Whitmarsh on the "exile" literature of the second sophistic and the use of Odysseus as a figure of self-fashioning in Favorinus and Dio Chrysostom (2001) 162-200.

now I wish to show you the condition of my abdomen" (νῦν δὲ ὡς ἔσχε τὸ τοῦ ἤτρου δηλῶσαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς βούλομαι) (1.1). The majority of the rest of the oration reads like a dream journal. It takes a formulaic structure: date + form of δοκέω ("I seem," or, "I dream") + narrative. After recounting a dream he records that day's therapy in the briefest of terms, for example, "no bathing" (ἀλουσία), "vomiting" (ἔμετος), "fasting" (ἀσιτία). It is only once we have read (or heard) the second oration, that we will learn that this section represents the journal entries, which he claims to have kept in accordance with Asclepius' bidding.

The first dreams establish Aristides' body as a semantic field for the exposition of divine meanings. "I was in the warm bath. Bending forward I saw that the lower part of my stomach was in a rather strange state" (1.8). In the contained space of the bath, he sees his body as a doctor would—the experience is disembodied. After the dream, he explains, "I bathed at evening and at dawn I had pains in my abdomen, and the pain spread over the right side and down to the groin" (1.8). He continues, "On the seventeenth no bathing after a dream, and on the eighteenth no bathing." On the nineteenth he dreams that some barbarians overpower him (τινας τῶν βαρβάρων ἐγκρατεῖς γεγενῆσθαί μου), insert a finger in his mouth and pour something down his throat "according to some native custom" (κατὰ δή τινα ἐπιχώριον νόμον) (1.9). Here, his body comes under the sway of not only a foreign presence, but a foreign semiology. These dreams represent a dialogue spoken in ambiguous symbols between Aristides' body and the god. Aristides exerts no authorial control over the experience. He simply follows the messages that issue from the images he sees, as far as he can decipher them.

Aristides records another twenty-three dreams—most of them much longer than

these two examples—and the therapies he undertook in response. He closes this dream section with the phrase, "so much for my abdomen" (Τοσαῦτα μὲν τὰ παρὰ τοῦ ἤτρου (1.61)). The "journal" section (1.4-1.61), therefore, is contained within the turbulent confines of his stomach. Is this a coincidence? In some sense, the stomach and the dreamscape work in similar ways. They involve involuntary action and are unpredictable. They exist under the surface—of the body in one case and conscious awareness in the other. Aristides choses to include the abdominal section of his journal because, as an unmediated transcript of his bodily and oneiric activity, the journal works in a way that is analogous to its subject—it too is a form of unconscious processing.[86] Aristides begins his orations, therefore, by establishing three passive sites of the god's healing intervention, three sites of encounter with the self—the body, his dreams, the journal.

As we saw in the prologue, Aristides establishes the sea as a primary metaphor for his experience: "For it seemed to me to be the same as if after swimming through the whole sea under water, I should then be compelled to produce an account of the total number of the waves which I encountered, and how I found the sea at each of them, and what it was that saved me" (1.2). Here, Aristides is not only the narrator (like Helen) but also the subject (like Odysseus). The sea is the site of this conflation. As a body that contains and a body that can be traversed, it provides a metaphor for a subject who is either overwhelmed by his experience or is sufficiently in control so as to be able to navigate (through) it. As an entity that also moves involuntarily and unpredictably, it represents the externalized image of the three sites discussed above.

In what follows, I trace the development of the metaphorical paradigms that are

[86] Or, as Holmes (2010) puts it in relation to the body, the "non-conscious forces" (2-3n.4).

physically and psychologically transformative for Aristides. The sea metaphor is especially operative in the first section (5-17) of the second oration. It is in this section that Aristides narrates his attempt to find a path (*poros*)—a narrative path, a path to healing, and also a physical pathway—for in this section, Aristides describes a number of failed or prescribed journeys. These sections crucially establish Aristides' narrative co-presence with the god, as well as the link between his body and his ability to travel. I treat the former in Section III, "Establishing Divine Authority," and the sea paradigm in Section IV. In Section V, I treat the "initiation paradigm." The initiation paradigm corresponds to Aristides' description of what he calls "the prophecy of years," and takes up a large portion of the oration (sections 18-48). It is here that Aristides' healing process moves to the dramatic stage. The prophecy gives Aristides' life diachronic structure, thus imbuing his suffering with meaning. Finally, in Section VI, I discuss the "inscription" metaphor, which is the subject of Aristides' fourth oration. Here, Aristides transcribes this "meaning"—his immortal fame—through various media, onto his social world and beyond.

2. Approaches

The *Hieroi Logoi* are one of the few autobiographical accounts we have of non-Christian religious experience in antiquity.[87] Nevertheless, it is only in the past ten years or so that scholars have begun to take it seriously. Work by scholars such as Alexia Petsalis-Diomides, Janet Downie and Brooke Holmes has resituated the orations within Aristides' contemporary society and, more specifically, within the context of second century CE

[87] See, Quet (1993): "nous pouvons admettre désormais que l'oeuvre d'Aristide…nous introduit, pour la première fois en Occident, au discours non conventionnel d'un écriture du moi, centrée sur l'histoire de la personne dans son être le plus intime…" She goes on to assert that the notion of the "personne psychologique" emerges not exclusively in a Christian context, but in the second century in sources like these (251).

Greek oratory. Before these interventions, the *HL* were largely treated as a problem in need of diagnosis.[88] At worst he was dismissed as insane.[89] The scholars mentioned above have done a great deal to correct this view by emphasizing the consciously constructed, rhetorical nature of the text and the fact it is was not a private diary, but a public work. I agree with these approaches; but not enough has been done to account for the stranger elements of the *Logoi*. These speeches are written in a style that differs radically from Aristides' other extant works and I argue that this style represents a suppression of the authorial voice which, in other orations, he does not hesitate to employ.

The *Hieroi Logoi* relate to three discrete fields of experience: the bodily, the oneiric and the professional. Thus, at the heart of any effort to interpret the orations as a whole is the question of how these three aspects interact and what relationship they convey between Aristides and Asclepius. I argue that the orator's experience and the form of his narrative are intertwined. The account of the god's sacred healing is not only depicted in the text, but the text itself progressively "makes sense" of the healing process by relating the process intimately to Aristides' identity as a prominent orator—an identity that emerges and becomes more stable in the course of the orations.

Lee Pearcy was one of the earliest scholars to analyze the narrative strategy of the *HL*. According to Pearcy, the text itself represents a resolution to the problem of the body's contingency: "The *Sacred Tales* [unlike the physical body]…might endure to present the complex interpenetration of the word of the god and the transformation of the

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[88] For other more sympathetic accounts, see, Boulanger (1923), Dodds (1965) 39-45, Festugière (1960).
[89] Bonner (1937).

diseased and imperfect text of Aristides' body into the lasting text of the Sacred Tales."[90] Narrative is essentially unifying: "The god's providence expressed in his *logoi* links levels of reality in a unity beyond the powers of conventional narrative to express or conventional reading to distinguish."[91]

But Brooke Holmes has challenged the tendency to read the orations as the conflation of body[92] and text. She argues instead that the text reflects the resistance of the body to inscription in the context of healing. She points out that a marked body represents the failure of the body to "forget" whatever has happened to it.

> The body is rather written into stories that are first staged in dreams and then recorded in the archive. By interpreting these stories, Aristides is able to act on the body in such a way as to restore it to a primeval state of harmony in which the dissonance between an opaque interior harboring something foreign, on the one hand, and the person who suffers and seeks the meaning of that suffering, on the other, is eliminated…[93]

For Holmes, instead of the body acting as a text, the body is projected into the dream world where it can be interpreted by Aristides. It is the dream world that constitutes the productive field in the text.

So while Pearcy sees the narrative as representing resolution and unity (insofar as it captures Aristides' experience for posterity), Holmes reads the text as incorporating the processual and repetitive aspect of healing: "Moments of communion with the divine participate, rather, in an ongoing cycle by which Aristides has his stories purged and washed from him as a condition of the renewal of life."[94] Holmes also emphasizes Aristides' role as an interpreter of these dreams—an argument made forcefully by Janet

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[90] Pearcy, (1988) 391.
[91] Ibid., 385.
[92] See also, Quet (1993) 239.
[93] Holmes (2008) 109.
[94] Ibid., 112

Downie. For Downie, "Aristides intended the *HL* as an open text in which he makes various layers of composition visible in order to expose the dynamics of memory and language and to reflect more adequately the hermeneutic effort unique to divine human collaboration in the literary process."[95]

Interpretation, however, is a concept that assigns too much deliberate cognition to the orator. It assumes the very control that Aristides insistently relinquishes.[96] Against these views, I argue that Aristides establishes various sites of intervention between himself and the god. These sites are imbued with metaphorical import, whose comparisons the audience or reader must register. In doing so, the audience participates in Aristides' healing process.

The interpretive aspect of the text, therefore, is systematically suppressed, or at least, mystified. He claims, after all, to submit even the composition of these *logoi* to the god. Instead of linear reasoning or chronological order, he composes in a strictly associative mode.[97] This associative logic is a function of memory which, as we will see, Aristides understands to be a product of the god's intervention. The often attenuated and insistently paratactic nature of the relationship between episodes signifies a healing process that is under the providence of a divine logic. Therefore, instead of locating the site of productivity in his dream world (as Holmes suggests), or in the text itself (as a record of body, as Pearcy argues), I locate the productivity of the orations in the metaphors which bind otherwise seemingly discontinuous *logoi* together. In order to activate a performative linguistic function, Aristides relies on the productive capacity of

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[95] Downie (2013) 34.

[96] Quet (1993) qualifies her general approval of Pearcy's reading by identifying his assumption "que tout le récit repose sur une construction volontaire" (221).

[97] As Downie (2013) writes, "Within each *Logos* stories are related by theme, and a sense of prophetic time structures the narrative" (46).

figurative language.

My use of the concept of "metaphor" relies on an anthropological approach in which the figure is understood not only as a function of cognition, but also as function of social experience. Anthropologist Michael Jackson has argued that metaphors connect people to the means by which they become, and learn to function as, productive members of society. Thus, metaphors do not merely map, for example, spatial dimensions onto abstract thought.[98] According to Jackson, metaphors are modes of praxis which "mediate relationships between conceptual and physical domains of the *habitus* in a dialectical manner…"[99] Jackson explains that in preliterate societies there exists a "corporeal and sensible way of 'reading' what the world means" in which there is a "continuity between language, knowledge and bodily praxis" because "speech cannot be readily abstracted from contexts of practical activity."[100] But in Aristides' case (and in the case of the sophists of the second century more generally), speech—rhetoric—*is* practical activity. And the sea that features in his prologue *is* Aristides' means, his *poros* to productive activity. Therefore, Aristides' heavy use of these metaphors is not merely a *topos*: it also reconfigures his relationship to his work and world.[101] As Jackson explains, "quiescent" metaphors are "activated [in situations of crisis] to mediate changes in people's bodies

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[98] An obvious example are metaphors of "standing." Jackson (1983a) summarizes Binswanger (1962) "…When our familiar environment is disrupted, we feel uprooted, we lose our footing…but this is not…a mere manner of speaking; it is a shock and a disorientation which occurs simultaneously in body and mind and refers to a basic ontological structure of our Being-in-the-world…Metaphors of falling and disequilibrium disclose this integral connexion of the psychic and the physical; they do not express a concept *in terms of* a bodily image" (328-329).
[99] Jackson (1983b) 136.
[100] Ibid., 130.
[101] Cf. Porter's (2006) discussion of classicism as acquired *habitus*, "Greek identity has been refigured here as the ability to embody and control the resources of Greek culture in its finest dimensions. And the assimilation to an ideal has to be complete, down to the last atom of one's self" (46). See also Gleason (1995).

and experience, as well as alter their relationships with one another and their world."[102] Aristides activates metaphors[103] in just such a way.

I explore three metaphorical paradigms in this and the next chapter: metaphors of the sea, initiation, and inscription. Aristides relies on these paradigms to mediate between the (sometimes overwhelming) immediacy of lived experience and his self-understanding as an important orator. Moreover, by employing metaphors that connect his illness to his oratory, Aristides solicits the audience's participation in reconstituting him as an orator. The audience's recognition of the symbolism of these various encounters completes the healing work that the god began. The initiation and sea paradigms are found predominantly in the second oration; they are co-extensive. The third paradigm dominates the fourth oration and allows him to begin to fully externalize his experience. The trope of "inscription" inscribes his social distinction onto the outside world.

3. Establishing Divine Authority

The second oration features a prologue that retroactively defines the predominant narrative mode of the first oration as journal entries.[104] In this second prologue, Aristides apologizes for his partial compliance with Asclepius' order to make a record—an *apographē*—of his dreams. Janet Downie argues that the second prologue sets up the difference between the *apographē*—the records of his experience—and the *suggraphē*—

[102] Jackson (1983b) 134.
[103] When I use "metaphor," I always mean a "metaphorical concept" (Lakoff and Johnson (1980)) or paradigm.
[104] The second prologue has led scholars to argue that the first oration was not original. Dorandi (2005) for example, argues that it was written by students and based on Aristides' own notes. Downie (2013), however, correctly points out that the second prologue does not repeat the contents of the first prologue, but instead complements it (39, 49).

the narrative of his experience—introduced in the first prologue. For Downie, "The *apographē* at its best is a catalogue of experience. The *suggraphē*, on the other hand, is Aristides' attempt to make sense of that experience."[105] As indicated above, I agree that the journal entries represent the raw material of Aristides' experience, but resist the tendency to read the text as an explicit act of interpretation.

In the second oration, Aristides shifts from the transcript of his body and dreams to an increasingly dramatic narrative of his therapy. The drama is set in motion by Aristides' repeated indications of the god's immanence and agency in the production of the narrative. Before discussing the metaphorical paradigms (in sections IV, V, and VI), in this section, I argue that Aristides' strategy for indexing the god's presence is to produce narrative discontinuities and interruptions that only his associative composition restores.[106] First I analyze these discursive discontinuities—*adunata* and *aporiai*. But his inability to narrate is a result of his subject matter—it is here, in the beginning of *HL*II, that Aristides first relates the god's manifestations. I treat these in the second part of this section.

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[105] Downie (2013) 42. The contrast between what Aristides calls his *apographē*—his records or diary—and the *diēgēsis* (I.1) that is, what we have before us—has been a central point of interpretation in the *HL*. For Pearcy (1988), the *apographē* is clearly a trope and a foil for Aristides' project (see also Weiss (1998) 54-58). It "increases the authority and persuasiveness of the narrative before us, and because this rejected way of telling was, as Aristides presents it, a voluminous transcription of reality, its rejection amounts to a rejection of the claims of reality on the narrative" (383). See also Whitmarsh (2004) 444, who argues that the *apographē* represents Asclepius' communication with Aristides in his dream life and the *suggraphē* Aristides' communication with his public. In order to turn the interpretive focus to the text and away from the psychology of its writer, these scholars too readily read the *Hieroi Logoi* in terms of its rhetorical features. So, Downie argues that *HL*I is included because "it represents the material" Aristides uses to compose the *HL*, "and helps reveal the hermeneutic process that he signals in the second prologue" (47). These interpretations obscure the evolving aspect of the narration of the *HL*, which, I argue, distinguish the text as itself an act of healing.

[106] In Peirce's tripartite semiotics—index, icon, and sign—an index "depends upon association by contiguity" ([1940] 108); "Anything which startles us is an index in so far as it marks the junction between two portions of experience" (108-9); an index "is meant to put [an individual] in real connection with the object" (109). Thus Aristides ensures that narrative discontinuities indicate by contiguity the presence of the god.

In the second prologue, Aristides' claims that dreams have compelled him to make his experience public. He explains that the god ordered him to write his dreams "from the beginning" and admits that sometimes he followed through on the order, and sometimes he did not. He boasts that he has written some 300,000 lines in these journals, but then equivocates, "But it is not very easy to go over them nor to fit them into their proper chronology. Besides some have been scattered through various losses and confusions at home during these times." (II.3) Ultimately, this "loss" leads Aristides to submit the narrative to Asclepius:

> ὑπόλοιπον οὖν ἐστι <u>κεφάλαια</u> λέγειν, ἄλλα ἄλλοθεν ἀναμιμνησκόμενον, ὅπως ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἄγῃ τε καὶ κινῇ· καλοῦμεν δ' αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ πρὸς ἅπαντα.
>
> The only thing left to do is to speak in summary fashion, as I remember different things from different sources, however the god will lead and stimulate me. We call on him even in this, as in all things. (II.4)

Here, Aristides is explicit about the organizing principle of his orations: he will adopt a κεφάλαια—"summary" approach. *Kephalaion* will, in fact, become a marked term in the speeches.[107] The word is often used in the sense of "epitome"[108] but here, Aristides does not mean that he will give a condensed narrative account. In fact, it seems to mean something quite different from consolidation: ἄλλα ἄλλοθεν ("different things from

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[107] Though κεφάλαιον is his preferred term, he also uses ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς in two places in this oration (the other usage of the word takes a different metaphorical meaning—that of "attack," or "forward motion"). The metaphorical usage of "summary" for "moving forward" is precisely what I argue Aristides accomplishes in this oration.

[108] Plato indirectly defines the term in the *Phaedrus* when Socrates and Phaedrus discuss the precepts of rhetoric. Socrates suggests that everyone agrees about the end of a speech and Phaedrus clarifies: Τὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἕκαστα λέγεις ὑπομνῆσαι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων; (267d5). Isocrates seems to use the term in just such a way quite often (3.62, 4.149, 5.154). Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses the term in the beginning of his *de compositione verborum* as an organizing principle to introduce the main topics under discussion.

different places") acknowledges that the account might seem random.[109] Not only that, but Aristides links the element of randomness to the god's guidance: ὅπως ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἄγῃ τε καὶ κινῇ ("however the god will lead and guide me").

This submission to the will of the god is a response to his declaration that the records he kept are no longer available to him. It therefore represents a procedural *aporia*: what is he to do? The answer—to submit the narration to the god (just as he has submitted his therapy to him)—ensures that the text is experienced as being actively composed. Whether he actually has access to the diaries or not, his rejection of them shifts the discursive time from the transcribed past to the performative present. Now, every abrupt transition only heightens the sense of the god's intervention in the composition of the orations. Declarations of *aporia*, or *adunaton*—frequent in his assertions that he does not know how to put words to his experiences—mark these passages as moments in which Aristides yields authority to the god. In this oration, declarations of *adunata* and recourse to the "summary approach" repeatedly occur as a pair. In fact, this pairing presides relentlessly over the beginning of the oration, which is comprised of three sections of narrative (5-7), a statement of *adunaton* (8), two additional narrative sections (9-10), and another statement of *adunaton* again (11). While Aristides uses *kephalaion* on a number of occasions throughout the text, he uses it programmatically on more occasions in this oration than in any other. [110] In this section I

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[109] Plato puts the same expression in the mouth of Alcibiades when he begins his praise of Socrates in the *Symposium*: ἐὰν μέντοι ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν λέγω, μηδὲν θαυμάστῃς· οὐ γάρ τι ῥᾴδιον τὴν σὴν ἀτοπίαν ὧδ' ἔχοντι εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριθμῆσαι (215a1-2). The phrase characterizes Alcibiades as an especially flustered—and drunk—speaker. There are no other occurrences of the phrase with a verb of recollection.

[110] κεφάλαιον and the sister term ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς are used five times in the second oration, four times in the fourth oration, three in the third, once in the fifth, and not at all in the first or sixth. Every usage in *HL* II is programmatic: the terms are used either in answer to a statement of *adunaton* or a statement of the magnitude of the narrative task (4, 8, 29, 60), or to introduce a new topic (18). The latter usages become

focus on 5-11 to demonstrate how the paring of *adunata* and "summary approach" act as an index of Asclepius' presence.

The initial crisis of the lost journals leads to his description of perhaps the greatest crisis of Aristides' professional life—his failed journey to Rome—though he gives us no indication of the event's magnitude here. Instead, he begins with two related impasses: the doctors' inability to ease his pain or diagnose him (ἦν τοῖς ἰατροῖς <u>ἀπορία</u> πολλή), and his inability to breathe (χαλεπώτατον δ' ἁπάντων καὶ <u>ἀπορώτατον</u> ὅτι τοῦ πνεύματος ἀπεκεκλείμην). He decides, therefore, to go to the warm springs nearby and it is here, Aristides tells us, that Asclepius "first began to make his revelations" (ἐνταῦθα πρῶτον ὁ σωτὴρ χρηματίζειν[111] ἤρξατο) (7). The phrase seems to promise a proper narrative beginning, but Aristides merely describes the encounter (which will be discussed below) in a four short lines and then ends the description with the curt and verbless, μετὰ ταῦτα κλῆσις καὶ ἄφιξις ἀπὸ Σμύρνης εἰς Πέργαμον μετὰ τῆς ἀγαθῆς τύχης ("after this an invitation and journey from Smyrna to Pergamum with good fortune"). The potential narrative turn is likewise interrupted, this time with an *adunaton*: "it is not humanly possible to explain the things that followed (τὰ δ' ἐντεῦθεν)…but it must be essayed (ἐγχειρητέον) as I have proposed, to recount some of these things in a summary way (ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς)." (8) He directs those who remain curious (or skeptical) to his personal papers (διφθέρας) for a more accurate account. Here again, Aristides juxtaposes his oral summary mode of composition with the more detailed and accurate written accounts.

Aristides then tries to begin again: he will start from "somewhere" (νῦν δὲ ἐνθένδε ποθὲν ἀρξώμεθα)—from the story of how the orations came to be called the

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more frequent in later orations and on a few occasions Aristides uses the term to simply mean "main point" (III.48).

[111] χρηματίζω was a technical term for dreams that have predictive power. See, Israelowich (2012) 83.

Hieroi Logoi. On his first night at Pergamum, he explains, his foster father dreamed that Asclepius came to him in the form of Salvius, the consul, and "he sealed these speeches as '*Hieroi Logoi*'" (ἐπισημήναιτο ὡδὶ λέγων, ἱεροὶ λόγοι) (II.9).[112] The short but crucial anecdote is followed by another assertion and statement of *aporia*: "…I wish to recall strange happenings. Where should one begin when there are so many different things and at the same time when all are not remembered, only the gratitude because of them?" (…τῶν παραδόχων μνησθῆναι βούλομαι. Πόθεν οὖν τις ἄρξηται, πολλῶν τε καὶ παντοίων ὄντων, καὶ ἅμα οὐκ ἐν μνήμῃ πάντων, πλήν γε δὴ τῆς χάριτος τῆς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν;) (II.11). With this question, Aristides points to the god's presence. We are reminded of his earlier claim to narrate "however the god leads" (II.4). He does not simply move on to another topic, but signposts his transitions with questions or claims of ineptitude that remind the reader of Asclepius the text's immanent authority.

But the god is not only immanent in the structure of the oration, his manifestations are also the subject of the first half of *HL*II. These manifestations are characterized as ontologically ambiguous, and they often involve moments in which Aristides' life is at risk. This ambiguity influences the composition of the text: Aristides struggles to retain a perspective in the narrative and gives in to the god's authority. The composition of the body of the text is analogous, then, to the healing process Aristides has entrusted to his savior.

The first manifestation (mentioned just above) occurs when he decides, in the wake of the doctors' failures, to go to the springs near his home.

> ἐνταῦθα πρῶτον ὁ σωτὴρ χρηματίζειν ἤρξατο. ἀνυπόδητόν τε γὰρ προελθεῖν ἐπέταξε καὶ ἐβόων δὴ ἐν τῷ ὀνείρατι ὡς ἂν ὕπαρ τε καὶ ἐπ' ὀνείρατι τετελεσμένῳ, μέγας ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς, τετέλεσται τὸ

[112] The terminology of "sealing" (ἐπισημαίνω) anticipates the major metaphorical paradigm of oration IV.

πρόσταγμα. ταῦθ’ ἅμα προϊὼν ἐδόκουν βοᾶν. (7)

> Here first the Savior began to make his revelations. He ordered me to go forth unshod and I cried out in my dream, as if in a waking state and as if the dream had been fulfilled: “Great is Asclepius! The order is fulfilled.” I seemed to cry out these things, while I went forth.

This dream sequence diverges markedly from the dream sequences in the first oration which are (almost invariably) formulaically introduced with a form of δοκέω and do not involve direct contact with the god. This “prophetic” (χρηματίζειν) dream’s ambiguity rests on the blurring of two orders: time and conscious state. He reports that he shouted out in his dream, but that he shouted as if in a waking state and as if the dream had already been fulfilled.

Contact between Aristides and the god occurs as a function of Aristides’ recognition of the god and the fulfillment of his command. It is immediate: the verb in which Aristides is called to act and the verb in which he acknowledges the accomplishment of the command are right next to each other: ἐπέταξε καὶ ἐβόων (“he ordered me and I cried out”). Aristides eschews the accusative subject of the infinitive με governed by ἐπέταξε in the second sentence.[113] There is very little mediating the contact and no context (setting, or sensory) is given. We do not yet know if Aristides is reporting a dream or whether he is in a conscious state. The god’s act of commanding and the devotee’s act of submission are co-extensive. Finally, the repetition of the verb τελέω (“to fulfill”) in the perfect tense (ἐπ’ ὀνείρατι τετελεσμένῳ, μέγας ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς,

[113] Weiss (1988) has argued that Aristides’ reliance on the third person and eschewal of the first person “makes it seem as though Aristides is writing about someone else” (60-61). He suggests, furthermore, that *HL*I might even represent “a conscious effort on Aristides’ part to improve on rationalizing medical texts like Hippocrates’ *Epidemics*, as if Aristides’ notebooks belong to the true doctor, Asclepius.” This, I argue, is not the case, especially in the passages I analyze below, which describe intense communion with Asclepius. The eschewal of the “I” in such descriptions seems rather to indicate that there was no sense of a self being acted upon, or even perceiving. The absence, instead, heightens the sense of the god’s unmediated presence.

τετέλεσται τὸ πρόσταγμα) gives the passage added mystical force. The verb, which indicates initiation in the mysteries—an important theme for Aristides here and in other orations—accomplishes Aristides initiation into the god's authoritative care.

Finally, the formal composition of the short passage raises Aristides' acclamatory recognition of the god—μέγας ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς, τετέλεσται τὸ πρόσταγμα ("Great is Asclepius! The order is fulfilled")—to the performative now, as if he were acclaiming Asclepius directly to his audience and not only in the past.[114] There is a crescendo of clauses introducing the direct speech: [115] καὶ ἐβόων δὴ ("and I cried out") / ἐν τῷ ὀνείρατι ("in my dream") / ὡς ἂν ὕπαρ τε ("as if in a waking state") / καὶ ἐπ' ὀνείρατι τετελεσμένῳ ("and as if the dream had been fulfilled"). The episode ends in ring composition, with the same verb that introduced the acclamation: ταῦθ' ἅμα προϊὼν ἐδόκουν βοᾶν. But now, we have settled into the past and into a stable—if oneiric—ontology with the formulaic: ἐδόκουν.

Only a few sentences before this episode, Aristides explains that the god ordered him to write down his dreams and, furthermore, that this was the first of his orders: καίτοι τοσοῦτόν γε ἔχω λέγειν, ὅτι εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς προεῖπεν ὁ θεὸς ἀπογράφειν τὰ ὀνείρατα· καὶ τοῦτ' ἦν τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων πρῶτον ("And yet, I am able to admit this much, that straightaway, from the beginning, the god ordered me to record the dreams; and this was the first of his commands") (II.2). The –τάγμα-root noun of the passage discussed above (πρόσταγμα—"command" (II.7)) echoes this passage. The narrative is coextensive with the events narrated.[116] The phrase is no longer structurally embedded in a single moment,

[114] Cf. Quet (1993) 232.
[115] See also II.21, discussed below.
[116] In a subsequent passage, Aristides uses πρόειμι to explain how the god should direct him discursively: καὶ τοῦ λόγου προΐοιμεν ὡς κάλλιστα (24). Furthermore, each episode in the first few pages of this oration

but transcends narrative fixity. When Aristides claims, τετέλεσται τὸ πρόσταγμα, he is referring not only to the order to go out barefoot, but also to the order to write his dreams. Here he is, after all, before his audience, reporting them.

As I mentioned above, immediately after this short episode Aristides seems to begin a new *logos*: "an invitation and journey from Smyrna to Pergamum" (II.7). After a long *adunaton* directing the reader to his personal writings, he finally returns to the narrative, with another beginning (νῦν δὲ ἐνθένδε ποθὲν ἀρξώμεθα—"Now, let us begin from somewhere or other") and describes his foster father's dream in which these speeches are indicated ("sealed") as *hieroi logoi*. The dream represents the sanctioned beginning of the narrative and corresponds to the "first revelation" of the god above. What follows, then, is doubly authorized by Asclepius. The initial work of writing his experiences was authorized by a dream that followed closely upon the heels of the god's first revelation and it is authorized in the performative time of the speeches by his repeated insistence that he is not guiding the narrative course.

I argued that Aristides relinquishes narrative authority with his repeated *adunata* and that these *adunata* indicate the immanent presence of the god in the text. These rhetorical *adunata* correspond to two other physical impasses (*aporiai*). One impasse is body-internal and the other consequent impasse relates the body's mobility as a whole. Aristides first phrase of the narrative portion of the speech (following the prologue) is, "When I returned from Italy" (Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐκομίσθην ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας) (II.5). This is a passing reference to Aristides' failed trip to Rome.[117] He describes the ailments that

begins by introducing a different departure or destination. He is always *en route* here. Therefore, the prescription to "go forth" triggers a response not only within the dream, but also with in the narrative itself.
[117] The fact that he does not mention Rome is indicative of the fact that at this point in the narrative he has not yet come to terms with the loss. His ability to name the city at II.60 perhaps indicates that the act of

precipitated his return: “the hardest and most difficult thing of all was that my breathing was blocked” (χαλεπώτατον δ’ἁπάντων καὶ ἀπορώτατον ὅτι τοῦ πνεύματος ἀπεκεκλείμην). His bodily struggle is mirrored by the inability (ἀπορία (I.5)) of the doctors to diagnose him. Passage is essential to Aristides’ work as an orator. The passage of breath, passage between cities, movement of thought in an oration—these are all necessary for his success and they are interdependent courses.

4. The Sea

In the introduction to this chapter, I discussed Aristides’ usage of the metaphor of the “triple waves” to describe his suffering (περὶ τὸ σῶμα τρικυμιῶν I.3). In the third oration, Aristides employs a ship metaphor to describe an attack of violent convulsions:

> ἀλλ’ εἵλκετο πάσας ἕλξεις τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὰ μὲν γόνατα ἄνω πρὸς τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐφέρετο, καὶ προσερρήγνυτο, τὰς δὲ χεῖρας οὐχ οἷόν τ’ ἦν κατέχειν, ἀλλ’εἰς τὸν τράχηλον καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐνέπιπτον· τὸ δὲ στῆθος ἔξω προεωθεῖτο καὶ τὸ νῶτον εἰς τοὔπισθεν ἀντεσπᾶτο ὥσπερ ἱστίον ἐξ ἀνέμου κεκυρτωκός. (III.17)
>
> “But my body was drawn in every direction: my knees were brought up to my head, and dashed against it; it was not possible to control my hands but they beat against my neck and face. My chest was thrust forward and my back was drawn back like a sail bulging with wind.

The image of Aristides’ body roiled by the sea is explanatory in its vividness. If his body is a ship, he is a sailor whose fate rests on the vehicle’s ability to weather the storm. Like the ship, the body is an existential threshold—either his salvation or his demise. The sea represents his physical turmoil. In the second oration, however, the “sea” paradigm develops into a *poros*—a path—for healing.

This development is contingent on a second field of signification associated with

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narrating is proving effective.

the sea: it represents his path to fame. Because of his illness, Aristides cannot travel and traveling is fundamental to his professional success. If he does not declaim, he risks losing his reputation and, perhaps, the hope of fame beyond it. Aristides states as much in a singularly reflective passage in the fifth oration:

> I calculated how much time I had been away from Smyrna, and this when honorary decrees had come, and that I was already middle-aged, and in addition the many former times when it was possible, if one was healthy, to tour the cities, and that there was a danger that I might be deprived even of my existing reputation through long idleness. I considered these things, as it is likely that a man would, but I knew well that everything was foolishness in comparison to obeying the god… (V.56)

As we saw above, the second oration begins with his failed trip to Rome—a trip that would have represented a culminating point in his career.[118] The trauma of his body's betrayal and the doctors' *aporia*, then, precipitate his submission to the god. Asclepius' early interventions are staged on the sea. The sea, to recall Jackson, is "activated…to mediate change" in Aristides' "bod[y] and experience, as well as alter [his] relationships with… the world." Aristides' trip to Rome had actually been taken on land, but the sea, nevertheless, becomes a site for his healing, symbolically connecting the internal upheaval of his body to his body's ability to move in the outside world. The sea becomes for Aristides the initial site of re-embodiment and return to self (*nostos*), as exemplified by Odysseus.

After Asclepius' first intervention immediately upon his return (II.7) and a trip to Pergamum (II.9-10), where the orations are named, Aristides reports an incident in which he is ordered by Asclepius to take a trip to Chios.[119] But his ship encounters a storm and

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[118] Behr (1968) dates this event to October 144 CE (24-25).

[119] According to Behr (1986) this trip to Pergamum is the beginning of what Aristdes calls his "cathedra" (26-27). Behr calculates that the stay lasted two years. The trip to Chios would have occurred after this

they are nearly wrecked. The sailors are anguished, but Aristides, full of faith, invokes the god and they just barely survive. That night, Asclepius orders Aristides to perform a purgation. Aristides does so, and explains that the purgation was particularly effective, "since everything was stirred up by the tempest" (ἅτε καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κλυδωνίου πάντων κεκινημένων (13)). Safely on shore in Smyrna, Asclepius issues another order: he asks Aristides to conduct a mock shipwreck, explaining the prescription in terms of fate:

> καὶ φράζει δὴ τὸ πᾶν, ὡς εἱμαρμένον τε εἴη ναυαγῆσαί μοι… καὶ νῦν ἔτι δέοι ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας καὶ τοῦ παντάπασιν ἐκπλῆσαι τὸ χρεὼν, ἐμβάντα εἰς λέμβον ἐν τῷ λιμένι οὕτω ποιῆσαι, ὡς τὸν μὲν λέμβον ἀνατραπῆναι καὶ καταδῦναι, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐξάραντός τινος ἐξενεχθῆναι πρὸς τὴν γῆν. (II.13)
>
> And he made everything clear, that it was fated for me to suffer shipwreck…and it would be necessary for my safety and in order to fulfill my destiny completely, to embark in a skiff and to arrange it in a harbor, so that the skiff overturn and sink, but that I myself be picked up by someone and brought to land.

By conducting a symbolic shipwreck, Aristides will transform the near-death experience of the real shipwreck into something ordained by the god. His trip to Rome is replayed on a smaller scale with the interrupted journey to Chios. The shipwreck is then played out in the city's bay. This scaling down corrects his failure at Rome by rewriting it as a destined event. The mechanism for this transformation is the sea. The sea's motion is literally internalized through the ritual and the purgation, and it is then externalized in order to "reconfigure" the relationship between body and self, and self and world. "The world," in this case, is metonymically signified by the sea which represents Aristides potential path to fame. This reconfiguration thus bodes well for his professional work as an orator.

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stay in the winter of 149 CE. The fact that the text does not follow chronological time is evidence that an entirely different principle of organization is at work.

This episode has transformative power for the course of Aristides' healing and his life. Once his experience is given a structure external to himself, Aristides can take up a subject position within that structure. More than that, he can emotionally invest in the healing process. Eventually, he will come to understand the illness itself as a meaningful part of his life story. But in the immediate context of the second *Logos*, the emotional structure that emerges is borrowed from discourse around initiation experiences—namely, hope and fear.

5. Initiation

The initiation paradigm is introduced by way of allusion to Odysseus. Aristides is to go to the river, dig a trench and sacrifice to the gods.[120] Like Odysseus, he is to symbolically approach death. He is to take some coins, cross the river, cast the coins away, and then sacrifice to Asclepius. Finally, Asclepius indicates that he must cut off some part of his body. On this last point, however, the god changes his mind and asks him, instead, to dedicate a ring of his to Telesphorus—a boy deity whose name means "he who fulfills" and who "personified the hopes for healing" at Pergamum.[121] This prophecy leads to the following reflection:

> τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔξεστιν εἰκάζειν ὅπως διεκείμεθα, καὶ ὁποίαν τινὰ ἁρμονίαν πάλιν ἡμᾶς ἡρμόσατο ὁ θεός. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τελετῇ περὶ πάντα ταῦτα διήγομεν, παρεστώσης ἅμα τῷ φόβῳ τῆς ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος.
>
> After this it is impossible to imagine our condition and into what kind of harmony the god again brought us. For we engaged in all this, almost as if in an initiation, since there was great hope together with fear (28).

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[120] ἔδει δὲ ἄρα βόθρους ὀρύξαντα ἐπ' αὐτῶν δρᾶσαι τὰ ἱερὰ οἷστισι δὴ καὶ ἔδει θεῶν. Cf., *Od.*11.25, where Odysseus sacrifices at Okeanos: βόθρον ὄρυξ' ὅσσον τε πυγούσιον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα..
[121] *OCD*, s.v.

Here we see the basic shape of the initiation paradigm and the emotional trajectory it establishes. To Aristides the radical uncertainty of illness resembles initiation, in which fear is managed by the hope or expectation that joy will follow.[122] Initiations dramatize the life-process by creating a beginning-middle-and-end structure determined by divine providence. Pindar, for example, writes of the Eleusinian mysteries: "Blessed is he who sees them and goes beneath the earth; he knows the end (τελευτάν) of life and knows its Zeus-given beginning."[123] Through a dramatized encounter with the ultimate end, death is transformed into fate. Fear becomes part of a story that leads to joy—an awareness that the unknown lies in the providence of a knowing god.

In the episodes that follow, Aristides further develops the connection between initiation and fate. For example, he recounts a dream: he and many others were assembled at the Propylaea as if for a purification ritual. Aristides calls out to the god, naming him the "arbiter of fate" (μοιρονόμος), since he distributes fate to individuals (ὡς τὰς μοίρας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διανέμοντα) (31). He explains that the neologism *moironomos* originates from his personal experience (ὡρμᾶτο δέ μοι τὸ ῥῆμα ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς ἐμαυτόν).

Aristides then describes the diffusely vivid presence of the god (μυρία ἕτερα ἐναργῆ τὴν παρουσίαν εἶχε τοῦ θεοῦ), and how he registered his presence bodily:

> καὶ γὰρ οἷον ἅπτεσθαι δοκεῖν ἦν καὶ διαισθάνεσθαι ὅτι αὐτὸς ἥκοι καὶ μέσως ἔχειν ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως καὶ βούλεσθαι ἐκβλέπειν, καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν μὴ προαπαλλαγείη, καὶ ὦτα παραβεβληκέναι καὶ ἀκούειν, τὰ μὲν ὡς ὄναρ, τὰ δὲ ὡς ὕπαρ, καὶ τρίχες ὀρθαὶ καὶ δάκρυα σὺν χαρᾷ καὶ γνώμης ὄγκος ἀνεπαχθὴς, καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτά γ'ἐνδείξασθαι λόγῳ δυνατός; εἰ δέ τις τῶν τετελεσμένων ἐστὶ, σύνοιδέ τε καὶ γνωρίζει. (32)

[122] See Plut. *Moralia* 47a. In his Eleusinian Oration (19), Aristides calls the mysteries φρικωδέστατόν τε καὶ φαιδρότατον (2). *Phrikōdēs* describes both a physical effect "causing shuddering" and religious awe.
[123] Fr. 137, Trans., Race.

> For there was a seeming, as it were, to touch him and to perceive that he himself had come, and to be between sleep and waking, and to wish to look up and to be in anguish that he might depart too soon, and to strain the ears and to hear some things as in a dream, some as in a waking state. Hair stood straight, and there were tears with joy, and the pride of one's heart was inoffensive. And what man could describe these things in words? If there is any man who has been initiated, he knows and understands.

In this description, the initiation paradigm is a drama that plays out on the surface of Aristides' own body. The governing impersonal construction removes any unifying cognitive faculty. The god seems present to the touch, to sight, to hearing. It is his body that responds to that diffuse presence (which can nevertheless not be grasped): his hair stands on end, tears are shed. And it is the diffuse presence, rather than the *ego*, which expresses his joy (χαρά). Where there are nominative subjects, there are no verbs (καὶ τρίχες ὀρθαὶ καὶ δάκρυα σὺν χαρᾷ καὶ γνώμης ὄγκος ἀνεπαχθὴς). The fragmentation of the body's experience thrusts him into a liminal state which is emphasized twice in this short passage (μέσως ἔχειν ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως; ἀκούειν, τὰ μὲν ὡς ὄναρ, τὰ δὲ ὡς ὕπαρ). Again, his conscious faculties are disabled. This indescribable experience in which the self seems to dissolve is something, Aristides asserts, which only those who have been initiated would understand. From now on, instead of detailing his bodily experience, he will use this metaphor (in concert with the metaphor of the sea) in order to allow the narrative to turn from the body to the man.

This passage is emblematic of the oration as a whole. It is fragmented; it is imbued with the presence of the god, but the god's presence occurs on a surface which the subject and object share. Just as Asclepius' epiphany is not separate from or independent of Aristides' body, Asclepius never appears in the text with an independent

form.

Equipped with the fortitude of the god's guiding presence, Aristides goes on to recount a near death experience. He contracts the plague and the doctors inform him that he will die. He brings his audience with him to the brink: "I was conscious of myself as if I were another person and I perceived my body ever slipping away" (οὕτω παρηκολούθουν ἐμαυτῷ, ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλῳ τινὶ, καὶ ᾐσθανόμην ὑπολείποντος ἀεὶ τοῦ σώματος).[124] He dreams that he is at the end of a drama (ἔδοξα δὲ καὶ δὴ ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ δράματος εἶναι); he is putting away his buskins. Then Asclepius turns him over and Athena appears. She appears in her iconic form: she has her aegis (which gives off a scent); she is beautiful like Phidias' statue. He points her out to those who have gathered at his bedside (ἐγὼ δὲ ἐπεδείκνυν καὶ τοῖς παροῦσι). He calls out to her, by name: βοῶν καὶ ὀνομάζων. His intimates cannot see her and they are afraid that he is losing his mind. But then they see that he is gaining strength and they hear what she says to him:

> ἀνεμίμνησκέ με τῆς Ὀδυσσείας καὶ ἔφασκεν οὐ μύθους εἶναι ταῦτα, τεκμαίρεσθαι δὲ χρῆναι καὶ τοῖς παροῦσι. δεῖν οὖν καρτερεῖν, εἶναι δ' αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα καὶ τὸν Τηλέμαχον καὶ δεῖν αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν... (II.41)
>
> She reminded me of the *Odyssey* and said that these are not idle tales, but that this could be judged even by the present circumstances. It was necessary to persevere, to be both Odysseus and Telemachus and she must help me…

Holmes argues that the dramatic stage here symbolizes the work of his dreams more generally, "the dramatic format of the dream generates interpretation that gives rise in

[124] Holmes (2008) suggests that his projection of the self into a dream-world reflects a "sense of the body as strange or alien in cases of disease" (ibid.). But this might also reflect the initiation process. Cf. Sopatros' description of emerging from Demeter's *anaktoron*: ἐξῄειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνακτόπων ἐπ'ἐμαυτῷ ξενιζόμενος –"I came out of the temple a stranger to myself." (*Rhetores Graeci* VII:117).

turn to therapeutic activity."[125] But instead of paradigmatic of the dream sequences, this moment is pivotal. The episode comes at the end of what Aristides calls, "the prophecy of the years." In this context, drama is directly related to the theme of fate. With the staging of a drama, his life takes on the fullness of narrative time.

Athena appears to Aristides as the hero's guide. She not only saves Aristides' life in this passage,[126] she reconfigures his self-understanding. The episodicity of his illness and the overabundance of experiences resemble the μύθοι of the *Odyssey*; but they should not be misinterpreted as trivial. They are applicable to one's life. Odysseus and Telemachus are models for action. The fascinating split-association with father and son recalls Aristides' identification in the prologue both with Helen and with Odysseus. There, he employed different characters in order to differentiate between the narrator and the narrator's subject. That does not seem to be the case here. If the initiation paradigm helps Aristides conceptualize his illness in terms of narrative time, then the command to be both Telemachus and Odysseus may indicate that Aristides must endure both as if at the beginning of his journey and as if nearing the end. In other words, while the prophecy imposes diachrony from the outside, the dream instills that perspective from within.[127] Athena tells Aristides that he should appropriate the outlook of Telemachus, who looks to Odysseus' return, and of Odysseus, who strives toward that return.[128] Well-

[125] Ibid., 89.

[126] He is explicit about this in the next few sentences. Further "proof" of divine intervention in his salvation is that on the same day that he recovers, one of his foster children dies (44).

[127] The assumption of a deity's perspective may account for the power of mystery initiations. The initiations also reconfigured initiates' relationships to time: the afterlife was now something to look forward to.

[128] The *Telemachia*, of course, opens the *Odyssey*. As such, it not only represents a chronological beginning, it represents the condition of not knowing the outcome of one's immediate predicament. It represents the first step in essaying a meeting with one's destiny. Telemachus' journey to Pylos and Sparta represents a scaled down version of Odysseus' own travels. Telemachus seeks information. Odysseus performs his way back home. He tells his story to the Phaeacians in order to secure his safe passage to

being is found at the place where the two perspectives converge.[129] Aristides must both wait for the return of his health and reconstituted selfhood and he must declaim and actively seek out his rightful destiny at once.[130] He must act in seach of narrative.

The initiation and sea paradigms work together. The initiation paradigm accounts for Aristides' phenomenological experience of the divine and helps Aristides make sense of the uncertainty of his illness. The sea paradigm gives him a way to literally move forward. As we saw above, the sea represented his body's breakdown, but through the ritual of internalization its metaphorical force also allows him to begin to heal. With Athena's dream he can now embody the sea's greatest and most articulate sailor.

Interestingly, Aristides comes to fully embody Odysseus towards the end of the oration in a rare summary section (60-70) in which he explains how his illness began. Here, Aristides tells what happened before his failed trip to Rome. While the oration begins with the beginning of the god's *healing*, the story of how his symptoms first arose, occurs as a digression towards the end.[131] Aristides begins the summary of his sickness by conjuring, as he did in the first prologue, an imaginary person (τις). But unlike in the first prologue, here the τις is not an observer of his troubles, but an audience member: "Perhaps someone might feel the need to hear the origin of such great troubles" (Πόθεν

Ithaca. Aristides explicitly invokes Odysseus as a model storyteller (as we will see) on a few occasions.

[129] Odysseus before the Phaeacians will serve as a model for Aristides repeatedly. See, for example, 42.14 and *HL* V.12.

[130] Odysseus' return means the restoration of their family's rule on the island and the assurance that Telemachus will be heir. The two together represent the integrity of the family's power. Thus, by embodying both perspectives, Aristides also points to the future restoration of a whole self.

[131] *HL* I is more concerned with his symptoms. It begins, after all, with his "abdomen." But this oration contextualizes his sickness within the framework of a narrative, unlike the "Dairy" of *HL* I. Within this framework, then, we might expect a more chronological account. Inscriptions also bear this "chronological" structuring out. (See, for example, *Inscriptiones Graecae* IV, 1, no. 126 (ca. 160 AD; = pg. 247 in Edelstein & Edelstein) and the Stelai at Epidaurus (4th c. BC; = pg. 221-237 in Edelstein & Edelstein).

οὖν συνεσκευάσθη τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἴσως ἄν τις ἀκοῦσαι δεηθείη). He goes on to compare his task to that of Odysseus at Alkinoos' court: "It is beyond or like the story told to Alkinoos" (τὸ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν πέρα ἢ κατ' Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογον…(60)). Thus, the subject-audience divide is re-established.

As the summary proceeds, Aristides describes setting out for Rome. He goes into great detail about his pain and the extreme treatments he underwent (purges, an incision from chest to bladder, antidotes and drugs). Then he explains that it was decided that he must be taken home. "A sort of Odyssey took place" (καὶ συμβαίνει τις Ὀδύσσεια (65)). He describes a storm and his great difficulty with his passage home. Throughout the summary section, Odysseus is both a model narrator and as a model sufferer. Aristides has fully accepted Athena's narrative about the meaning of his pain.

Despite the work these paradigms do, Aristides' text remains fragmentary. He never declares himself healed and he never overtly declares his illness as fated in the hic-et-nunc of performance time (though he will quote others as saying so and he will do so in later orations). In these orations Aristides does not employ the common metaphor that imagines survival as salvation from a tempest or arrival at a clam harbor. He is not yet saved. It is only in subsequent orations that metaphor can be employed to the fullest rhetorical effect. He opens his *Lalia to Asclepius*, in the following way:

> Ὦ πολλὰ δὴ πολλάκις ἐν νυξί τε καὶ ἡμέραις ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ κληθεὶς ὑφ' ἡμῶν, Ἀσκληπιὲ δέσποτα, ὡς ἀσμένοις καὶ ὑπερποθοῦσιν ἔδωκας ἡμῖν οἷον ἐκ πελάγους πολλοῦ καὶ κατηφείας λιμένος τε λαβέσθαι γαληνοῦ καὶ προσειπεῖν τὴν κοινὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἑστίαν, ἧς ἀτέλεστος μὲν οὐδεὶς δή που τῶν ὑφ' ἡλίῳ
>
> O you who have often for many reasons been summoned by us, night and day, publicly and privately, O Lord Asclepius, how glad and eager we were when you granted us, as it were, from a great sea of despair to reach a calm harbor and to address the common hearth and mankind, in which

no one, indeed, under the sun is uninitiated…

Here, the time of affliction is safely in the past. The now is defined by the orator's communion with his audience. In the calmness of the harbor, the sea rests as an almost quiescent metaphor. But just as the metaphor removes him from his suffering, it also distances him from his god. Aristides is self-possessed here. The god is appealed to, not as an active author of his speech, but as a separate entity, the recipient of his gratitude.

6. Inscription

In the previous sections, I argued that in the second oration Aristides framed his experience using two distinct, but interdependent metaphors: the "initiation" paradigm and the "sea paradigm." *HL* IV represents a shift in his discourse. This oration is concerned with Aristides' oratory and less directly with his illness or the direct manifestations of the god. The shift in the field of experience from the body to oratory triggers different narrative strategies. For one thing, his *logoi* within the speech become more overtly chronological. Still the relationship *between logoi* is not necessarily chronological and, when it is, the temporal relationship is often obscured. The narrative, therefore, still operates on the principle of association. Here, the thread of association is a third metaphor: "inscription." The new paradigm triggers a new kind of divine presence. Asclepius' interventions now shift from the performative-now to the time of composition—a near past. In addition, recognition's vector takes a new direction. While *HL*II was concerned with the recognition of the god—evidenced both in the episodes recounted and in the formal features of the oration, like *adunata* and apostrophe—in *HL* IV, it is the god who recognizes and sanctions Aristides' pre-eminence among men. This

shift establishes a place for Aristides in the cannon of immortal literary figures. Aristides maps himself onto the landscape of the history of philosophy and oratory and maps Asclepius' importance onto the philosophical tradition. Here more than elsewhere in these orations, Aristides takes on the role of authorship independent of the god.

In this section, I begin by taking up the first episodes in the oration in order to demonstrate the general shift in discourse. I then focus on a particularly marked episode in order to establish how the "inscription paradigm" works. I argue that the practice of writing externalizes the act of recognition allowing the audience and the public to bear witness to the exchange between Aristides and the god. This communion pervades all of his professional activity, from letter writing to appeals to the governor. The externalization of the field of contact with the god away from the body precipitates the process of Aristides' reintegration in the social and political spheres.

This oration has a unique beginning: it opens with a prophecy and a particularly efficacious divine intervention. It thus represents a transitional point within the orations. By employing the same themes—most prominently "initiation"—as he used in the earlier *logoi* and especially in *HL* II, he marks the end of his focus on the god's presence at his body to a focus on the god's presence in his writing.

The prophecy configures his illness as a temporally bound phenomenon:

> Ἔτει δεκάτῳ περιήκοντι τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπελθὸν φάσμα ἔλεγε τοιάδε, ἐγὼ τὴν αὐτὴν νόσον νοσήσας περιιόντι τῷ δεκάτῳ ἔτει, βουλομένου τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ πορευθεὶς ἐπὶ τοὺς τόπους, ἐν οἷς ἡ νόσος ἤρξατο συλλέγεσθαι, ἀπηλλάγην. τοιαῦτ' ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ ἐδόκει γεγράφθαι.
>
> At the beginning of the tenth year of my illness, a vision came and said the following: 'Sick with the same disease, at the start of the tenth year, by the will of Asclepius, I went to the places where the disease began and was rid of it.' Such was what was said, and it seemed to have been written. (1)

HL II abounded with prophecies, but this prophecy is of a fundamentally different type. First of all, this "epitome" of his illness has a full narrative arc. Implicit in these three short periods is the beginning of his illness, the end of his illness and what must be done in order for the latter to be accomplished: he must go to the place where it began. The "prophecy" operates, then, on two overlapping logics: first, physical return, which works, on the narrative level, as a symbolic return to a time when he was well.

This prophecy also differs with respect to his self-presentation. Aristides is an independent actor here. The φάσμα ("apparition") is indeterminate, but he speaks in the first person and narrates the full temporal trajectory of his illness and his healing. In a sense, then, Aristides is the voice of his own prophecy. But Aristides adopts the prophetic register with the phrase: "such was what was said, and it seemed to have been written" (τοιαῦτ' ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ ἐδόκει γεγράφθαι).[132] This is the first time in the text in which Aristides adopts the language of religious sanction in order to participate in the proleptic recognition of its efficacy. The use of the verb g*raphein*, here, is programmatic. The only place where the verb occurs in *HL* II is in the beginning of the oration (1-3) when Aristides reports that the god ordered him to write down his dreams and that he did so when he could.[133] Thus, whereas *HL*II hinged on the tension between the original records of Aristides' contact with the god (*apographē*) and the *suggraphē*, or *diēgesis* (as

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[132] Which contrasts with the prophetic dreams of *HL* II. Consider, for example, the shipwreck prophecy discussed at length above, where Aristides never exhibits his own authorship. He only expresses his recognition of the god's intervention: "And the contrivance of the shipwreck…seemed wonderful to all. Wherein we also knew that is was even he who saved us from the sea" (II.14). The same can be said for the prophecy of the years. In both prophecies, Aristides represses his knowledge about the eventual efficacy of the prophecy. He writes from within the experience. Here, instead, with the formula, "it seemed to have been written," he *authorizes* the prophecy.

[133] I highlight *HL*II here because it is the oration most concerned with the process of composing the orations. It is therefore especially remarkable that the verb does not occur. Γράφω occurs in other orations, but usually to describe an event (i.e., *HL*I.60: "we spent the whole period…in writing and speaking and correcting that which had been written."). It is not used in this formulaic way anywhere other than here and in another important case, which also occurs in *HL*IV.

Downie and Whitmarsh argue) or, as I argued, his performance itself, here Aristides appropriates the terminology of authorship.

This appropriation suggests the possibility of closure, and thus marks a shift in the productive mode of the text and in the felt presence of the god. As he moves from the spoken to the written word, the god's interventions themselves are inscribed: they are externalized in enduring material form. Because they are recognizable, they can be narrated "from-the-outside"—that is, from the perspective of the τις, whose point of view dissolves so quickly in the first prologue. This reflects the ideal dynamics of oratory itself—a process in which one's words prove so efficacious that they are worthy of being passed on in written form and in which the orator proves so masterful that, when recognition becomes a public act, he himself might be set in stone.

While in no way total, these shifts allow the authorial-I to begin to emerge. The emergence of the authorial-I is apparent in the narrative that follows from the prophecy. Aristides gives his audience all the important contextual details. He tells us that he was at the temple of Zeus in Mysia. He tells us how long it will take to get to this destination: he is two days, he reports, from the springs on the Aesepus where his "body first slipped away through a cold in winter time" (2). The prophecy precipitates direct action. He begins his pilgrimage.[134] External conditions mimic his own sense of hope: τότε δ' ὡς εἰς θεωρίαν ἐστελλόμεθα ὑπ' εὐθυμίας αἰθρίας τε οὔσης θαυμαστῆς καὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ δεχομένης ("then we set out for the pilgrimage in good spirits—the weather marvelous and the road inviting.") The pathetic fallacy seems to already confirm the prophecy. Although the journey gets muddy, Aristides is in an almost ecstatic state: ἐνταῦθα δὴ παντελῶς οἱονεὶ

[134] Note the dramatic difference from the journeys of *HL*II.1-18, where it was hardly clear where he was going, when, and for what purpose.

καθιερώμην τε καὶ εἰχόμην, καὶ μοι πολλὰ μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν σωτῆρα ἐποιήθην μέλη, ὡς ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ ζεύγους ("There it was entirely as if I was consecrated and possessed, and I wrote many songs to the savior as I was seated in the carriage") (3). After a few days of dreams and purgations at Poemanenos, a dream tells him to return (6).

Aristides summarizes his days at the springs by employing the familiar "initiation" paradigm:

> ἦν οὖν οὐ μόνον τελετῇ τινι ἐοικὸς, οὕτω θείων τε καὶ παραδόξων τῶν δρωμένων ὄντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνέπιπτέ τι θαυμαστὸν ἀηθείᾳ, ἅμα μὲν γὰρ ἦν εὐθυμεῖσθαι, χαίρειν, ἐν εὐκόλοις εἶναι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἅμα θ' οἷον ἀπιστεῖν εἴ ποτε ταύτην ἰδεῖν ἐξέσται τὴν ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾗ τις ἐλεύθερον αὐτὸν τῶν τοσούτων πραγμάτων ὄψεται, πρὸς δὲ καὶ δεδιέναι μή πού τι τῶν εἰωθότων αὖθις συμβὰν λυμήνηται ταῖς περὶ τῶν ὅλων ἐλπίσι. κατεσκεύαστο μὲν οὕτω τὰ τῆς γνώμης καὶ μετὰ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ἅμα καὶ ἀγωνίας ἡ ἀναχώρησις ἐγίγνετο. (7)
>
> It was all not only like an initiation into a mystery, since the rituals were so divine and strange, but there was also coincidentally something marvelous and unaccustomed. For at the same time there was a gladness, and joy, and a contentment of spirit and body, and again, as it were an incredulity that it will ever be possible to see the day when one will see himself free from such great troubles, and in addition, a fear that some one of the usual things will befall and harm one's hopes about the whole. Thus was my state of mind, and my return took place with such happiness and at the same time anguish.

Here the initiation paradigm is no longer a gloss in response to narrative powerlessness—it is now a category of experience. Moreover, this field of experience is not limited to the body. Instead, the emotional forces have a diachronic reach. Aristides hope and fear here do not relate to the immediate retreat of the god (II.32), but to a more general future. These emotions are also conceptualized as a function of a mental state: ἀπιστεῖν ("incredulity"). This mental work is extended through the imagined focalization of his experience through the eyes of the hypothetical τις. While the metaphorical paradigm

remains the same, it no longer relates to Aristides' physical survival, but to his psychological state. He is on the cusp of transformation, and in disbelief that such transformations will be accomplished. Just as in the second oration Aristides moved from transcribed time to performance time, here we move from the drama of performance time, to the diachrony of narrative time. Increasingly at stake is Aristides' "life story."

In the first third of *HL* IV, Aristides deals with the god's interventions in his composition and oratorical practice. Before Aristides presents himself as a professional success (when the trope of inscription really takes hold), he establishes oratory's healing power over his body. The oration deals with his physical reclamation of his voice. And the development of this theme leads to a discourse on the god's recognition of his preeminence. For example, at IV.22 he explains, "It was often my experience that when I received my topics and stood ready for the contest, I was in difficulty and scarcely recovered from the failure of my breath; but as I proceeded in my introduction, I held my breath more easily and was able to breathe, and as my speech proceeded further, I was filled with strength and lightness and strung my words together so well that the audience scarcely followed…" [135] In other words, his ability to produce speech was beyond the audience's capacity to process it.

The two main topics discussed in *HL* IV are Aristides' oratory and his legal problems. Aristides famously eschewed extemporaneous declamation. For him, composing speeches was a matter of writing. He expands on the theme with episodes

[135] συνέβαινε δέ μοι λαμβάνοντι μὲν τὰ προβλήματα καὶ καθισταμένῳ πρὸς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀπορεῖσθαι καὶ μόλις ἀναφέρειν, ἐπιλείποντος τοῦ πνεῦματος, προϊόντι δὲ τῶν προοιμίων ῥᾷον ἴσχειν ἤδη καὶ ἀναπνεῖν οἵῳ τε εἶναι, καὶ προϊόντος ἀεὶ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμεως ἐμπίπλασθαι μετὰ κουφότητος, καὶ συνείρειν οὕτως ὥσθ' ἕπεσθαι μόλις τοὺς ἀκροωμένους. See also IV.18, 30, 38.

related to inscription: his legal problems are also negotiated via letter writing.[136] Words written on objects allow Aristides to share the viewing of various signifiers with us and ultimately to imagine his own significance inscribed in the minds of future readers. It is, for example, in this oration that Aristides' contact with famed orators of the past is first established. After he describes a dream involving Plato, he writes, "It came about that I beheld nearly all the other ancients who were most famous in literature, both prose writers and poets alike" (59). And he goes on to describe dreams with Sophocles and Lysias. These interactions with the "late greats" establish Aristides as part of the canon; he dreams that a Platonist points to the sky and declares the region Plato's "soul of the Universe." When he looks up, Aristides sees Asclepius of Pergamum (56).[137] Just as he takes his place among the canon of orators, Asclepius takes his place in the philosophical canon.[138]

As Holmes argues, a marked body portends danger in the context of illness.[139] A marked body is a body that has not healed. In a much remarked upon scenario in *HL* V, Aristides' foster daughter dies and he dreams that her entrails declare her death as an exchange for Aristides' own.[140] If, as I suggested above, *HL*I establishes a direct analogy between the body and the transcript (belly and dream), *HL*II disambiguated the body from the transcript. Here, in *HL*IV, writing is, as Webb Keane writes, "the externalization

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[136] Aristides considers letter-writing an important part of his work. He concludes the *Lalia* (quoted above) by asserting that the greatest gift the god gave was oratory. He continues by explaining that Asclepius was content not only that he perform, but that he become famous; then he says, "the greatest thing in this respect is putting me on such friendly terms with the divine Emperors, and aside from contact with them by mail, by making me a speaker before them" (XLII.14). Aristides is hailed by Philostratus as "founder of Smyrna," because of a letter Aristides wrote to Marcus Aurelius upon the destruction of Smyrna in 177 due to an earthquake. The emperor apparently wept and came to the city's aid (*VS*, 214-216).
[137] He adds that he when he woke up he found that it was the same hour as it was in the dream.
[138] Nuffelen (2011) demonstrates the way that religion was increasingly conceptualized by philosophers as generated by philosophical truths in the Post-Hellenistic period.
[139] In the Greek world, a marked body was a slave's body. Holmes (2008) 97-100.
[140] *HL* V.22-24.

of something that otherwise remains inside the body and inaccessible to the senses."[141] Aristides' project is just such an externalization. He recounts dreams that exist in an interior landscape and are absolutely inaccessible to the public.

Writing is also a field apart from the body, and thus a less risky space for divine intervention. Although the process of writing is nearly as concealed as the "interior landscape," writing about writing allows Aristides to expose this process. At one point in the speech, for example, he has just recorded the favorable reception of a letter he sent to the orator Quadratus and he interrupts his narrative: "When I had reached this part of the speech, and I intended to turn to the other benefactions of the god and to write in order those which occurred under other governors and other circumstances, in the midst of composing, I had a dream…" (68). In the dream he calls out to the god in the middle of a speech, "Lord Asclepius, if in fact I excel in oratory and excel much, grant me health and cause the envious to burst." When it was daytime, he opened a book and "found what I had said." So, he adds this new dream to the ones that occurred in the past. In this oration the god is present in the compositional process of creating the text. He is not the immanent presence that, I argue, he was in the second oration. His immediate intervention is contained in the past, just like the descriptions of his interventions, which have heretofore resided in his mind.

I shift now to my analysis of the inscription paradigm as it manifests in Aristides' dreams and resultant actions. I begin with a brief summary of the inscription theme leading to this most pivotal dream of the oration, which occurs almost exactly mid-speech.

The first half of the oration is dedicated to the god's intercession in his rhetorical

[141] Keane, (2013) 4.

career. In the beginning of his sickness, as Aristides explains early in the oration, he stopped performing but was commanded not to give up his practice (IV.14-15). He then recounts his professional progress. He dreams that an important philosopher, Rhosander, compliments him by comparing him to Demosthenes (IV.19). Aristides reports that the god confirmed the dream in waking life (καὶ μέντοι καὶ ὕπαρ αὐτὸς ἐπεσφραγίσατο ὁ θεός) (IV.20). The word ἐπισφραγίζω—"put a seal upon, confirm"—activates the language of inscription I identify in this oration.[142] Here a metaphor of inscription refers to the efficacy of the god's word.

Aristides includes another dream (IV.21) in which Rhosander is equated with Asclepius. This equation happens through abstract writing: he explains, "through the kind of writing geometricians do" (διὰ γραμμῆς τινος ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι). This is a clear example of how writing externalizes the field of interpretation of the god's presence. Since the god is equated to Rhosander in the dream, we now know that when Rhosander compares Aristides to Demosthenes, it is actually the god who does so. This comparison is "sealed" (ἐπεσφραγίσατο) in a dream in which Rhosander's name is drawn in relation to the god's.[143]

In subsequent sections, Aristides describes how Asclepius influenced his oratorical work (IV 22-44): he helped him with extemporaneous composition[144] and encouraged him to write poetry. Declamation healed his body (22, 30, 38) and Aristides

[142] The word occurs in one other instance in this oration to describe the Emperor's granting of immunity on the condition that Aristides continues to practice his oratory. Also, recall the use of the word *episēmainō* at HL II.9 to indicate the sanctioning of the project of the Hieroi Logoi by the god (via Zosimos' dream).
[143] ὡς ὁ Ῥώσανδρος δύναται δηλοῦν τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι διὰ γραμμῆς τινος ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι, γράψαντα δύ' ἑξῆς ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐξ ἴσου, τὸ μὲν Ῥώσανδρος, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον Θεόδοτος· καί πως τοῦτο Θεοδώτης ἦν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ. σαφὲς δ' εἶναι τοῦτό γε, ὡς ἄρα ὁ Θεόδοτος ὁ ἰατρὸς τὸν θεὸν δηλοῖ, ταυτὸν οὖν δύνασθαι καὶ τὸν Ῥώσανδρον, ἐπείπερ ἴσον γε Ῥώσανδρος καὶ Θεόδοτος. τοσαῦτα μὲν περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐδήλωσε τοῦ Ῥωσάνδρου
[144] Aristides preferred composing his speeches beforehand to extemporaneous exposition.

conjectures that his paean to Apollo might have saved him while sailing to Delos.

After his success with these choruses, Aristides decides to offer a tripod to the god. He decides on the inscription of which Aristides reports the first two lines, leaving out the line with his name: Ποιητὴς ἀέθλων τε βραβεὺς αὐτός τε χορηγὸς,/σοὶ τόδ' ἔθηκεν ἄναξ μνῆμα χοροστασίης—"The poet, judge of contests, and *chorēgos*,/ has dedicated to you, Lord, this monument of his choral performance." But then at the last minute, he thinks up another inscription and dreams that he dedicated it to Zeus. He inscribes the tripod with the latter inscription: Οὐκ ἀφανὴς Ἕλλησιν Ἀριστείδης ἀνέθηκε/μύθων ἀενάων κύδιμος ἡνίοχος—"Not unknown to the Greeks, Aristides dedicated this,/ The glorious charioteer of everlasting words" (*HL*IV.45).[145] Aristides emphasizes that this is the fulfillment of a dream prophecy three times in the passage immediately following: καὶ οὕτω δὴ τοῦ ὀνείρατος ἡ φήμη ἐξέβη...καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα ἐπιγέγραπται καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὀνείρατος προσπαραγέγραπται. ἀνέθηκα δὲ καὶ τῷ Διὶ Ὀλυμπίῳ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα καὶ ἀνάθημα ἕτερον, ὡς πανταχῇ τελέως ἔχειν τὰ χρησθέντα—"And so the prophecy of the dream turned out…And the inscription is inscribed, and it has been added that it is from a dream. I also dedicated to Olympian Zeus the inscription and another dedication, so that the oracle was in every way fulfilled." This *logos* precipitates the central dream sequence of this oration. Aristides makes clear that this dedication activates an exchange with the god: γενομένου δὲ τοῦ ἐπιγράμματος πολὺ δὴ μείζων προθυμία μοι ἐγγίγνεται καὶ ἐδόκει παντὶ τρόπῳ χρῆναι ἀντέχεσθαι τῶν λόγων, ὡς κἀν τοῖς ὕστερον ἀνθρώποις ὄνομα ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον, ἐπειδή γε ἀενάους τοὺς λόγους ὁ θέος ἔτυχε προσειρηκώς—"After the inscription, I became much more eager, and it seemed in

[145] See Downie (2009) on Aristides' negotiation of divine inspiration and self-aggrandizement in this particular episode.

every way to be fitting to keep on with oratory, as our name would live even among future men, since the god happened to have called our speeches everlasting" (*HL* IV. 47). Just as his paean saved him at sea, his offering has led, not only to salvation in this case, but to recognition by the god. His recognition triggers the god's.

This episode directly precedes the dream that will be the focus of my analysis. Here, I provide a brief outline of the main dream sequence and the two (including the epigram episode) which bookend it.[146]

i. 45-47: A. decides to offer a tripod as a thanks offering to Zeus-Asclepius for his successful choral performances & gives the inscription; but then he has a dream in which a different inscription[147] comes to him and he inscribes and dedicates the tripod[148] with the latter. Also dedicates to Olympian Zeus.

ii. Interlude of dreams in which Aristides is "acclaimed" (48-51)

    1. 48-49: Dream of the tomb of Alexander:

        a. At the temple of Olympian Zeus with a group of people. The herald calls his name and adds, "because of his speeches" and reiterates emphatically, "for he is invincible in oratory" (προσθεῖναι δὲ ὅτι λόγων ἕνεκα· βεβαιώσασθαι δ' αὐτὸ ἑτέρᾳ προσθήκῃ ἐπειπόντα, καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀήττητος περὶ λόγους).

        b. He leaves and finds a tomb that is shared by him and Alexander. One side is designated for Alexander and the other for him.

        c. He bends over and appreciates the smell of incense. He rejoices, "conjectur[ing] that [each] had reached the top of [his] profession…and that this man was very important in Pella and that those here would be proud of [him]."

    2. 50: Apostrophe to Asclepius

    3. 50: Aristides continues dream

[146] The outline corresponds to the bolded section (*HL* IV.48-51) of Appendix I, in which I have produced a complete outline of this oration (and have placed asterisks next to section involving "inscription")
[147] "Not unknown to the Greeks, Aristides dedicated this,/ The glorious charioteer of everlasting words."
[148] The three feet of the tripod depict Asclepius, Hygieia and Telesphorus.

a. The cult statue appeared with three heads and body shone with fire.

b. The god, "in the posture in which he is represented in his statues," indicates that all present should leave but when Aristides turns to go the statue indicates that he should stay.

c. He shouts out, "The One," but the god responds, "It is you."

4. 51: Second apostrophe to Asclepius

iii. 52: communion with the god rightly results in Aristides' superiority

The Alexander dream is central to Aristides' concern with inscription and writing as a metaphor for recognition. The sequence takes place in three main stages. In the first, the herald publically "crowns" him for his "inability to be conquered in speech-giving" (καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀήττητος περὶ λόγους); in the second, he is at the tomb that is shared between him and Alexander and in the third, he is alone with the god and acclaimed by him. These stages represent three distinct forms of recognition: social recognition, recognition by posterity, and recognition by the god himself. All three spheres are imbued with the sacred.

In the first stage, Aristides undergoes a ritual-like victory ceremony in the Temple of Olympian Zeus—the same god to whom, in the previous episode, he offered the inscription that came to him in a dream. He then "crosses over" (διαβῆναι) into the garden of Asclepius where he finds a tomb shared between him and Alexander. He enjoys the scent of incense that had been laid out for each of them. From within the dream, Aristides interprets this symbol as another comment on his oratory: "I rejoiced … that we both had reached the top of our professions…in addition, it also occurred to me,

that this man was very important in Pella, and that those here would be proud of me."[149]

Like the Athena dream sequence in *HL*II, here Aristides approaches death: he hovers over his own tomb. Both experiences lead to epiphanies of remarkable transformation for Aristides. However, in the Athena sequence, Aristides is on the verge of death. Here, instead, Aristides has transcended death. He is physically close to his death, but this proximity does not threaten his *being*. His death is externalized, transformed into a sign that represents his legacy. The fact that he is present to witness the marker of his own death paradoxically represents Aristides' immortality—the fulfillment of his earlier remark that "our name would live even among future men, since the god happened to have called our speeches everlasting" (47). Thus, inscription in stone is the result of the god's epiphanic presence—his personal and intimate recognition of Aristides externalized.

It is in this scene that the full mediating work of inscription is activated. The space is marked off. In the beginning, he walks through or "crosses over" (διαβῆναι) into the garden of Asclepius. In Greek literature, διαβῆναι is often used in the sense of crossing boundaries: "walking with great strides," or "crossing over the Ocean" or "Acheron."[150] Aristides himself uses the verb in the dream discussed in section I in which—activating an Odyssean motif—he sacrifices to the gods and "crosses the river" to cast his coins away.[151] The tomb itself (μνῆμα κοινὸν) is διαφράγματι μέσῳ

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[149] This recalls the legend of Alexander's pilgrimage to Achilles' grave at Troy (Arrian I 11.7–12.1; Plut. *Alexander* 15.8–9.). For the importance of the theme of Alexander in the declamation of orators of the second sophistic see, Bowie (1970) 7. In his *Anabasis*, Arrian also compares himself to Alexander (1.12.5): "And for this reason I do not think I am unworthy of the first place in the Greek language, as Alexander was in arms."
[150] *LSJ*, s.v.
[151] The only other usage of the verb indicates a river crossing and, though not as charged, it does activate a change in mood. It is the opening *logos* of Oration V and the god has ordered a journey. Aristides starts out, but the trip is interrupted due to extreme heat. He is at a loss for what to do (καὶ ἠπόρησα μὲν ὅ τι

διειργόμενον (“divided in the middle by a partition”). The accumulation of δια-prefix words activates the sense of “splitting” and “separation” that places Aristides on both sides of the established divide. He is in the gardens, alone, a place marked off from the public ceremony at Zeus’ temple. He is alive, but partakes of the offering left for his dead self. He looks down over his own grave (ἐπιστὰς δὲ καὶ προκύψας) and enjoys the incense left there. The splitting, therefore, suggests a larger wholeness. If he is a man of words and Alexander a man of action then together they represent the height of human achievement.

The most transcendent moment of this dream sequence, as mentioned above, is marked off by two apostrophes of the god. At 50 (Biii2) he apostrophizes the god directly:

> τὰ δ’ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη, εἰ μὲν θέμις, εἰρήσθω καὶ γεγράφθω, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοσοῦτον σοὶ μελήσειε, δέσποτα Ἀσκληπιὲ, ἐπὶ νοῦν ἀγαγεῖν μοι διαγράψαι παντὸς δυσκόλου χωρίς
>
> As to what comes next, if it is fitting, let it be said and written, and if not, may you be fully concerned, Lord Asclepius, to prompt me to describe it without causing any disagreeableness

This apostrophe represents a marked shift from those of *HL*II. For example:

> ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν σὸν ἤδη, ὦ δέσποτα, γίγνεται δεῖξαι καὶ παραστῆσαι ὅ τι ἑξῆς λέγοντες καὶ ὅποι τραπόμενοι σοί τ’ ἂν κεχαρισμένα ποιοῖμεν καὶ τοῦ λόγου προΐοιμεν ὡς κάλλιστα. (II.24)
>
> But as to what follows it is your task, O Lord, to make clear and to reveal, by saying what and by turning where, we would do what is gratifying to you and would best continue our tale.

Both apostrophes begin with almost the same formula, but the difference is instructive. In the apostrophe of *HL*II “what follows now” (τὸ ἐντεῦθεν…ἤδη) is attributed to the god

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ποιῶ) but decides finally to push on and once he has crossed the river there is a breeze: “somehow his body recovered and [his] will power was imbued by a certain energy and contentment.” (V.1-3)

from the get-go. The interjection of σὸν before ἤδη makes it "already" his work. Responsibility is completely given over to the god and, as such, Aristides almost completely yields his own voice. He is simply a medium whose attention is turned, whose words are already determined.

In the apostrophes of *HL*IV, instead, there is a much greater distance between him and the god. In *HL*II, the apostrophe is followed by a catalogue of possible narrative paths, as if he were creating the space for the god's voice to enter (and as I argued above, he did not continue with any of the suggested options—as if the god offered his own). Here, Aristides' voice remains distinct. The conditionals indicate that Aristides cannot *know* what is religiously sanctioned (εἰ μὲν θέμις). Using a phrase he uses elsewhere in the context of traditional modes of inspiration,[152] Aristides suggests that the mind of the man and the power of the god remain distinct. While in the earlier apostrophe Aristides' activity is undefined and general (ἂν κεχαρισμένα ποιοῖμεν), here the act of narrating is made explicit: διαγράψαι. Note, in addition, his use of the *graptō* stem verb which opens the apostrophe. With εἰρήσθω καὶ γεγράφθω he varies the formula with which he opened the oration (τοιαῦτ' ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ ἐδόκει γεγράφθαι ("such was what was said, and it seemed to have been written")). The text is no longer a shared space.

This independence is achieved by means of a remarkable act of recognition. In the dream, the cult statue of Asclepius blazes and it has three heads. The statue signals for all the worshipers to leave but when Aristides turns to go the god bids him stay. Aristides reports that he is joyful at having been distinguished. He shouts out, "the one!" But this act of verbal recognition is reciprocated: σὺ εἶ—"You are."

[152] In the *Peri tou Paraphthegmatos* he uses the phrase to describe the Muses' inspiration: ἐπὶ νοῦν ἀγαγεῖν μοι.

The second apostrophe (51) closes the sequence and does the work of smoothing out any tension that his reporting of the dream may have created with the god:

> τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐμοὶ, δέσποτ' Ἀσκληπιὲ, παντὸς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κρεῖττον, τούτου πᾶσα ἐλάττων νόσος, τούτου πᾶσα ἐλάττων χάρις, τοῦτ' ἐμὲ καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ βούλεσθαι ζῆν ἐποίησε. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν εἰρηκόσι μηδὲν ἔλαττον εἴη τῆς πρόσθεν τιμῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ.
>
> For me this remark, Lord Asclepius, was greater than life itself, and every disease was less than this, every grace was less than this. This made me able and willing to live. And now that we have said these things, may we have no less honor than before from the god.

Here, Aristides addresses the god, not to ask for help, but to describe the power of the dream he has just narrated. Asclepius has become the audience of the *HL*, rather than its author. Aristides now testifies to the god regarding what he has done for him: he has imbued him with the will to live. This moment therefore represents a crucial stage in the healing process. He is able to reflect back and state summarily what has been accomplished. In the beginning of this chapter, I quoted extensively from Aristides' prologue in *HL*I. There, not only does he state that he yields to Asclepius, he promises to do so in silence (ταῦτ' οὖν ἐνθυμούμενος ἐγνώκειν παρέχειν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ τῷ θεῷ σιγῇ ποιεῖν ὅ τι βούλεται.). Instead of giving himself over to the god completely, he now has motivation independent of the god.

Here, we see a development in Aristides' "voice." Immediately following this *logos*, Aristides recounts another encounter in which Asclepius reassures him that his distinction is justified:

> Λόγον δέ ποτε ἤκουσα τοιόνδε φέροντα εἰς λόγους καὶ ὁμιλίαν θείαν. ἔφη χρῆναι κινηθῆναι τὸν νοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ καθεστηκότος, κινηθέντα δὲ συγγενέσθαι θεῷ, συγγενόμενον δὲ ὑπερέχειν ἤδη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἕξεως· καὶ οὐδέτερόν γε εἶναι θαυμαστὸν, οὔτε ὑπερέχειν θεῷ συγγενόμενον οὔθ' ὑπερσχόντα συνεῖναι θεῷ.

> Once I heard the following tale, which pertained to oratory and divine communion. He said that it was fitting that my mind be changed from its present condition, and having been changed, associate with god, and by its association be superior to man's estate, and that neither was remarkable, either by associating with god, to be superior, or being superior, to be with the god.

Aristides makes clear that the theme of this short episode is both speeches (λόγους) and communion with the god (ὁμιλίαν θείαν). This is a progressive accomplishment: first his mind must be changed. Once it is changed, he can "associate" with the god (συγγενέσθαι θεῷ). This association, in turn, elevates him over other men. Finally, Asclepius seems to state, it is natural that this association should result in what is perhaps an even closer communion with the god (συνεῖναι). The verb συγγενέσθαι occurs five times in the *HL*. Four of these occurrences are in this oration (the fifth occurs in *HL*V and does not describe a relationship with the divine). Three occur here. The only other occurrence is in Aristides' paraphrasing of Pardalas who "dared" to assert that Aristides "had become ill through some divine good fortune, so that by [his] divine association with the god, [he] might make this improvement [in his oratory]."

This is the sort of interpretation that Aristides cannot himself make in this oration (as mentioned above, he does explicitly state this in another oration). But it is no coincidence that he reports on the justification for his communion with the god directly after his dream in which the god indicates that he is "the one." He is now separate from the god and with him. Moreover, this separate togetherness is a condition that allows for his oratory to prevail—according to both the god and his friend. In the following section, Aristides reports the dream in which he is named by the god (53-54): "Theodorus." The act of naming confers distinction upon Aristides who is now the "gift of god." But it also symbolically determines his sanctioned relationship to the god. He is independent from

him, but in sacred relationship with him.

The relationship between Aristides and Asclepius changes in these orations. Asclepius moves from being an immanent presence in performative time, to being immanent in the process of composition. Eschewing declarative statements about the god and their relationship, Aristides employed metaphorical paradigms to do the work of reconfiguring their relationship. The first, second and fourth orations had different modes of narration: transcript, performance, and writing, respectively. The transition to writing sanctioned by the god represents Aristides' restoration of a self independent of divine co-presence. With this independence Aristides will be able to speak declaratively about the god and his transformative role in his life.

Part Two: Bound to the Beyond. Magic and the Unreal in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*

One is not quite the master of a bond which has been tied elsewhere.
–Jeanne Favret-Saada

1. Introduction: The Framing Work of Magic in the *Metamorphoses*

In his *Encomium to Helen*, Gorgias argues that speech (*logos*) is able to change the perceived reality of its listeners.[153] An exemplary case is incantatory magic: αἱ γὰρ ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπῳδαὶ ἐπαγωγοὶ ἡδονῆς, ἀπαγωγοὶ λύπης γίγνονται. συγγιγνομένη γὰρ τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἐπῳδῆς ἔθελξε καὶ ἔπεισε καὶ μετέστησαν αὐτὴν γοητείᾳ—"enchantments inspired through words are inducers of pleasure and reducers of pain; aided by the opinion of the mind, the power of enchantment bewitches and persuades and changes the mind by way of magic" (10). Similarly, astronomers, "by destroying one belief for another and replacing it, make the unbelievable and invisible appear to the eyes of belief" (δόξαν ἀντί δόξης τὴν μὲν ἀφελόμενοι τὴν δ'ἐνεργασάμενοι τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄμμασιν ἐποίησαν) (13). The change in belief is internalized. Just as drugs change the constitution of the body and even cause death, some words can cause pleasure, pain, fear—"and others, with some evil persuasion, drug and bewitch the mind" (οἱ δὲ πειθοῖ τινι κακῇ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξεφαρμάκευσαν καὶ ἐγοήτευσαν) (14). In the particular case he is discussing—Helen's either willing or forced abscondment—this bewitchment is the genesis of one of the most enduring narratives the Greek world had seen.

In Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, the protagonist, Lucius, confronts this supremely

[153] On Gorgias' psychological interpretation of what words do, see, Segal (1962).

efficacious mode of human expression directly. Lucius' ultimate desire is articulated in a prophecy he receives before he sets out on the journey that will delimit the contents of the novel. Diophanes prophesies that Lucius will have *gloriam floridam*—"flowering glory"—and that he will be a *historiam magnam et incredundam fabulam et libros*—"a great chronicle and a story not to be believed and a book" (2.12). The conceit of literary magic allows Lucius to encounter his desire as though it were a physical, traversable space. In the *Metamorphses*, speech's incantory potential is realized—to appropriate Gorgias, "the unbelievable and invisible appear to the eyes of belief."

In my reading, I will approach the novel as a series of concentric circles whose penetration by the narrator correlates with transformations of medium and voice. The outer circle of the prologue is inhabited by the voice of an anonymous narrator who is all too aware of his material contingency. His manifestation depends on the reader deigning to engage with the papyrus (*modo si papyrum Aegyptiam argutia Nilotici calami inscriptam non spreveris inspicere*) and on the listener forgiving his crude accent (*En ecce praefamur veniam, siquid exotici ac forensis sermonis rudis locator offendero*) (1.1). As we will see, magic traffics in paradoxes—resolving one only to perpetuate another in turn. Here a disembodied voice transforms into a material reality when the reader assumes the subject position supplied by the second person address (*at ego tibi*). We conjure the *magus* who will entertain us, as his final words promise: *lector intende: laetaberis*—"reader pay attention: you will enjoy yourself" (1.1).

The entirely discursive prologue becomes an inhabitable world, and a traversable terrain, as soon as we are introduced to the personage of the narrator and his destination. Thessaly is the first word of the diegetic narrative. In the Greek imagination, Thessaly

was the heartland of magic and witchcraft.[154] Storytelling and physical travel become analogous operations in this, the second ring of three concentric circles. By the third sentence following the prologue we are introduced to Aristomenes, the passerby whose story will replace the drudgery of travel. At the end of the tale, Lucius proclaims: *gratas gratias memini, quod lepidae fabulae festivitate nos avocavit, asperam denique ac prolixam viam sine labore ac taedio evasi*—"I give deserving gratitude, because your pleasant tales diverted us with their liveliness and I avoided the labor and tedium of this lengthy and difficult road" (1.20). His horse must be particularly grateful, he reports, since he was brought to the gate of the city not on his back, but with his ears (*non dorso illius sed meis auribus pervecto*) (1.20)). As Gérard Genette writes, "produced in time, like everything, written narrative exists in space and as space, and the time needed for 'consuming' it is the time needed for *crossing* or *traversing* it, like a road or field."[155] In terms of their linearity (in time and space), there is, then, a natural homology between narrative and physical journeying. In this second ring we enter the narrative's linearity. This linearity has already been invoked in the prologue with the image of the Nilotic reed moving across the scroll (*modo si papyrum Aegyptiam argutia Nilotici calami inscriptam non spreveris inspicere* (1.1)). The purely geometric movement of eye takes on three dimensions in the second phase: a world is magically brought before us.[156]

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[154] For magic in Greece and Rome see Graf (1997); on Greece in particular see Collins (2008) and Dickie (2001).

[155] Genette (1980) 34.

[156] As Genette (1980) explains, "The transition from one narrative level to another can in principle be achieved only by the narrating, the act that consists precisely of introducing into one situation, by means of discourse, the knowledge of another situation. Any other form of a transit is, if not always impossible, at any rate always transgressive" (234). In this chapter, I describe such transgressions (what Genette calls "narrative metalepses"). But instead of an extradiegetic narrator intruding on the diegetic universe (235), the narrator of the *Met* is able to descend further and further into that universe. He exposes the mechanism by which he crosses the boundary of verisimilitude, "a boundary that is precisely the narrating (or the performance) itself: a shifting but sacred frontier between two worlds, the world in which one tells, the

The problem with Aristomenes' story, as becomes immediately clear, is that it is only a distraction. It is transient and it keeps the boundary between the first-person narrator and his audience, Lucius, intact. The road, like the text, makes it possible to enter new spaces and places, but one is not necessarily changed by this transgression. When Lucius arrives in Hypata, Thessaly, he begins to actively seek out magic—the active force of the story the passerby initially told. He gets very close to a direct experience of magic—watching his host transform into an owl. On the road, he played the role of the audience to a story. Here, Lucius is a direct witness. And yet this too is insufficient. He desires not only exposure to what is unbelievable, he also wants to embody a story (*fabula*) that is not to be believed (*incredunda*). His transformation into an ass is the third concentric circle we cross into. Thus his encounter with the homology between road and *fabula* does, therefore, lead to his transformation. And this transformation, as we will see, triggers another homology relating to surfaces—that between his hide and the materiality of the text itself (the papyrus of the prologue). The question is whether this metamorphosis results in greater self-understanding or wisdom. I argue not.

Lucius' desire to be directly subjected to magic is a desire to be in direct contact with *fabula*. But this desire is paradoxical.[157] To be the subject of *fabula* is to be subject to the binding forces of *fabula* (personified, as we will see, by *Fortuna*). Unmediated contact with these force strip Lucius of his agency. What he experiences is not transcendent communion with his own flowering glory, but total subjugation. But he also begins to increasingly embody the expectations of his human masters. Simultaneously,

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world of which one tells" (236).

[157] See Sandy (1974) on Lucius' slavish desire (*serviles voluptates* (*Met*., 11.15)) for magic.

Lucius the narrator (to whom I will refer with the short-hand, "Lucius-*auctor*," following Winkler[158]) increasingly becomes a narrative function, instead of a narrator.

The prologue, as we have seen, invites the reader's direct participation in the creation of the novel and I will argue that ultimately we, as readers, play a role in Lucius' subjugation. At each of the three circles, the narrator or *actor* is threatened by his audience's failure to identify or properly recognize him. In the prologue this threat is addressed with the question: *quis ille?*—"who is he?" The narrator replies with very general and poetic reference to Greece.[159] As a human, Lucius becomes a sacrificial victim, humiliated at the altar of the god of laughter, Risus. The recognition he gains from the citizens of his ancestral land does not reflect his experience. This horrible brush with a fiction shared by everyone but him, triggers his radical transformation. Finally, as an ass, recognition becomes an impossibility. He becomes a mode of conveyance for *other peoples' stories*, and loses sight of his own goal—the restoration of his humanity. We the readers, I argue, begin to see Lucius as his human counterparts do—as a foolish ass—despite the fact that his image is conveyed to us in his own very human speech.

Magic is an ambiguous concept. In terms of its practice, scholars have traditionally defined it in opposition to religion,[160] and while thinkers like Plato and Roman laws like the *Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis* condemned the practice,[161] it is not at all clear that such a binary existed in the minds of those who invoked Hermes, Aphrodite, and

[158] Winkler (1989) 139-142.

[159] *Hymettos Attica et Isthmos Ephyraea et Taenaros Spartiaca* (1.1). See Clarke (2001) and Innes (2001) on the allusive nature of these periphrases.

[160] For a helpful overview extending from Hegel to contemporary cognitive approaches, see Cunningham (1999).

[161] The law was concerned with murder and was not a blanket prohibition on magic *per se*. See Collins (2001) for the famous case of Theoris in Athens. Collins argues that she was not prosecuted for magic, but for poisoning.

Hecate in service to their needs. A second ambiguity has to do with magic's representation. As Winkler has explained, there is a tendency in literary depictions to transpose the gender positions of the actors found in material evidence. Papyri and tablets show men asking for help in their erotic pursuits, but in literature young women are most often depicted in pursuit. Similarly, in literature, the witch is most often a woman (as is the case in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*), while in actuality the most famous witches were men (i.e., Apuleius).[162] In fact, it is the invisibility of magical practice that lends itself to fantasy and Apuleius' own *Apologia* archly demonstrates just how ambiguous magic can be.

In 158/159 CE Apuleius was put on trial for witchcraft.[163] The charges were brought by the family of a rich widow whom Apuleius had married.[164] Apuleius opens the defense speech by pointing to the inherent shiftiness of accusations of witchcraft. He explains why the family resorted to these specific charges: "To avoid giving the impression that he was completely abandoning the charge of such a serious crime, he picked out the false allegation of magic, something easier to insinuate than to prove, and

[162] Winkler (1997) 227. Winkler suggests that the crones are "a Rorschach blot onto which men projected facets of their own behavior." See, Stratton (2014) on Roman representations of women and magic.

[163] The only evidence for Apuleius' trial is the speech itself. The speech is very long and many scholars assume that it underwent at least some revision before publication (for the opposite case, see, Winter (1969)). It is also possible that the speech is entirely fictional, though few scholars have made the case for its complete fabrication. As the only extant post-Ciceronian speech, the issue is of particular importance for historians. See, especially, Bradley (2012) and (2014). Noreña (2014) follows Bradley, but argues that the circumstances of the speech's delivery matter less than the fact that "it was a script generated by the coercive apparatus of the Roman imperial state" (42).

[164] The trial was, therefore, a proxy for a property dispute. Magic often arises around the repetition of biological misfortunes (Favret-Saada (1980) 8), especially in agricultural contexts. Included in the Twelve Tablets (the legendary fifth century BCE compilation of Roman laws) was a prohibition on the drawing away (*pellicere*) of crops. As Collins (2008) writes (citing the singular case of Furius Chresimus), "This trial illustrates that the provision in the Twelve Tables concerning the attraction of another's harvest is fundamentally about the violation of property and the destabilizing effects this could have on an agrarian community" (143-144).

used only this for his accusation" (2).[165] The first charge that Apuleius addresses is that he is suspiciously eloquent (4). Apuleius does not dignify this or any other accusation with a direct answer. Instead, his strategy is to emphasize the inherently ambiguous nature of magical practice. He begins with a question: "I would like to ask his most learned lawyers what a magician really is?" He continues by discussing the etymology of the *magus* as a Persian term for a priest—"Can it be wrong to be a priest, to have the proper knowledge, competence, and experience of ceremonial rules, sacred rituals and religious laws?" (25). He juxtaposes this magician to the common magician, "one who, through immediate communication with the immortal gods, commands incredibly powerful charms to achieve anything he wants" (26). But, he argues, no one who actually believed another man had such power would ever risk making such an accusation. He points out that philosophers and men who have inquired into the nature of things are often charged with magic. He lists: Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus; and then, Epimenides, Orpheus, Pythagoras, Ostanes (whom he will later identify as a magician (90)), Empedocles and even Socrates' daimonion.

When he refutes more specific points of evidence—for example, the suspicious venture of having bought a fish—his strategy is similar. He appeals to literature, presenting a catalogue of sources whose depictions of magic never involve fish (39). Since the greatest authorities—Homer especially—do not record any connection between magic and fish, how can Amelianus be so bold as to assert that one exists? His obfuscation is twofold. First of all, Homer's knowledge of magic, by Apuleius' own admission, would implicate him in its practice. Secondly, formally speaking, Apuleius evades directly addressing the accusation by impressing his erudition upon his audience.

[165] Trans., Hunink (2001).

He shifts the arena of disputation from that of his own activities to that of literary knowledge, where, if his characterization of Aemilianus is in the least bit accurate, he is sure to prevail. Refusing to deny the accusation, Apuleius instead insists that his interest in fish is purely academic. Moreover, even if their suspicions were correct, they never could have observed him in practice, and therefore could not know that he was a magician (28).

Apuleius does not argue that magic is not real. To the contrary, when responding to the charge that a boy fainted in front of him, he gives evidence for the use of boys as tools of prophecy ("I remember reading in Varro the philosopher, a man of the greatest accuracy, learning and erudition the following story" (42)). While he cannot be sure that these methods work, he explains, "I do believe Plato when he argues for the existence of certain intermediate divine powers, which by nature and location are situated between gods and men and which control all divinations and magicians' miracles" (43). In other words, by harnessing the full force of his own erudition, he colonizes almost any practice in the name of the philosophical enterprise. Thus he asks, "Are soothsayers allowed to probe the liver, but a philosopher not to consider it, although he knows he is the prophetic interpreter of *all* animals, the priest of *all* gods?" (41).

His refutation of the accusation that he keeps magical objects wrapped in linen turns into a fascinating excursus on the impossibility of knowing hidden things. He begins, "[T]here are things you have to admit you do not know, but which you nonetheless use in your charge as if you know them. For you say I keep certain objects wrapped in a handkerchief with Potianus' household gods. But the ins and outs of these wrapped objects you do not know and nobody else has seen them, so you admit" (53).

He continues by quoting Aemilianus as saying, "Since I do not know what these objects were, I argue they were magical. So, believe what I say, for I say what I do not know." This is surely a parodic manipulation of his words, but the important point is that Aemilianus argues his case from a distance, from a point of ignorance: I do not know what constitutes magic, but I know it when I see it. Apuleius challenges Aemilianus to declare the contents of the kerchief and then preempts him, "in any case I would fight the issue out with you. Either I would argue that it is a substitute, or that it serves as a remedy, or that it fulfils a religious purpose or that it has been commanded in a dream." (54) In other words, even if Apuleius did have magical objects he would have argued just as he has been.

He explains that there is no ontologically stable act of magic:

> Thus, in a case of magic, anything at all that people have done can be held against them. You have attached a written vow to the thigh of a statue: so you are a magician, or else why did you do so? You have made a silent prayer in a temple to the gods: so you are a magician, or else what did you ask for? Or, conversely, you have *not* made a prayer in a temple: so you are a magician, or else why did you *not* ask the gods? The same could be said if you have deposited a gift, made a sacrifice, or taken home a sacred branch. This day would not suffice if I wanted to pursue all the points for which a slanderer could equally call a man to account. In particular, objects stored at some place or sealed or wrapped inside the house could, by the same line of argument, be called 'magical' and be transferred from the store-room to the forum and the courtroom. (54)

This represents Apuleius' most explicit statement of magic's ambiguity.[166]

Apuleius now finally promises to reveal what was hidden in the linen cloth. He explains that he has been initiated in many cults and that these objects pertain to these mysteries (55-56). He calls on the initiated to publicly distinguish themselves, "if any of those who have taken part with me in these solemnities is present here, let him give a

[166] It also represents precisely the sort of argument modern scholar use to challenge the magic-religion binary

sign. He may then hear what it is that I preserve. For no threat in the world can ever make me reveal secrets to the uninitiated" (56). Having thus separated the wheat of the initiated from the chaff of the uninitiated (among whom Aemilianus numbers), Apuleius wraps himself in his pious observance of the prohibition on divulging the mysteries and admits nothing.

I would like to discuss one more important section of the speech. Here, Apuleius does more than just fold all pursuits into the philosophical enterprise or rebuff the inquiring eyes of the impious; he flirts with the suggestion that he does practice magic, challenging his audience to accuse him in the face of his overwhelming show of erudition, wit, and religious service. The evidence he here refutes is his possession of a wooden statue, which he addressed as *basileus*, "King," (61)—a term used in magical papyri.[167] After discussing the circumstances of its production, he asks that the statue be produced. It is a statuette of Mercury—not an innocuous revelation: Mercury was the god of magic. Apuleius describes the statue: his Mercury has curls, wings at his temples, a felt cap and wears a cloak around his shoulders.[168] He then curses his accusers,

> May this god, the messenger between upper world and underworld, call the wrath of the divine powers of both upon you, Aemilianus, as a punishment for your lie! May he continually bring appearances of the dead before your eyes, and whatever shades, malevolent ghosts, spirits and spooks there are; and all nocturnal phantoms, all fears of the grave—from which you, through age and merit, are not far away" (64).

If there is daylight between this curse and magical practice, it is the fact that he speaks it publicly (we saw that he asserted that magic was by definition a covert affair). As to the question of the supreme Platonic deity ("king") whom he worships, "Now I shall personally strengthen the suspicion of magic: I am not going to answer you, Aemilianus,

[167] See, Graf (1997) 80-81.
[168] The caped Mercury had special associations with magic.

as to which 'King' I worship. No, even if the proconsul himself asked me who is my god, I would remain silent" (64).

By skirting around the possibility that he does actually practice magic, Apuleius has created a vivid portrait of what such practice would look like. Only he knows whether he inhabits that world or not. For everyone else the suggestion remains just that. He creates an absolute epistemological boundary that shields magic from becoming an object of knowledge for those who have not assumed a subject position within its practice.

There is some debate about whether Apuleius wrote the *Metamorphoses* before or after the trial, but most scholars assume that the novel is a later work.[169] It seems to me that had the *Metamorphoses* been written before the trial, it would have been mentioned just as his poetry was.[170] While my argument rests on an understanding of the way that magic works in practice and in the imagination, Apuleius need not have developed his own fully formed theory thereof. Magic and sophistry had a long history of association in ancient Greece and Rome. Contemporary sophists were condemned as magicians. Philostratus defends Dionysius against rumors of teaching the "Chaldean arts" to his pupils.[171] In the *Apologia*, as we saw, Apuleius listed a number of cases in which philosophers were accused of magic.

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[169] Dowden (1994) argues that the *Metamorphoses*, which moves from Greece to Rome and demonstrates an interest in Roman law (426), was a Roman work and thus written in the 150s. He relegates any mention of the *Metamorphoses*' absence from the *Apologia* to references listed in a footnote (425, n.16). Drawing on a number of linguistic parallels between the two works Dowden argues, "These types of expression are…called into existence by theological concerns, not invented for occasional use in a speech. If we are prepared to think the *Metamorphoses* has a theological level, then the likely direction of transit of these terms is from *Metamorphoses* to *Apologia*" (427). But the *Apologia* does exhibit theological concerns. If Apuleius' developed particular expressions to indicate a particular theology, there is no reason that he would hold them back in case he should ever produce a more "systematic" work (428). See Harrison (2000) 9-10 for a review of the debate.
[170] *Apol*. 9.
[171] Philostr.*VS*, 523.

The *Metamorphoses* dramatizes a man's transgression of the threshold of knowledge which Apuleius so deftly toes in the *Apologia*. On the other side of the threshold, it turns out, is pure fiction.

Apuleius wrote one other novel, the *Hermagoras*, but the rest of his works were philosophical, rhetorical or scientific in nature. The *Metamophoses* (and the lost *Hermagoras*), therefore, hold a special place in his canon. The novel is based on a Greek original of which there is an extant epitome.[172] The *Metamorphoses* takes the plot of Lucius' assdom from the Greek story. The inset tales seem to be drawn from an episodic collection of "Milesian tales;"[173] the Isis Book seems to be an original addition. Assuming that the prologue and the introductory encounter on the road are Apuleian, we can read these sections as the dramatization of the author's own entrée into[174]—if not desire for—the text he translates.[175]

In this sense the concentric circles of the text might operate like a *mise en abyme* structure, which Mieke Bal defines broadly as "a microstructure that contains a summary

[172] Here I follow B.E. Perry's (1967) solution to the convoluted problem of the authorship of the Greek novel attributed to (and passed down in the manuscripts of) the second century satirist Lucian. Photius of Constantinople includes a synopsis of the Greek *Metamophoses* in his *Bibliotheca* and references a longer *Metamorphoses.* Perry argues that the longer version was probably written by Lucian and that this is an epitome thereof.

[173] Hence the *sermone isto Milesio* of the prologue. The Milesian tales are attributed to an Aristides writing in c.100 BCE; these tales were then translated by Sisenna. The translation was well-known at Apuleius time. Fronto and Gellius make reference to Sisenna (Fronto 4.3.2; Attic nights 9.14.12, 11.15.7, 12.15).

[174] Apuleius does seem to insert himself into the text at the very end. Lucius learns from the priest of Osiris, in whose cult he is being initiated, that the latter had a dream that prophesied that a man from Madauros would come to him to be initiated. Apuleius was from Madauros, but Lucius tells us that he is from Corinth.

[175] Lucius is often read as a proxy for Apuleius. Augustine considered them one and the same (*De civ. D*, 18.18). Keulen (2004) argues that "Lucius …truly appears as the satirical *alter ego* of Apuleius, who lends traits and concerns of his own to his hero, but nevertheless makes him the object of his satire" (235). He reads Lucius as an unequivocally pompous intellectual (comparing him to the type caricatured in Gellius). And for Tilg (2014): "Given the strong authorial presence behind Loukios/Lucius in the prologue, which sets the tone for the 'poetics of *lepos*' followed in the tales, it is difficult not to attribute Lucius' narrative focus also to Apuleius" (52).

of the overall fabula in which it functions."[176] In her study of love stories in the Torah, Bal argues that the figure has to do with identity and that it is triggered by the relationship between a character's name and her fate. Names tell a "crucial, determining action, by which the destiny of the character is summarized,"[177] and so, "the difference between analogy [between name and deed] and chronology is almost ruled out."[178] Bal goes on to describe the figure in Lacanian terms: the figure acts like a mirror; the mirror is a paradox insofar as it operates as a reflection.[179] This process stages "the dramatic confrontation with the *same* by the perception of the *different*… In the mirror, the subject recognizes itself as a topic, by the mutual focalization of the mirroring and the mirrored subject."[180] This dialectic resembles the process of turning the foolish (*asinus*) man into an ass (*asinus*). But here what is important is precisely that Lucius does not recognize himself as a topic and there are scenes in which he probably should. So, whereas for Bal, the figure is part of the construction of identity, accomplished through a dialectic "between the unique and the identical,"[181] the *Metamorphoses* disrupts the figure's constructive potential with the eleventh book in which the protagonist fails to integrate his experience into his self-understanding.

In this next section, I will explore the mechanics of Lucius' descent into this structure. For each concentric circle, I propose a different theory of magic (or, the supernatural) that explains the transgression of boundaries. These circles correspond, as I indicated above, to 1) the prologue, 2) Lucius' initial encounter with *fabula*, and 3)

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[176] Bal (1987) 75.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Ibid., 76.
[179] Ibid., 88. She next asserts that the basis for the paradox is language and the process of self-identification in Lacan's mirror stage.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid.

Lucius' experience of *fabula* as an ass. They each reflect a different kind of discourse. Lucius as an ass embodies a *fabula*, which, in the novel, indicates a first-person account of an unbelievable experience. Lucius the narrator presents what ancient literary critics called an *argumentum*,[182] a fictional account, which was, however, plausible. The third, outermost circle represents discourse itself: the encounter between the 'I' and 'you'. The 'I' and 'you' are unhinged from any referents in the text. They wait for speaker and audience to animate the *ego* and *tibi*—the second and third words of the novel. What we will find, by the end of this chapter, is that this structure collapses in on itself. The fallacy that the novel sets up is that there is a reality beyond the immediate communion between the book's words and the reader's mind (or the reader's voice and the audience's ears). But what we ultimately realize is that the only communion we have achieved is discursive.

The Second Circle

I will begin at the second circle, the level that we are invited to enter as the line between Lucius' curiosity and our own blurs. The driving force behind the transformation from *argumentum* to *fabula* is Lucius' desire to directly experience unreality. Lucius expresses his desire for *fabula* as a desire for knowledge. The first words he speaks constitute a plea to a passerby whose story he overhears being disregarded as *absurda* and *immania* ("preposterous and terrifying") to please proceed. Lucius explains that he is a *sititor novitatis*—"a man who thirsts for novelty," and so he asks, '*impertite sermones non quidem curiosum, sed qui velim scire vel cuncta vel certa plurima*'—"Share your story with me, not because I am the curious type, but because I want to know, if not everything,

[182] Cic. *Inv*. 1,27; *Rhet. Her*. 1,12 f.

then at least most things." Knowledge is, here, an encounter with new information. He then adds, *Simul iugi quod insurgimus aspritudinem fabularum lepida iucunditas levigabit*—"At the same time, the delightful charm of stories will smooth out the unevenness of the ridge we are climbing" (1.2).

Above, I suggested that the homology between narrative and travel is triggered by Lucius' assertion that the former replaces the latter. Here, the wording actualizes the therapy it predicts as it moves from difficulty (*aspritudo*) to levity. In the prologue, the narrator promises to soothe our ears, *modo si papyrum Aegyptiam argutia Nilotici calami inscriptam non spreveris inspicere* (1.1)—"that is if you do not scorn to look upon the Egyptian papyrus written with the sharpness of the Nilotic reed." The difficulty of tracing along a rough surface—the scroll or the ridge—is mitigated by the stories that emanate from it. By replicating the pragmatics of storytelling in the physical world, the reader is drawn into the *argumentum* of the text. As we read Aristomenes' story, narrated in the first person (instead of in indirect discourse), our experience is seemingly synchronous with the telling.

At the end of Aristomenes' tale, Lucius again draws attention to the uplifting work of storytelling: *gratas gratias memini, quod lepidae fabulae festivitate nos avocavit, asperam denique ac prolixam viam sine labore ac taedio evasi*—"I give deserving gratitude, because your pleasant tales diverted us with their liveliness and I managed this lengthy and difficult road without labor or tedium." His horse must be particularly grateful, he reports, since he was brought to the gate of the city not on the horse's back, but with his own ears (*non dorso illius sed meis auribus pervecto*) (1.20)). With these words, our own awareness of the framing narrative—away from which we have been

diverted now for some seventeen chapters—returns. We are mimetically called upon to admit our own absorption into the tale. We have also been transported by our ears. When Lucius announces his arrival, we are incorporated into the same space through our assent to the tale.

So what does this all have to do with knowledge? Before Aristomenes tells his tale, the unnamed skeptic clarifies exactly what kinds of absurdities Aristomenes would have them believe: the kind which claim that, with a whisper (*magico susurramine*), rivers can be reversed, sea waters and winds stilled, the sun stopped, the moon skimmed, stars plucked, the day raised, the night preserved. The clarification only emboldens Lucius (*in verba fidentior*[183]). He encourages Aristomenes again;[184] and then turns back to the skeptic, chides him for his stubbornness, and continues:

> Minus hercule calles pravissimis opinionibus ea putari mendacia quae vel auditu nova vel visu rudia vel certe supra captum cogitationis ardua videantur; quae si paulo accuratius exploraris, non modo compertu evidentia, verum etiam factu facilia senties. (1.3)
>
> By God, don't you know that it's by way of crooked judgement that things are considered lies which are new to the ear or rough on the eye or which seem steeply beyond the reach of the mind? But if you look into these things a little more carefully, you will sense that they are not only verifiably evident, but also likely in fact.

For Lucius, the ideal encounter with the unknown is an uninterrogated sensory experience.[185] The first sentence of the prologue brings the phenomenology of listening to the fore: *auresque tuas benivolas lepido susurro permulceam*—"I will soothe your

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[183] As we will see below, Lucius repeats *fides* after Aristomenes' story has been told. He chides the skeptic for losing faith in the unbelievable (*perdant fidem* 1.20). GCA 2007 notes allusions to Empedocles and to Plutarch's *de audiendis poetis* (2, *Mor.* 17e). Empedocles was Gorgias' teacher. Kirichenko argues that Lucius' appeal to the familiar in order to justify belief in what is otherwise unverifiable resembles Pliny's (citing *NH* 8.37) (353).
[184] For the question of naming, see, Brotherton (1934) and Hijmans (1978).
[185] So Bellardi (1964) states, Lucius is a "dilettante of sensation" even with regard to language (Schlam (1971) 294).

kind ears with a charming whisper." Words are tangibly (and Gorgianically) present to the body. Lucius characterizes his interlocutor's skepticism in physical terms: he has *crassae aures* ("rough ears"); he spits Aristomenes' story out (*respuis*). If you look at the unfamiliar more closely, he says, *non modo compertu evidentia, verum etiam factu facilia senties. Evidentia* is the Latin translation of the Greek *enargeia*—the term used to describe the power of ekphrasis, defined in ancient texts as "a speech that brings a subject matter vividly before the eyes."[186] Here, then, when Lucius moves from *evidentia* to *factu*, he elides what is conjurable in the imagination with what is actual. The suspension of disbelief here becomes a way to experience *fabula* as real.

After Aristomenes tells of his encounter with the witch Meroe, the skeptical companion challenges Lucius to pin his credulity to the tale. Lucius does so without reservation:

> Ego vero…nihil impossibile arbitror, sed utcumque fata decreverint, ita cuncta mortalibis provenire. Nam et mihi et tibi et cunctis hominibus multa usu venire mira et paene infecta, quae tamen ignaro relata fidem perdant. (1.20)
>
> I don't think anything's impossible. Everything the fates have decided on, happens to people. I, you, all of us experience marvelous (*mira*) and basically impossible (*paene infecta*) things but when someone tells them to someone who's ignorant they become implausible.

Here, Lucius articulates a theory of the unbelievable that will determine the events of the novel. Nothing is impossible because the fates determine reality. We will see that fate (*fortuna*, *sors*, and *fata*) will play a central role in Lucius' own drama. *Fortuna* has already played a key role in the story that Aristomenes narrates (as we will see below). A boundary is drawn here between personal experience determined by the fates, and those

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[186] See Webb (2009).

outside the experience who have the luxury to undermine their veracity. The real, here, is whatever one claims as one's own experience. This boundary permeates the novel. Lucius, therefore, presents a similar choice to the reader: we can choose to believe what follows, or we can hold fast to our skepticism and remain outside of the story.

So, by the end of Lucius' encounter with these wayfarers, Lucius has confronted and learned to make sense of the impossible as a privileged (personal) reality. He finds his host's house, has a small adventure at the market, and, finally, exhausted, goes to bed. The next morning, when he steps out the morning after his arrival, a transformed reality is palpable:

> anxius alioquin et nimis cupidus cognoscendi quae rara miraque sunt, reputansque me media Thessaliae loca tenere, quo artis magicae nativa cantamina totius orbis consono ore celebrentur, fabulamque illam optimi comitis Aristomenis de situ civitatis huius exortam, suspensus alioquin et voto simul et studio, curiose singula considerabam… (2.1)
>
> Rather distressed and exceedingly desirous to experience rare and marvelous things, and considering the fact that I found myself in the heart of Thessaly, where, with the resounding consensus of the whole world, the native spells of the magic arts are celebrated, and moreover considering the story of my most excellent companion Aristomenes which was set in this city, I kept examining every single thing carefully, suspended, in a sense, in prayer and, at once, by my pursuit.

Nothing is what it seems:

> nec fuit in illa civitate quod aspiciens id esse crederem quod esset, sed omnia prorsus ferali murmure in aliam effigiem translata, ut et lapides quos offenderem de homine duratos, et aves quas audirem indidem plumatas, et arbores quae pomerium ambirent similiter foliates, et fontanos latices de corporibus humanis fluxos crederem … (2.1)
>
> There was nothing in that city which was, as I looked, what I believed it to be, but all was transformed by a sinister murmur into another likeness, such that I believed that the stones I happened upon were petrified men, and that the birds I heard were plumed men and the trees that surrounded the town were leaved men, and that the liquid founts flowed with the

bodies of men…

Lucius has entered a transformed world, one permeated with magic. Aristomenes' story shapes Lucius experience of this new place. The world is defamiliarized: everything is touched with the possibility that it is inhabited by invisible human souls. And yet defamiliarization is not enough.[187] As he wanders, he is disappointed: *Sic attonitus, immo vero cruciabili desiderio stupidus, nullo quidem initio vel omnino vestigio cupidinis meae reperto, cuncta circumibam tamen*—"In this way astonished—or rather, stupefied by a tortuous desire—I walked in circles, finding not a hint, not a trace of my desire" (2.2). The potential for the world to be other than it seems is wrenched from him and from the reader.

The motif of a chance encounter on the road is common in Greek literature, especially between poets and the source of their inspiration. If the road in the opening scene of the *Metamorphoses*' *argumentum* establishes a homology between reading/writing and travel, then the element of travel allows what we read to open into imaginative space. It triggers the transgression of what Genette calls the "sacred frontier between…the world in which one tells, [and] the world of which one tells."[188] Here Genette is referring to a discursive intervention by the narrator. In the *Met*, the transgression is seemingly not discursive. It is mapped onto the landscape—Lucius' transgressions are physical. Whereas in Hesiod and Theocritus the encounter with the divine leads to new poetry, here it leads to a new reality.

[187] In "Art as Technique," Shlovsky (1917) identifies defamiliarization as the mode by which art performs its essential function: "art exists that one may recover the sensation of life" (18). According to Shlovsky, art undermines the laws of perception according to which "as as perception becomes habitual, it becomes automatic."
[188] Genette (1981) 236.

Fiction, it turns out, is just as ambiguous as magic. It presents an alternate reality to its audience and can affect individuals profoundly. But it can just as easily evaporate behind the everyday or loose force with over-familiarization. In an article by Stephan Greenblatt explaining anthropologist Clifford Geertz's influence on his new historicist project, the author writes of his attempt to uncover a "touch of the real" in Shakespere, the supremely canonized English playwright. In his effort to begin to defamiliarize *Hamlet* (and "thus return to art one of its principal powers."[189]), Greenblatt turns to anecdotes that conjure the "reality" with which the tragedy interacted, citing a deposition in which a man recounts an encounter with a ghost. Walking from the market back home, the man meets an acquaintance. As they approach a bridge, they converse about an apparition that had been seen there. The next thing he knows, the apparition is before them. He passes out in shock. Greenblatt cites the deposition to conjure a sense of "the power of suggestion to which it bears witness."[190]

I am drawn to Greeenblatt's anecdote for two reasons: because of the stance Greenblatt assumes with respect to the anecdote and because of the particulars of anecdote itself. The act of imagining how the power of suggestion works creates an overlap between fiction and reality, in which the encounter with artifice and "the shock of the real" promise to be one and the same. On the road, this space becomes an approachable place, it becomes inhabitable. The road is where the mundane meets the unknown. Greenblatt chooses an anecdote recording an encounter with an apparition on a road to illuminate a scene in which a group of stationary watchmen conjure a ghost by recounting the apparition's recent appearance. Greenblatt tries to satisfy his "desire to

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[189] Ibid., 26.
[190] Greenblatt (1997) 23.

speak with the dead"[191] by exploring the implications of an encounter on the road. Lucius' desire is dramatized within the fiction itself. As we will see, this desire is ultimately unattainable.

The Innermost Circle

The innermost circle of the tripartite encounter with magic corresponds to Lucius' transformation into an ass and results directly from the implications of his desire for *fabula*. Fabula—in the *Met*, a first-person story about an unbelievable experience—resembles Tzvetan Todorov's definition of the fantastic. Todorov measures the fantastic according to the degree of "hesitation" the reader experiences in accordance with the protagonist's own: "The fantastic… implies an integration of the reader into the world of characters; that world is defined by the reader's own ambiguous perception of the events narrated…"[192] Andrew Laird has suggested that the *Metamorphoses* fits Todorov's strict definition of the fantastic; I do not think that this interpretation is plausible.[193] But Todorov's discussion of the relationship of the supernatural to language helps to identify what is at stake in Lucius' transformation.

> [T]he supernatural often appears because we take a figurative sense literally…the supernatural is born of language, it is both its consequence

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[191] Greenblatt (1988). In his discussion of Greek and Roman necromancy scenes (2007), Niall Slater also quotes Greenblatt's opening line. He points out that Thelyphron's story of the reanimated dead has been preceded by Aristomenes': Socrates, after all, was sapped of life by Meroe and Pamphile, despite his morning revival. Finally, pointing to Laird's argument that the whole of the *Met* is a staged encounter with a dead narrator, Slater settles on a reading that emphasis the ultimate ambiguity of the text: "If both of these posthumous parleys are contained within a narrative which is itself a dialogue with a dead narrator, how shall we judge the reliability of the voice we have been listening to?" (67-68).

[192] Todorov (1973) 31.

[193] Laird (1993) cites Lucius' comment when he sees Pamphile's transformation that he did not know whether he was awake or asleep, but this is purely rhetorical. There is no ambiguity within the text as to whether Lucius transforms into an ass and the ending casts no doubts on the actuality of the transformation.

> and its proof; not only do the devil and vampires exist only in words, but language alone enables us to conceive what is always absent: the supernatural. The supernatural thereby becomes a symbol of language, just as the figures of rhetoric do, and the figure is, as we have seen, the purest form of literality.[194]

Lucius comes to embody the subject of supernatural power. And, granting Todorov's definition, this power is essentially linguistic. Similarly, in a paper on magic and mystical speech, S.J. Tambiah has described what words themselves can do:

> Since words exist and are in a sense agents in themselves which establish connections and relations between both man and man, and man and the world, and are capable of 'acting' upon them, they are one of the most realistic representations we have of the concept of force which is either not directly observable or is a metaphysical notion which we find necessary to use.[195]

The view that the fantastic is symbolic of language and that language is analogous with the beyond helps to explain the easy slippage between persuasion and enchantment—between a resistible and an irresistible force—on which Gorgias depended in order to absolve Helen of blame. Language is here, as in Todorov's definition, symbolic of what exists beyond an immediate empirical reality. When Lucius becomes an ass, therefore, he becomes a symbol of the power of language,[196] which for him is exemplified by (at least initially) Aristomenes' *fabula*. In this light, his speechlessness becomes a function of the fact that he embodies a symbol—he is the thing spoken and imagined, a slave to his meaning.

My contention so far has been that Lucius treats stories as imbued with

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[194] Todorov (1973) 82.
[195] Tambiah (1968) 184.
[196] Cf. Plaza (2006), who treats various "verbal expressions" that become physical manifestations in the novel. She begins her essay, "In Apuleius' Metamorphoses words are turned into flesh" (68) and argues that "the narrative instantiations of verbal expressions… [are] profoundly akin to the main theme of Apuleius' novel in being a kind of metamorphosis. The novel also provides an emblematic illustration of what literature in general is about—shaping words into (fictional) reality" (81).

propositional content and thus as available to him in the same way that knowledge is. However, the paradox of the homology between language and the supernatural is that the one—language—cannot be used to get to the other.

The Outermost Ring

Finally, we take a hairpin turn back out to the prologue. Here, I draw on previous scholars' interpretations of this perplexing introduction. In two separate articles, Ahuvia Kahane has investigated the discursivity of the prologue.[197] His later analysis calls attention to the "materialization of meaning" in reading and writing in the prologue. He explains,

> reading the written words 'I [*ego*] will tell you [*tibi*] a story' to one's self…undermines some of the basic premisses of identity…The reader is the person who reproduces the *ego*, yet he cannot lay claim to that first person pronoun. But the reader is also the person to whom the word *tibi* is addressed and is meant to refer…The result is a profound paradox. The reader is both the 'I' and the 'you' but also neither.[198]

He goes on to discuss the *quis ille?* interruption, arguing that with these twists the novel "marks its own effacement." The prologue begins by "enacting the 'death' of its speaker, then, paradoxically, acknowledges that very death by asking *quis ille?*"[199] According to Kahane, these gymnastics enact the "irreparable referential loss" that inheres in writing. Instead of reading this exchange in terms of writing and death, I argue that this question introduces the reader to the problem of unmediated communion, which Lucius seeks in his hunt to attain glory and fame. While the novel flows from this initial act of animation, the ensuing dramatization will only prove that this initial moment is the

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[197] Kahane (2001), (1996).
[198] Kahane (1996) 236.
[199] Ibid., 236-7.

closest we come to the ideal of communion with the beyond.

In an earlier article, Kahane analyzes the prologue in terms of its illocutionary force. He argues that what begins as a promise (*conseram…permulceam*) ends as a command (*laetaberis*) and that this creates the model for the unmet expectations and asymmetrical transformations that govern the rest of the novel. He begins the paper by pointing out that *At ego tibi* is about the here and now:

> First, the speaker's promise to tell a story is real, since that is what he is about to do. Second, he himself is just what he claims to be, a teller of tales. Third, the deictic *tibi* points to ourselves, the readers, and we are also real. Indeed by our very act of reading we make ourselves the addressee referred-to in the text…[T]he relationship between the narrator and ourselves, his readers is not fictional but 'real'.[200]

Thus, like the *Greek Magical Papyri* with their deictic 'I' and their NN shorthand for the given problem or person of interest, as soon as we assume our positions with respect to the text, we revivify the dead author Kahane postulates in his more recent article. In this sense, the prologue provides a structured discourse that can constantly revive the stories that follow. We simply need to do our part, step into our role. But as I hope to show in the course of this chapter, as Lucius becomes the fiction conjured herein, the reader becomes alienated from him. Lucius, the human character, recedes. In my reading Apuleius is less concerned with the "referential loss" that inheres in writing than he is in the ultimate reality of the discursive context. Writing is a surface (like a hide) containing (propositional) content that fails to transcend the barrier it is bound up in.

Kahane repeatedly suggests that magic is the engine of transformation at the linguistic

[200] Kahane (1996) 75.

and supernatural level.[201] Paula James puts it more directly. She writes that the prologue is the work of a magician: "Apuleius wishes to be seen, indeed presents himself as a magician, thus associating the art of writing with the skill of the conjuror."[202] His seductive voice, which promises to soothe our ears, certainly helps with this identification. But so does his demonstrable understanding that discourse is where the unreal resides. We saw above that language has a special status with respect to what cannot be known insofar as it resembles the invisible power of the beyond. But magic is itself a special case of what cannot be known. Magic operates by way of paradox. It does so by creating epistemological boundaries that cannot be penetrated (precisely because of the absence of propositional content). We saw that Apuleius deftly leaned on such an understanding of magic in order to mount his defense against charges of witchcraft in his *Apologia*. In what follows, I rely on the work of anthropologist Jeanne Favret-Saada to more vividly demonstrate how this paradox is sustainable.

When Favret-Saada went to study magic in the French countryside in the late 1960s, she approached it as she would any other research project: she would find people who practiced witchcraft, she would ask them about their practices, read relevant literature and watch them perform their rituals. But whenever she asked, she was referred to the crone in the woods who had starred in newspaper accounts—an ostracized figment of the village imagination; no one openly professed their involvement. Under the

[201] For example: "We must now consider either that the speaker is transgressing fundamental conventions of speech…or is a…liar, or else that he has some un-usual (Magical?) capacity to change his text once it has been fixed in writing" (85); "The only way to resolve the paradox is by fantastic speculation. For example, we might consider if through some magical process the speaker will abandon his tale or will be prevented from telling it—that the book we are at this very moment holding will somehow disappear, the pages become blank, or, on a different level , that the speaker will momentarily become a mute animal" (86); "One of the basic conditions of the speech act *command* is that the speaker believes that the hearer is subject to his will…Can we not put down the book? Perhaps not, if the book has some magical, or semi-magical quality, which, of course, is the power of all well-spun tales" (89).
[202] James (1987) 3.

hegemony of enlightenment ideals, witchcraft did not exist—and yet, it thrived.

Favret-Saada was only able to discover witchcraft by relinquishing her objective stance. When her demonstrable interest was misinterpreted by one woman as an indication that she practiced witchcraft, Favret-Saada began to practice as an "unwitcher."[203] This was her first discovery. In the Bocage, there were no self-identified witches. There were only those who defended their clients by means of their own supernatural gifts (cultivated through apprenticeship) against the individual who was identified in a given case as the culprit witch. But because witchcraft is a zero-sum game, involving the total sapping of one's opponent's life-force, a strong defense is a violent and potentially deadly offense. When the person one couple identified as their witch died, they were left with doubts about their role in her death. Was their unwitcher a witch?

We learn two things about witchcraft from this ethnography: magic is a product of individuals' taking up a discursive position with respect to one another. The content of the discourse shared between those individuals is only as real as their intentions prove effective. As Favret-Saada explains, "witchcraft is spoken words; but these spoken words are power, and not knowledge or information."[204] There is no knowledge about that content; there is only participation.[205] Participation is total assent. With his prologue,

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[203] Favret-Saada (1980). The term is a translation of the local use of *désorcelleur* instead of the standard French *désensorcelleur*, "unbewitcher" (3).
[204] Ibid. 9.
[205] This is a more radical example of Derek Collins' own theory of magic as communication. In the introduction to *Magic in the Ancient Greek World* (2008), Collins imagines the following scenario. One finds the pierced heart of a chicken on one's doorstep. Tucked into the bloody heart is the reader's name (and hair and fingernails). As Collins explains, "Even if one does not believe in magic, one can nevertheless believe that a magical act was meant to convey a message" (6). He explains that the recipient of this trick would not stop to ponder whether this is a magical act, but would immediately try to pinpoint the responsible party. "Magical acts imply intention, which means that behind the individual act someone intends to convey a message" (6). In these circumstances, one might be tempted to do more than merely

Apuleius ensures that his readers are discursively implicated in the story. With the encounter between Lucius and Aristomenes we enter a dramatization in which the content of discourse can be personally experienced—in which the lines between fiction and reality can be blurred. But as Favret-Saada saw, and Apuleius himself asserted, there is no knowledge to be had about witchcraft. Apuleius demonstrates a Todorovian understanding of the fantastic as pure language. By framing the novel in such a way, Apuleius collapses even the propositional content of the ass into discourse—a fiction balancing on the breath of a temporary 'ego'.

I will now turn to my reading of the Metamorphoses. I begin with an investigation of the terms embedded within the novel and its inset *fabulae*, which reflect the construction of epistemological boundaries. Such boundaries, I have argued, frame the text as a whole. These terms are *curiositas* and *fortuna*—terms long recognized as central to the text. In what follows I am less interested in the normative values that Apuleius may or may not have ascribed to the quality of *curiositas* or to the intervention of *fortuna* than I am interested in the way in which, with these terms, Apuleius stages the penetration of the epistemological boundaries of the framing narratives.

Terminology

Curiositas

According to Plutarch, from whom Lucius claims descent in the first sentence spoken in his voice (1.2),[206] πολυπραγμοσύνη[207] (*curiositas*[208]) is a disease of the soul in which

ascribe intentionality, though; one might resort to apotropaic measures of various kinds. What possible harm could that do?

[206] *nam et illic originis maternae nostrae fundamenta a Plutarcho illo inclito ac mox Sexto philosopho nepote eius prodita gloriam nobis faciunt…*

one's attentions are thrown outward instead of inward. It is a disease defined by an unchecked desire to uncover what has been properly hidden. Instead of looking into your neighbor's house, he urges, block the windows and look into your own—the men and women's chambers, the servants' quarters (515e-f). The failure to do so represents a blinkered perspective not only of the world, but of one's own circumstances.

Curiosity is not only a character trait for Lucius. Curiosity is the engine of his desire and as such, it structures the novel's plot. Lucius' denies that he is *curiosus* in the first direct speech he utters (1.2). But the adjective is subsequently a refrain he uses to explain decisions and behavior. The defining feature of Lucius' time as an ass, as he himself will put it, is his unfettered access to otherwise hidden material—the stories, speeches, and unseemly shenanigans of people to which—but for his animal hide—he would not have access.

This epistemological transgression is dramatized by Lucius' penetration of the homes of his masters—a proclivity that begins with his pseudo-rabid incursion into the house of his cult-master's host (9.1). After the first intrusion, Lucius enters a home in almost every subsequent episode with a new master. As he does so, he increasingly becomes the object of *fabula*. Thus, it is again Lucius' interaction with physical space that changes his relationship with story. The pivot from interiority entailing access to others' stories to interiority signifying his embodiment of story occurs when, at the end of Book 9, Lucius peeks out of the window of the house in which he and his master are hiding. In doing so he exposes himself and thus his master to the soldiers who are looking for them. The culmination of Lucius' transformation from privileged observer to

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[207] Plut. *de curiositate*.
[208] The word is attested only once before the *Metamorphoses* (Cic. *Att.*, 2.12.2). The adjective form *curiosus* is much more common and occurs in Plautus.

spectacular *fabula* occurs in Book 10 at the pastry-chef's house where Lucius' proclivity for human delicacies transforms him into a domesticated curiosity. Here, his master takes pleasure in him (*novitate spectaculi laetus* ("pleased by the novelty of the spectacle") (10.16)), just as we are told by the prologue's narrator that we will take pleasure in the stories that follow (*laetaberis* (1.1)). Their domestic spectacle will be scaled up, as the master will make a business of displaying Lucius, culminating in plans to include him in upcoming *munera*.

At this juncture, we see clearly that Lucius' embodiment of *fabula* only reduplicates magic's structure instead of epistemologically conquering it as Lucius seems to have initially desired. Lucius does not gain knowledge; he becomes a function of human pleasure—his master's and the reader's, whose concern for his survival and his transformation back into human form diminishes with Lucius' own. His hide is no longer a barrier to the actualization of his intentions—it is his agency manifest.

Fortuna

In the pastry-chef scene, Lucius-*auctor* indicates his assent to his role by characterizing his spectators' pleasure in him as the manifestation of *Fortuna*. *Fortuna* is one of the themes that scholars identify to link magic in Books 1-10 (or more narrowly in Books 1-4, after which there are no direct encounters with magic[209]) to the master narrative offered by the priest of Isis in Book 11.[210] The priest, Asinius Marcellus, declares Lucius free of

[209] It is often claimed that the theme of magic ends with Lucius' transformation (i.e., Scazzoso (1951)). But of course Lucius remains in the grip of magical power until he returns to human form.
[210] For example, James Tatum (1979) writes that the prologue's promise to narrate changes in *figurae* and *fortunae* "prepares the way for his story to lead directly to the Isis Tyche, or *Fortuna videns*, of Book

the capricious *Fortuna* and under the direct care of the benign *Fortuna*, who was strongly associated with Isis.[211] Lucius is now in the power of *Fortuna videns*.

Fortuna videns contrasts strongly with the *Fortuna* invoked repeatedly in the preceding books. In an especially lengthy lament against her intervention Lucius calls her blind,[212] characterizing her as supremely unjust (7.2).[213] As Paula James writes, "Lucius' desperate cry that Fortune is blind, unable to distinguish between the just and the unjust, punishing the deserving and rewarding evil-doers…is the cry of 'personal subjectivity'. The course of *Fortuna* has to be constantly re-assessed with hindsight by its victims."[214] This is a crucial point. The blindness of *Fortuna* leads to the inability of her subjects to comprehend, to see their lives in perspective. The invocation of *Fortuna* throughout the novel is an articulation of one's own blindness to the meaning of one's experience in the face of what is felt to be an oppressive force. There is no *Fortuna videns* until one has seen the light for oneself. *Fortuna*, then, is another term that instantiates the boundaries between being inside and outside of *fabula*.[215] Being inside *fabula* is to have no sense of what lies beyond it. It is to be without the capacity to interpret the events at hand. Invoking her is an expression of an oppressed self—a crucial aspect of the reader's

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11…Apuleius has announced a complex theme that unites all eleven books of his novel. The evil deeds of Meroe and Panthia in Book 1 are linked directly to the benign magic of Isis in Book 11" (32). Explicit treatments of magic in the *Metamorphoses* tend to interpret Isis as a goddess of "positive" magic and the witches of Books 1-10 as Isis' foil. See, for example, Frangoulidis (2008).

[211] In the form of Isis-Fortuna/Tyche Pantheia.

[212] Isis-Fortuna blinded those who have not followed her (Witt (1971) 135).

[213] *Haec eo narrante, veteris fortunae et illius beati Lucii praesentisque aerumnae et infelicis asini facta comparatione, medullitus ingemebam, subibatque me non de nihilo veteris priscaeque doctrinae viros finxisse ac pronuntiasse caecum et prorsus exoculatam esse Fortunam, quae semper suas opes ad malos et indignos conferat …*

[214] James (1987) 216.

[215] The use of the word in historical writings is illustrative. Particularly helpful is Bouwer's (2011) explanation of Polybius' seemingly contradictory use of *tyche*. Polybius generally rejects the term, but makes allowances for what Brouwer calls epistemical and physical appeals. The latter, Brouwer argues, is a Stoic conception of the reasoning force that determines events. The former may occur whenever individuals are not able to otherwise explain events.

identification with Lucius (and one which, I argue, fades with time). Therefore, if *curiositas* structures Lucius' internal motivation, *Fortuna* is the personification of external authority that (en)counters his motivation. The priest links the two terms directly when he blames *Fortunae caecitas* (Fortune's blindness) on Lucius' curiosity (11.15).

Lucius' physical transformation can be linked to *Fortuna* in another way as well. We can look again to the first, exemplary story of the novel for the model of *Fortuna*'s interventions. When Aristomenes finds a disappeared acquaintance, Socrates, sulking and lifeless on the side of the road, he chides the man for having abandoned his family. Socrates replies with a pathetic plea: *Sine, sine …fruatur diutius tropaeo Fortuna quod fixit ipsa*—"Let Fortuna take profit from the victory monument, which she herself erected" (1.7).[216] This is again an expression of powerlessness, both over his life, but also over his ability to make sense of his life. It is not only that he cannot act against *Fortuna*, it is that his agency is entirely restricted to his function as a symbol of her power.

Lucius will similarly constitute the physical embodiment of *Fortuna*'s power. The materiality of this condition of embodiment is made explicit again in Book 11. When the priest in the passage referred to above (11.15) attributes Lucius' fate to *Fortuna*'s power, he tells Lucius that from that point on the goddess will have to find some other material (*materies*). Similarly, Byrrhena, Lucius' aunt, will ask Lucius to contrive an honor for the god of laughter, Risus, whom they will be celebrating the next day. Lucius hopes to find enough material with which to dress so great a god (*Et vellem*

[216] *Fortuna* is made the responsible party for the fate of Socrates and Aristomenes repeatedly: 1.6.1, 1.6.3, 1.6.4, 1.7.1, 1.7.10.

hercules materiam repperire aliquam quam deus tantus affluenter indueret) (2.31). Initially, his "material" will be the joke he will provide the town, but in the long run, it will take physical form as his hide. The word's meanings range from the raw material of construction—wood and mortar—to the metaphorical material of texts and treatises (the subject-matter). Therefore, the term when applied to Lucius refers both to his corporeality—the raw material of his body given over to the creative force of Fortuna in the form of a donkey—and to his status as the subject of the book we hold—the *libri* that Diophanes prophesied Lucius would become before he set out on his journey. The goddess of the magical arts then legitimizes the homology between story and magic: Lucius' transformation is the raw material of both.

There are three phases to Lucius' contact with magic in the *Metamorphoses.* The first phase begins with his pursuit of magic and ends with his metamorphosis. The second phase lasts the duration of his captivity under the robbers and his escape with the maiden abductee, Charite. The third phase comprises his subjugation under the masters that proliferate in Books 7-10. These phases represent a progression with respect to Lucius' agency and thus with the reader's own response to him.

In the first phase, Lucius is a desiring (curious) subject. Readers adopt Lucius' desires as their own. We want to hear the stories Lucius wants to hear and perhaps more importantly we become emotionally invested in his efforts to transcend the humiliation he undergoes at the Risus festival. In the second phase, Lucius' desire begins to shift. At first, of course, he wishes and attempts to ensure his transformation back into human form. But when these attempts fail, his loses sight of this larger goal. Just as Lucius'

initial pursuit of magic is modeled on a *fabula*, his motivation in this second phase is likewise shaped by the fairytale *fabula* of Cupid and Psyche. He attaches himself to the escape of a fellow captive—a beautiful maiden—attempting to restore her to her fiancé. The maiden promises Lucius glorious honor (*dignitas gloriosa*); she will display an image of the flight in her atrium; it will be heard in stories (*in fabulis*) and become a written chronicle (*stilis rudis perpetuabitur historia*) (6.29). This represents Lucius' first mental acquiescence to his role as an ass and as a character in a story—a romance story that resembles the old woman's story of Cupid and Psyche. Here, his acquiescence to his donkey body—as the vehicle of the maiden's escape—is synonymous with his acquiescence to his role in the plot of a story.

But this is a fairytale and it will not last. In the last phase, Lucius is reduced to servitude. He is the vehicle only for other people's stories and he will become less and less consequential—that is, until he comes to embody the entertaining fiction that is his destiny as the object of magical power.

So far, I have argued that Lucius' desire for magic is a desire to become story. He wants to become story in order to experience stories as a real and transcendent reality. But this logic operates according to a paradox. Lucius' desire amounts to a desire to embody language and language, as symbolic of the power of the beyond, cannot offer direct contact with that beyond. Favret-Saada demonstrates how magic can operate in the world without existing. It only arises when individuals take a subject-position within its discourse. Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* dramatizes this logic. The prologue creates a purely discursive encounter. The narrator then suggests that this discourse can become a

real experience. The supernatural provides the promise of propositional content—of an encounter with the impossible made manifest. Our intimacy with Lucius as an ass is an illusion that resembles contact with the impossible. But, I argue, this content ultimately fails. In the rest of the chapter I will trace this failure by demonstrating how Lucius becomes increasingly subjugated to his own fictionality.

2. Lucius in the Social World: Books 2-3

Social Laughter as Magic

It is not only the "positive" model of Aristomenes' story that recommends magic as a desideratum to Lucius; it is the negative exemplum of memorialization that the Risus festival provides that drives him to magic as a logical refuge from public humiliation. The transformative force that haunts Lucius in Books 2 and 3 is laughter. Laughter reduces Lucius to a humiliated subject of social forces, which prove beyond his comprehension let alone his control.

Laughter—of the sort directed at an individual—and magic share certain properties.[217] Both draw absolute lines—phenomenologically speaking—between victim and victimizer. When one is the butt of mockery, it is difficult to see the humor; just as it is impossible to both laugh and feel sympathy for the victim at the same time. Laughter is experienced as an external force that is paralyzing—if not bodily then socially. The paralysis is less a product of the joke's propositional content than of the radical social

[217] Baker (2012) compares magic and law in the *Met*, arguing that "Apuleius' conflation of law and magic in the tales of Aristomenes and Thelyphron demonstrates the power of words backed by violence" (361). Laughter, especially in the case of Thelyphron's story, is the mechanism that assures that these forces reverberate in the lives of their victims.

alienation it causes. This is certainly the case in the Risus festival where the laughter is a product of Lucius' ignorance of his role, rather than of any shameful attribute or conduct on his part.

But the differences between laughter and magic are also instructive. Laughter is immediate and it is public. Magic's humiliating effects—if visible—are nevertheless suffered in isolation. Or, so the logic seems to go in the *Metamorphoses*. In the first phase of the novel—Lucius' human experience in Hypata—laughter (*risus* or *cachinnus*[218]) is a force that strips Lucius of his social agency and thus of his ability to control his own narrative. This inability to control his story will drive Lucius to pursue what I have argued represents *fabula* at its most essential—magic—with even greater tenacity. In so doing, he has substituted public isolation and loss of agency for private experiences of same. He transforms into a beast of burden, after all. Under his last master, he does throw off the yoke of physical labor. But here, I argue, is where his humanity is most under threat. In these scenes, Lucius capitulates to his role as a fictional character—a donkey who acts like a human—thus embodying *fabula* completely.[219]

We last left Lucius on the streets of Hypata, the morning after his arrival, in search of some confirmation of his giddy suspicion that nothing is what it seems. Instead, he meets an aunt, Byrrhena, who recognizes him immediately. He visits her home, marvels at her statue group of Diana and Actaeon; but when she warns him that his host's wife, Pamphile, is rumored to be a witch, Lucius cannot restrain himself. He rushes home. This is the opportunity he has been waiting for.

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[218] On *cachinnus* vs. *risus*, see Skulsky (1981); Shumate (1996) 82-4; Lateiner (2001).
[219] Fry (1984) notes that with the Risus festival Lucius for the first time is both a protagonist and its narrator (151). For a thorough analysis of all manner of humiliation in the *Met*, see, Lateiner, (2001).

Over dinner with his hosts, Lucius first encounters the deleterious effects of laughter. When Pamphile predicts rain for the following day, Lucius, with characteristic over-eagerness, launches into a defense of the arts of prediction. He proudly reports that before he left, a man named Diophanes foretold that his journey would be a great success: *Mihi denique proventum huius peregrinationis inquirenti multa respondit et oppido mira et satis varia; nunc enim gloriam satis floridam, nunc historiam magnam et incredundam fabulam et libros me futurum*—"When I asked about the outcome of this journey, he related many exceedingly miraculous and myriad things: that I would have flowering glory, that I would make up a great chronicle and a story not to be believed and become a book" (2.12). But instead of winning Pamphile's trust, he is discredited by Milo, his host. Milo recognizes the man as a known charlatan who, while predicting other people's futures, missed his own impending downfall. According to Milo, Diophanes only realizes he has been publicly swindled when he is inundated by the laughter of the surrounding crowd (*Diofanes…sensit …labem, cum etiam nos omnis circumsecus adstantes in clarum cachinnum videret effusos* (2.14)).

This laughter, embedded in a story told by his host, affects Lucius directly. It undermines the legitimacy of his very presence, because it exposes as a fraud the figure who sanctioned and authorized his journey. The first night at Milo's, Lucius went to bed hungry. [220] On this, his second night, he goes to bed angry.

The next story Lucius hears will not pertain directly to Lucius' life. But it will serve as a warning to Lucius—one which he will not heed. Lucius goes to dinner at his aunt

[220] Lucius buys fish in the market and then meets an old friend who stomps on the fresh purchase in protest at his having paid too much (1.24-25). When he returns home Milo keeps him up with unwelcome talk.

Byrrhena's house. When she asks how he is finding their town, Lucius echoes the praises his aunt had already hinted were the town's due. But he adds that he fears the lairs of witchcraft (*caecas et inevitabiles latebras magicae disciplinae*[221]). He repeats rumors he has heard of witches who race ravenously to the corpses of the newly dead. Just as he did with Pamphile, he again solicits information about witchcraft. One of the guests takes the bait. He explains that not even the living are spared, adding that he knows someone whose face was destroyed by magic. At this sobering comment, the table erupts in laughter and all heads turn to one of the guests. The man, Thelyphron, begins to rise in an effort to escape the unwanted attention, but Byrrhena asks him to stay and tell his story (*fabulam illam tuam*) in his urbane manner (*more tuae urbanitatis*) so that her nephew (Lucius) might take some pleasure from his *lepidus sermo*.[222]

When he first arrived in the city, Thelyphron explains, he volunteered to be a night watchman over a corpse that he was to protect from the ravenous hands of witches. When morning comes it seems that he has succeeded: the corpse is intact. But soon he learns that the witches mistook *him* for the corpse because they share the same name. He only realizes this when the corpse he has been watching over is brought back to life to recount the attack of the witches the night before. The corpse explains that instead of mauling him, they mauled his protector. Only then does Thelyphron realize that the witches have had their way with him. He removes his wax ears and nose and the crowd points and laughs: *Ac dum directis digitis et detortis nutibus praesentium denotor, dum risus ebullit, inter pedes circumstantium frigido sudore defluens evado*—"and as I was

[221] See James (1987) for magic's lairs as "blind."
[222] This language echoes the first sentence of the prologue in which the narrator promises *varias fabulas* and to soothe the listener's ears with a *lepido susurro*. Cf. 3.19 *risi lepido sermone Fotidis*. See Tilg (2014), pp. 41-52, on the programmatic aspects of *lepidus*.

marked by the pointing fingers and turned head of those present, while laughter boiled over, I, in cold sweat, escaped between the feet of those standing around" (2.30). Thelyphron sums up the consequences of his humiliation, *Nec postea debilis ac sic ridiculus lari me patrio reddere potui…*—"Maimed and ridiculous I have not been able to return to my fatherland since" (2.30). Becoming a joke results in total alienation.

Thelyphron is a man with some social standing. He is invited to dinner parties and flattered as urbane. However, his social capital is contingent on his willingness to relate his story and thus transform himself into the evening's entertainment.[223] The retelling is in fact a reenactment of the original experience. Just as he was marked by the dinner party attendees as a victim, in the embedded story he is marked by his by the audience as a victim as well. When he is done, his present company bursts into laughter, mirroring the laughter of the embedded audience. He is a walking *fabula* whose physical presence is inscribed with his victimization by witches. [224]

Here, Lucius is allied with society.[225] The alliance is made explicit when they toast to the god, Risus, whom they will be celebrating—as Byrrhena explains to Lucius just after the toast—the following day. Byrrhena asks if he would be willing to help with the celebration and Lucius answers in the affirmative. What he does not know is that he is agreeing to a fate that resembles Thelyphron's. The toast, therefore, reorients the communal attention from one sacrificial victim, Thelyphron, to another, Lucius.[226] Once again, this story will condition Lucius next "storied" experience. Once again, a story

[223] Some argue that the fact that Thelyphron does not remove his ears and nose suggests that he is dissembling. See Steinmetz (1982) 264ff. and Bitel (2000) 192 & 198.
[224] *Pace* James (1987) 76.
[225] Although, as *GCA* (2001) notes that he reports the laughter of the others and does not seem to take part.
[226] A standard interpretation of the Risus festival makes Lucius a *pharmakos* for the community. James (1987) 87-106, Habinek (1990), McCreight (1993).

provides an architectural structure into which Lucius all too happily saunters.

So while he could not trigger contact with magic directly (by goading Pamphile), he very successfully triggers stories about magic. In fact, this ability represents the extent of his agency. When he tries to accomplish simpler things, like procuring a meal on his first night in Hypata, his efforts fail. The dichotomy between his ability to attract stories and his inability to be an effective social actor will only be heightened with the Risus festival.

Ritual Laughter

As we saw, at the end of her dinner party, Byrrhena asks Lucius to come up with a way to honor the god Risus: *atque utinam aliquid de proprio lepore laetificum honorando deo comminiscaris, quo magis pleniusque tanto numini litemus*—"If only, with your own particular charm, you would think up some fruitful way in which we might honor all the more fully such a great divinity" (2.31). He promises to do so: *et vellem hercules materiam repperire aliquam quam deus tantus affluenter indueret*—"By god, I hope to find some *materia* with which to lavishly dress so great a god" (2.31).[227] As I mentioned above, in Book 11, just after Lucius is restored to his human form, the priest, ascribing Lucius' trials to *Fortuna*, announces: *eat nunc et summo furore saeviat et crudelitati suae materiem quaerat aliam*—"Now let her go, let her rage with all her fury and seek some other *materies* for her cruelty" (11.15). Here Lucius is made the object[228]—the material—of *Fortuna*'s wrath. The "material" he will find with which to "clothe" the god

[227] The metaphor refers to the common ritual act of clothing religious statues. *GCA* (2001), citing Plin. *NH* 33.63.
[228] As we saw above, *materia* can also refer to the object of study or art (OLD s.v.7).

at the festival, will be himself.[229]

Lucius leaves the party, but once at his host's door, he finds a band of what he assumes are robbers. He slaughters them heroically and then slinks inside with the first tremors of doubt. The next morning his doubts well into an outpouring of tears. Already he sees the trial unfolding before him (*iam forum et iudicia, iam sententiam, ipsum denique carnificem imaginabudus*) (3.1). He laments that this might represent the fulfillment of Diophanes' prophecy (*Hanc illam mihi gloriosam peregrinationem fore Chaldaeus Diophanes obstinate praedicabat* (3.1)). And in some sense it will: Lucius will win glory because of his performance at the trial, but it will not be the kind of recognition that he can accept.

Right on cue, the law comes knocking. As soon as Lucius is paraded in public, Apuleius highlights the distinction between Lucius' experience and his public's. Lucius proceeds with his head to the ground, "or rather, to hell below" (*et quamquam capite in terram, immo ad ipsos inferos, iam deiecto maestus incederem*), and when he looks up—obliquely (*obliquato aspectu*)—he sees a most surprising thing (*rem admirationis maximae*): among thousands of spectators, there is not one who is *not* cracking up (…*nemo prorsum qui non risu dirumperetur aderat*) (3.2). Their raucous pleasure is juxtaposed with Lucius' dejection. His walk enacts his submission to the law. His demeanor is already asinine.

Tellingly, when Lucius arrives at the forum, the crowd, too densely packed, calls for the proceedings to be moved to the theater (3.2). Instead of dispensing justice, the events will entertain—a shift too subtle for the overwhelmed Lucius to register. Once the

[229] Or, as Slater (1998) puts it, "he becomes the unconscious outer garment of the god of laughter, embodying him for the festival's spectators" (38).

proceedings have been transferred to the new venue, the prosecutor makes his damning accusations. At first, Lucius can only weep; but, finally, Lucius surmounts his distraught emotional state, and manages to produce an inspired defense speech of great rhetorical skill.[230]

Abandoning himself to tears once again, he raises pleading arms to the individual spectators, expecting to see compassion reflected in their eyes. But once again he is met only with laughter. The laughter is an affirmation of how well he is playing his role. With his spirited speech, the line between fiction and reality is blurred. Lucius' sincerity only feeds their fiction.

Unfortunately for Lucius, the trial is not over. The "mother" of Lucius' victims rushes in, demanding that the bodies of the victims be uncovered. Lucius struggles against the directive, but is finally forced to abide. He does not see what he expects:

> Dii boni, quae facies rei! Quod monstrum! Quae fortunarum mearum repentina mutatio! Quamquam enim iam in peculio Proserpinae et Orci familia numeratus, subito in contrariam faciem obstupefactus haesi. Nec possum novae illius imaginis rationem idoneis verbis expedire. (3.9)
>
> Good God, what an apparition! What a sign! What a sudden change of fortune! For I just numbered among the possessions of Proserpina, one of Orcus' clan, and suddenly I am fixed, stupefied by a contrary apparition and I am not able to find words appropriate for this new image.

Instead of a heap of human corpses, Lucius uncovers a pile of wineskins. Lucius has no idea what is going on. He remains completely outside the story unfolding about him. Nevertheless, his soliloquy is highly literary: *fortunarum mearum repentina mutatio* is a riff on the prologues of both his author's and Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. He uses dramatic language to express his surprise (*dii boni, quae facies rei? quod monstrum?*). The soliloquy demonstrates his readiness to play the part of the dramatic character at a

[230] See *GCA* (1971) *ad loc* for analysis.

crossroads. But unlike an actor, he does not know the script that he is performing.[231] He is entirely alienated from the story and his alienation is marked by his speechlessness.

Whatever laughter had not been unleashed before, now flares.[232] Those who are not managing their belly spasms, congratulate him.[233] Lucius' speechlessness metastasizes into paralysis (*fixus in lapidem steti gelidus* 3.10); reduced to tears, he experiences a social death (*ab inferis emersi*). As he leaves with his host, the magistrates approach and tell him to dispel his pain: he has served the community and the god exquisitely. Every year, they explain, the festival is reinvigorated with a novel prank. They promise that the god will always be with him and that the city will grant him great honors: they will erect a statue on his behalf (3.11). Lucius rejects the offer. The erection of a statue would only represent his divergent experience: to him the statue would point to the fact that the god's honor is his shame.[234] More to the point, because he was psychologically "petrified" throughout the ritual, the statue's iconicity would extend not only to his physiognomy, but also to his state of mind. It would make the latter, normally invisible and transient, visible and permanent.

Milo takes him to the baths to relax. But it is not an easy journey:

> at ego vitans oculos omnium, et quem ipse fabricaveram risum obviorum declinans, lateri eius adambulabam obtectus. Nec qui laverim, qui terserim, qui domum rursum reverterim, prae rubore memini: sic omnium oculis nutibus ac denique manibus denotatus inpos animi stupebam. (3.12)

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[231] For the theatricality of the novel see Graverini (2012).

[232] *Tunc ille quorundam astu paulisper cohibitus risus libere iam exarsit in plebem* (3.10).

[233] If one retains the reading of *φ,* as Zimmerman most recently does (2012). Others have emended the manuscript reading. Helm retains Armini's conjecture *gratulari*; Harrison (2006) conjectures *cachinnari*, arguing that, "something more dramatic than 'rejoice' is needed to match the suppressed belly laugh of the following phrase." But as van der Paardt (who nevertheless adopts *gratulari*) notes *ad loc*, "Yet the manuscript reading might be preserved, for Lucius is seen as an actor, who is congratulated on his performance."

[234] As we will see, statues represent a unifying experience in religious and honorific contexts. This scene represents the opposite. See Winkler (1985) 172.

> Avoiding everyone's eyes and deflecting the laughter—which I had created—of those along the path, I walked up along [Milo's] side, trying to hide. I could not remember bathing, scrubbing, going back home because of my shame; marked by everyone's eyes, by the turn of their heads and by their hands, destitute of mind, I was in shock.

Lucius is utterly exposed. He loses that most integrative of human capacities: memory. Finally, the object of everyone's eyes, nods, and hands,[235] he is again stupefied, completely unable to act.

Lucius' experience is a more extreme version of Thelyphron's. Similar vocabulary is used to describe how they are publicly marked with fingers, hands and turned heads and laughed at (Thelyphron: *ac dum directis digitis et detortis nutibus praesentium denotor, dum risus ebullit, inter pedes circumstantium frigido sudore defluens evado* (2.30)). Both are so humiliated their only recourse is flight.

Lucius, like Thelyphron, via an encounter with magic, has become a story. The men he murdered, as he will later learn from Photis, were the wineskins he found before him transformed by witchcraft. But he is not able to explain the plot, or what role he is playing. Despite the fact that the magistrates identify him as the *auctor* and *actor* (3.11), Lucius has no authority or access to the authorizing power.[236] Lucius embodies the material (*materiam*) for a ritual instead of contriving it as he promised his aunt that he would do (*comminiscor*). Instead of learning from Thelyphron's story (not to mention Aristomenes' tale in Book 1), he will demand further contact with magic and he will

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[235] The emphasis on the number of people present never flags in this description: *cuncta complete… civitas omnis …effuse mira densitate nos insequitur; nam inter tot milia populi...; pererratis plateis omnibus*; *cuncti consona voce flagitant, propter coetus multitudinem, quae pressurae nimia densitate periclitaretur…* (3.2) This heightens the sense of Lucius' isolation.

[236] Which will be expressed for him in Book 11. Winkler (1985) appropriates these terms in order to identify the competition between the authorization of Lucius' experience and his ego-narrative (13). I will use this terminology when necessary to distinguish the narrator from the more immediate perspective of the character.

dictate the terms. This will resolve the main obstacle hindering Lucius from accepting the honors that the people of Hypata wanted to bestow upon him in recognition for his sacrifice to the god Risus. The paradox of Lucius' experience at the Risus festival was that the better he played his role the more alienated he became from his own power. The more his audience enjoyed themselves, the more gaping his incomprehension became.

Lucius' transformation into an ass will isolate him so completely as to render public humiliation impossible. He may feel humiliated, but his shame will be suffered privately. Or, put differently, his humiliation will become a function of his condition as a slave. And not a human slave, defined by his ability to be publicly humiliated, but an animal slave who, from a human point of view is shameful by nature. The solution to being a public spectacle, therefore, only compounds the problem: an experience comes to determine the nature of his existence.

Lucius' Transformation

Lucius begins his courtship of Photis immediately after Byrrhena issues her warning regarding his host's wife, Pamphile. In order to get close to the witch, he will woo the witch's well-endowed[237] slave.

After the traumatic events at the Risus festival, Lucius retreats to his room. Photis eventually appears, somber and guilt-ridden. She confesses that she is to blame for Lucius' troubles, hands over a whip and asks him to punish her. But he does not take her up on the offer; he is deterred by his own curiosity: *Tunc ego familiaris curiositatis admonitus factique causam delitiscentem nudari gestiens suscipio…*—"Then I, prompted

[237] With flowing locks. Apuleius seems to have had something of a hair fetish. See Englert and Long (1973).

by my familiar curiosity, and wanting the hidden cause of the event to be revealed, asked…" (3.14).

Instead of the more frequent *curiosus alioquin*,[238] here Lucius characterizes his *curiositas* as *familiaris.* As DeFilippo writes, "The fact that *familiaris* is the adjective so used … emphasizes the intimacy of the connection between Lucius' character and the quality of *curiositas*. Lucius is habitually *curiosus*: he carries this quality with him wherever he goes…"[239] In his reaction to Photis' admission of guilt, he is able once again to recognize himself and regain some purchase on his life. His curiosity allows him to reorient himself with respect to the day's events; instead of a pawn in a larger scheme, he becomes an audience to his own experience,[240] thus transforming the latter into a story outside himself.[241]

Lucius asks Photis: *sed mihi cum fide memora: quod tuum factum <fortunae> scaevitas consecuta in meum convertit exitium*—"tell me honestly: what deed of yours did the perversity of fortune, persecuting me, translate into my ruin?" (3.14). This phrasing, of course, echoes the prologue (*figuras fortunasque hominum in alias imagines conversas*). *Fortuna*, as we know from Aristomenes' original story, and as will become all the more explicit in the course of Lucius' time as an ass, is the prime mover of plot. Finally, after Photis tells him about the wineskins, he refers to her story as a *lepidus sermo*—the same phrase used to describe Thelyphron's tale and the prologue's offering.

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[238] Or *curiositas ingenita* 9.13
[239] DeFilippo, (1990) 475.
[240] Could *familiaris* have a reflexive sense? The one other time Lucius uses *familiaris* is when, as an ass, he confronts the horrible spectacle of abused donkeys (9.12).
[241] There is much dispute over the role of *curiositas* in the novel. For example, Riefstahl (see, "Appendix" in *GCA* (1971)) explains that *curiositas* is defined by an openness to the world, but argues this trait is passive. Scobie, on the other hand, explains that in Apuleius, *curiositas* motivates and advances much of the action. Both interpretations are valid. One is concerned with the trait as it presents in the person and the other as it presents on the level of plot. Its strength in narrative is precisely that it works in the plot's favor and but against the character.

If the emendation adopted by Zimmerman is correct, Lucius' response reads, *At ego risi lepido sermone Photidis*—"and I laughed at Photis' charming story") (3.19).[242] Thus, Lucius not only understands his previous experience as a story, but also shares in the laughter that had been directed at him.

Photis' account is generically similar to Aristomenes' initial tale. He is drawing ever nearer to his goal. He had a brush with magic, but he had no idea at the time. He takes advantage of Photis' guilt in order to close in on his target:

> sed ut ex animo tibi volens omne delictum, quo me tantis angoribus inplicasti remittam, praesta quod summis votis expostulo, et dominam tuam, cum aliquid huius divinae disciplinae molitur, ostende, cum deos invocat, certe cum reformatur, videam; sum namque coram magicae noscendae ardentissimus cupitor… (3.19)
>
> But, so that, wholeheartedly and willingly, I might forgive every offense by which you implicated me in such anxieties, present what, with my utmost prayers, I ask for, and when your mistress takes up another act of this sacred discipline, show me—when she invokes the gods, and definitely when she transforms herself—show me that I might see; for openly I am most ardently desirous to become acquainted with magic…

He refuses tangential and indirect contact with witchcraft and demands to be a direct witness.

Some days later, Photis steals him away. They peer through a peephole as Pamphile anoints herself and transforms into an owl. Needless to say, Lucius is transfixed:

> Et illa quidem magicis suis artibus volens reformatur. at ego nullo decantatus carmine, praesentis tantum facti stupore defixus, quidvis aliud magis videbar esse quam Lucius. sic exterminatus animi, attonitus in amentiam vigilans somniabar. defrictis adeo diu pupulis, an vigilarem,

[242] Or other suggestions around the verb *ridere*: van der Paardt emends *atsi* to *risi*; Damste (1928) 11 reads *at <ri>si* and Walter *adrisi*. See James and O'Brien (2006) who suggest that this moment of laughter represents an emotional release from the pain of the Risus festival (238).

> scire quaerabam (3.22)
>
> And while she, by her own magical arts willingly transformed herself, I, enchanted by no spell, standing fixed with a numbness set on by the event at hand, seemed to be anything other than Lucius: my mind lost, astonished to the point of madness, I was in a state of waking sleep; rubbing my eyes for a long time, I tried to figure out whether I was awake.

Lucius' is fully implicated in Pamphile's transformation: his experience hinges on hers. The antithesis is manifested in the first three words of the two opposing clauses: *et illa quidem* and *at ego nullo*. Semantically each term works in opposition: the conjunctive and adversative in the first position, the third and the first person in the second position and the intensifying and negative in the third. The near homophony of *et* and *at* and the alliterative *illa/nullo* in parallel positions intensifies not only the juxtaposition between these subject positions, but the contingency of the latter on the former. But while Pamphile's transformation is caused by her intentional use of magic (*magicis suis artibus volens*), Lucius is transfixed simply by what is before him, the *praesens factum*. The complete control she exhibits contrasts with his out of body experience, which depends, and is entirely governed by her. She flies; he is immobile.

Awed by the vision, Lucius gets a hint of the beyond that he imagines she now inhabits. He enters an alternate state: a waking sleep. Yet, it is a transient state marked by uncertainty (*an vigilarem, scire quaerabam*); it is derivative of another person's experience.[243] As soon as he returns to himself (*tandem denique reversus ad sensum praesentium*), he begs Photis to get Pamphile's ointment. But the girl produces the wrong rub.

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[243] This experience, therefore, resembles Lucius' first walk in Hypata. In both cases the supernatural is palpable, and yet insistently outside himself. Here, of course, he is a direct witness of a woman's transformation, whereas, on his walk, he only felt that he was surrounded by transformed beings.

3. Becoming Body

> *It's in his animal communication Man is*
> *true, immediate, and*
> *in immediacy, Man is all animal.*
> *-"A Little Language," Robert Duncan*

Because Lucius desires contact with a *fabula* that is not believable, an encounter with magic becomes the perfect vehicle to reach his goal. Magic is binding and so is the story that is driven by it. His *fabula* increasingly takes hold of his experience. While in the first few books Lucius is obsessed with what lies ahead, once he is transformed—once that desire takes form—the future loses shape. As we will see, Lucius is swiftly tamed;[244] this process of subjugation is defined by his abandonment of the attempt to procure the antidote to his metamorphosis, roses. His immediate survival takes precedence over his long-term wellbeing. At first Lucius is concerned with his own survival and the abatement of his beatings. Eventually he becomes concerned with the entertainment of his masters. This is where he concedes not to necessity, but to the desires of his audience and thus accomplishes the prophecy of his eventual fictionality.

In order to argue that the novel dramatizes a protagonist's encounter with his own fictionality, I will trace the degree to which Lucius stays committed to transforming back into his human self. I will also trace a readerly response to his characterization. With regards to the latter, Lucius' human masters will play a key role. When Lucius' masters are cruel to him, we sympathize with his plight. When Lucius (increasingly) acts the ass, we tend to adopt a human perspective. The more we see him as his human masters do,

[244] Schlam (1968) 51.

the more we accept that we are reading the story of an ass who—a thing that cannot be believed—has access to language, rather than a man trapped in an ass' body.

Salvation in Servitude

Lucius' assdom is defined by his subjugation.[245] The first sign of the loss of his agency after he realizes that he is an ass (*ac dum salutis inopia cuncta corporis mei considerans non avem me, sed asinum video*) is his inability to rebuke Photis: *querens de facto Photidis, sed iam humano gestu simul et voce privatus, quod solum poteram, postrema deiecta labia, umidis tamen oculis obliquum respiciens ad illam tacitus expostulabam*—"In mid complaint about this feat of Photis'—but now deprived of human gesture and voice—I protested in the only way I could manage, looking at her obliquely, in silence, with my lips hanging down, with watery eyes" (3.25). Having lost his ability for human gesture and his voice, Lucius is cloistered in silence. He can no longer help to adopt the oblique gaze, which was initially a defense against the oppressive eyes of an entire town.

Lucius will now be a hybrid entity—a donkey body and a human mind: *ego vero, quamquam perfectus asinus et pro Lucio iumentum, sensum tamen retinebam humanum*—"although manifestly an ass and instead of Lucius a beast of burden, nevertheless I retained my human understanding" (3.26). *GCA* (1977) emphasizes that in this moment Lucius asserts his humanity and rejects his animal body.[246] This may be the case, but he quickly learns that his mind will be of little use to him. He will no longer be able to communicate his understanding except to his reader (in the future).

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[245] See Bradley (2000) on the immediate threat to Lucius' identity and his transformation's parallels with slavery.
[246] *GCA* (1977) 2.

Lucius considers killing Photis in retribution for her odious mistake—but then he realizes that killing her would mean destroying his sole ally. His inaction here is a precursor to the loss of agency that will define his existence as a donkey. Bereft of speech, his choices of action are limited to violence (an expression of his anger) or capitulation. But, violent action on his part (here, as throughout his assdom) will risk his own (violent) demise. He is forced to capitulate: *deiecto itaque et quassanti capite ac demussata temporali contumelia durissimo casui meo serviens ad equum illum vectorem meum probissimum in stabulum concedo*—"shaking my hanging head and bearing the temporary indignity silently, submitting to my most harsh plight, I retreated to the stable, for the company of my horse, my most upright conveyance" (3.26). Lucius' bodily comportment echoes his comportment at the Risus festival: again he hangs his head (*deiectum caput*). In this initial scene, then, we see Todorov's laws of the supernatural in action: Lucius' figurative dejection and capitulation to society has now become literal. He is a slave to circumstance and a slave to human whim.

And his lesson is not yet over. If he expects at the very least to find sympathy with his own horse, for example, he is sorely mistaken. When he retreats to the stables, his horse rejects him. His horse and his host's ass conspire to keep him from the food he himself had put out for them. When he sees a rose-crowned altar to Epona he reaches for the roses, but his own servant beats him away.[247]

This beating is interrupted in accordance with the persecutorial logic of magic's grip. The agents of his salvation will become his vicious masters. A band of robbers attacks the house. They collect so much booty they need the pack animals to bear the load. When in the course of their march to their hide-out they come to a public place,

[247] Other unsuccessful attempts to approach roses occur at 3.29, 4.1-2, 7.15.

Lucius tries, in his best Greek, to call out for the Emperor. But all he can manage is "O!" His second attempt to speak and thus to change the course of events fails and he is, of course, beaten for the disturbance.

He again sees a garden of roses. Mouth agape and full of hope, he is about to consume the roses when he realizes that to transform suddenly back into Lucius again would put him in even more immediate danger. He has a better chance of survival under the cover of an ass. Once again he bears his fate: *casum praesentem tolerans in asini faciem frena rodebam*—"bearing my present fate, in the likeness of an ass, I gnawed on my bit" (3.29). And once again it is clear that, within the confines of the plot, his only option is to yield to his subjugation. His alienation has become his salvation.

The morning brings more of the same. At every matutinal turn, he is tamed. In the opening scene of Book 4, Lucius thinks he sees a rose bush. His hopes are razed, however, when he realizes that the flowers are "rose-laurels"—a plant fatal to animals (4.2). He is so desperate, so overwhelmed by his situation, he decides to commit suicide by eating the poisonous vegetation. But even this degree of self-determination is too much. The gardener on whose vegetables Lucius has just breakfasted observes the devastation and comes to beat him. Almost beaten to death, Lucius bucks him. His wife comes out wailing and the villagers set their dogs upon him. Where can he turn now? Only to his captors who have at least a nominal interest in his salvation. In short, Lucius comes close to death three times in the span of a page and a half and his refuge at each (re)turn is his violent captivity. Lucius is trapped by the logic that his own desire has created. He is bound to the robbers who ensure that there is a plot. His agency amounts to his capitulation to his role as their ass.

But of course the robbers cannot allow this beast's insubordination to go unpunished. They beat him to within an inch of his life. This time it is not his externalized oppressors that save him, but the oppression he bears as his skin. His donkey body—bucking his human tastes—refuses the raw vegetables and he sprays his attackers with feces. In other words, his final salvation in this initial round is an *involuntary* bodily function. In his attempt to find liberation from his body—even if that liberation means death—it is back to his body that he returns. This return dramatizes the essential paradox of the novel. As an ass, Lucius embodies subjugation—he is a beast of labor. Therefore, he will only find salvation in accepting that role. To be the subject of *fabula* is to be a slave to *Fortuna*'s will—that is, to an authorizing force beyond one's epistemological horizon.

Lucius and the robbers resume their journey to the cave and Lucius is burdened with the largest load. He considers a scheme for relief. He will exaggerate his distress and his captors, seeing that he is half dead and debilitated (*exanimatum ac debilem* (4.4)), will distribute the cargo more fairly. But the days of figurative (social) death died with his human form. As a slave, if he has no utility, he is disposable. Fortunately for him, his companion donkey plays dead (*iacens in modum mortui*) before Lucius can. They cut his hamstrings and throw him over a precipice. Fate has anticipated him: *tam bellum consilium meum praevertit sors deterrima*—"Most wicked fate anticipated my very good plan" (4.5).

As we have seen, *sors*, *Fortuna* and *fatum* are central concepts in the *Metamorphoses*. *Fortuna* is a projection of a force behind one's inexplicable condition. She is invoked by those trapped in a story of repetitious woe—one which seems to defy

moral explanation.[248] Magic creates the structure for a binding story and *Fortuna* is the personification of the power that binds human lives to whatever is bound to happen. Lucius' "radical passivity in the face of Fortuna"[249] is simply the only viable response to magic's concrete subjugation of the object of its power. To submit to *Fortuna* is to recognize the authority of the inexplicable in one's life.

And so Lucius learns to be a good ass: *tunc ego miseri commilitonis fortunam cogitans statui iam dolis abiectis et fraudibus asinum me bonae frugi dominis exhibere*—"So, contemplating the fortune of my miserable comrade, I decided, throwing my ploys and trickery to the wayside, to present myself to my master as a healthy profit" (4.5). His worth is directly proportional to his servility.

Mythical Memorialization

Finally, they reach the robbers' cave and most of the fourth book is consumed with the robbers' boastful reporting of various exploits. In the evening, the robbers set out again; this time, they return with a young woman whom they plan to hold for ransom.

The maiden, Charite, relegated to the care of the old woman whom the robbers keep to do their cooking and cleaning, will not stop complaining. When finally she wakes from a bad dream, the old woman tries to console her with a story. The *fabula*—undoubtedly the most famous episode in the book—takes up approximately two of the novel's eleven books. The allegorical fairytale of a love affair between Cupid and the beautiful but hubristic Psyche, saturated as it is with themes of light, revelation, and

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[248] *GCA* (2000) 196: fortune and fate are presented as "an inevitable course of events which propel one along irresistibly"; see also, Intro 2.4.1

[249] Winkler (1985) 108.

darkness, has fueled Platonic readings of the novel for a very long time. In keeping with my emphasis on Lucius' relationship to story, I would like simply to point to the all-consuming nature of the tale. Its sheer length threatens to overwhelm Lucius' own story. In Book four, chapters 8-21 comprise the robbers' stories. The fairytale begins at chapter 28 and continues through 6.24. Lucius' trials recede. He returns to us with this famously impossible statement: *sed astans ego non procul dolebam mehercules quod pugillares et stilum non habebam qui tam bellam fabellam praenotarem*—"But standing not far off, I mourned, by god, that I did not have tablets or a stylus with which I might take down so pretty a tale" (6.25). This passage is often noted for its narratological complexity.[250] But I suggest that Lucius' forgetfulness about his own condition as a four-legged, cloven-footed animal replicates the reader's own forgetfulness of Lucius' status as a narrator and thus as a character. The Cupid and Psyche tale is so enthralling it rivals Lucius' own tale and threatens to subsume it.

There is little time for further acclimation: the robbers return, anxious to retrieve some booty they had left in another cave. Beaten to exhaustion on the way back, Lucius falls to the side of the road and the robbers bemoan his ineptitude. With Ciceronian exasperation (*quo usque ruptum istum asellum … frustra pascemus*? (6.26)), they brainstorm his death. A terrified Lucius hoofs it back. Once left alone, he soliloquizes on the need for action. Disdaining his original obsession with an ironic *praeclara*, he encourages himself to "man-up": *Nam et illa ipsa praeclara magia tua vultum laboresque tibi tantum asini, verum corium non asini crassum, sed hirudinis tenue membranulum circumdedit. Quin igitur masculum tandem sumis animum tuaeque saluti, dum licet, consulis*?—"For that famous magic of yours gave you the countenance and

[250] See, Winkler (1985) 44-45; Fowler (2001) 228-229.

toils of an ass but not the crass hide of an ass, wrapping you finely instead in the thin membrane of a leech. So why don't you seize that masculine (at the very least) spirit and, while you still can, do something for your own well-being?" (6.26). This time, instead of playing the slavish ass, he plans an escape. He calculates that he will surely be able to out-bully the old woman and rips himself free from his reins. But the woman sees him and gets ahold of the strap. Charite then snatches the thong from the woman and gently asks the ass to slowdown so she can mount. Off they bound—a maiden astride her savior.

Lucius undergoes another (albeit fleeting) transformation here. He is the heroic vehicle of the maiden's liberation. He is an ass imbued with mythological power. Lucius tells us that when the maiden came out of the cave, she saw a "grey-haired Dirce swinging not from a bull, but from an ass" (6.27).[251] The maiden mounts him and urges him on with whippings. He obeys enthusiastically.

> Ego simul voluntariae fugae voto et liberandae virginis studio, sed et plagarum suasu, quae me saepicule commonebant, equestri celeritate quadripedi cursu solum replaudens, virgini delicatas voculas adhinnire temptabam. (6.28)
>
> I, because of my own desire for escape and in eagerness to free the maiden, but also at the suggestion of the blows—a constant enough reminder— pounding the earth with equestrian, four-footed speed, I tried to whinny in response to the delicate vocalizations of the maiden.

He describes three motivations for his spirited performance: his own desire, his desire to free the maiden, and the persuasions of the whip. With this tricolon crescendo Lucius' self-interest (*voluntaria fuga*) recedes, making way first for the maiden's, and then,

[251] Dirce met her death being dragged by a bull. The Dirce reference is in the *Onos*, but the memorialization passage is not.

climactically for the more immediate motivation—Charite's admittedly pleasurable whipping. *Replaudens* governs *solum*, but extends to *delicatas voculas*. His hooves applaud the scene just as they enact it. He meets the girl's cries with his own whinnying.

As they ride, the girl starts to make encouraging promises to Lucius.

> nam memoriam praesentis fortunae meae divinaeque providentiae perpetua testatione signabo, et depictam in tabula fugae praesentis imaginem meae domus atrio dedicabo. visetur et in fabulis audietur doctorumque stilis rudis perpetuabitur historia, "asino vectore virgo regia fugiens captivitatem." (6.29)
>
> For I will designate a memorial of my present fortunes and of divine providence with a permanent testimonial and I will dedicate a likeness, painted on a tablet, of our present flight in the atrium of my house. It will be seen and in stories it will be heard and with the rough stilus of learned men the chronicle will be perpetuated as "The Regal Maiden Fleeing her Captivity on an Asinine Conveyance."

This promise sounds suspiciously close to Diophanes' prophecy. The maiden continues, comparing the two of them to other mythical pairs: Phrixus on the ram, Arion on the dolphin, Europa on the bull. She opines, *quodsi vere Iuppiter mugivit in bove, potest in asino meo latere aliqui vel vultus hominis vel facies deorum*—"but if truly Jupiter bellowed in the form of a bull, it is possible that in my donkey there somehow hides either the look of a man or the likeness of a god" (6.29). Lucius is being assimilated into a novelistic world in which he plays the part of the male hero and he is elated at the prospect. Not only does he articulate his assent, he continuously turns his head backwards and tries to kiss her feet. Lucius has no problem with his donkey body here. It allows him communion with the ideal maiden figure. But the image is completely comical. The reader, no longer pitying Lucius, laughs at his effort to close the circle of signification by making amorous contact with her feet. Here we glimpse the danger for

Lucius of embracing his asinine self. When he privileges his service to the maiden over his own self-interest, our investment in, and perhaps even memory of, his human self fades. Instead, we cheer on an ass with the unlikely good fortune of having a praise-singing virgin strapped to his back.

When they approach the road leading to Charite's family home, Lucius refuses to go because he knows that the robbers have gone that way. He cannot speak; but he nevertheless protests to himself: *Quid facis, infelix puella? Quid agis? Cur festinas ad Orcum? Quid meis pedibus facere contendis?*—"What are you doing, wretched girl? What are you thinking? Why do you rush to Orcus? What are you trying to accomplish with my feet?" (6.29). The delay will prove disastrous for their escape. But it will also offer a new perspective on Lucius as an ass—the ass focalized through his human masters: *sic nos diversa tendentes et in causa finali de proprietate soli, immo viae herciscundae contendentes, rapinis suis onusti coram deprehendunt ipsi latrones, et ad lunae splendorem iam inde longius cognitos risu maligno salutant*—"So we pulled in separate directions, arguing a case of the boundary line—or rather the stretch of road to be inherited—when, loaded with their booty, the robbers intercepted us, recognizing us there in the splendor of the moon from rather far off and greeted us with a cruel laugh" (6.29). Some see Lucius' insistence as ultimately human. Maehler, for example, writes, "The funny point of the episode is that the donkey, notoriously restive as he is, is for once wiser than the human on his back." [252] But notice the amplified description of their dispute and the robbers' early identification of the pair. The robbers have been watching

[252] Maehler (1981) 165. According to Maehler, the humor of the legal phrasing (*causa finali de proprietate soli, immo viae herciscundae contendentes*) is due to the fact that legal wrangling took time and these two had none. The joke is really about trivial litigiousness, though. Even the metaphor focalizes them through the eyes of the robbers.

the whole thing, just as the readers have. The robbers are not laughing at the "wisdom" of the ass. They are laughing because as far as these two managed to get, at the last minute, when haste was of the utmost importance, they were stymied by their own stubborn wills. For the readers, the added paradox is that, when Lucius uses his human capacity for reason, he acts the part of the ass. We may not like the robbers, and we may not laugh with malice, but we see the scene their way.

This escape scene represents the apex of Lucius' mythical heroics. For the rest of his time as an ass, he will embody the culturally loaded idea of the ass more and more. Much of the novel's humor rests on our recognition of Lucius' ass-like behavior.

Book 6 ends with the robbers' own version of Lucius' memorialization: they will gut him, stuff his hide with the maiden and leave them to rot. Her head will be left outside the body. They will be consumed by worms, stitched together in mutual decomposition. And she will watch all this: horrified by her own decomposition she will wish for suicide, the most self-effacing act of self-determination, and it will be denied—just as Lucius' has been. The fairytale of their symbiotic flight has become a nightmare of intertwined destruction. Their flesh becomes one. The image is a symbol of Lucius' condition: his hide contains his mythical (deteriorating) story.

But the image reflects an even more disturbing teleology for Lucius' initially idealistic project. The full embodiment of his desire is the nullification of the self. In the robbers' morbid fantasy Lucius will be killed before being stuffed; he will not even be able to bear witness to it. Here, his objectification by the forces of *Fortuna* is absolute—it is fatal. His contact with story is corporeal, and yet he will not be there to experience it. Perversely, the virgin maiden will instead. She will see outside his donkey hide in a

way that he is not able to.

In Books 4-6 Lucius' story—his struggle to survive—threatens to be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of stories to which he is exposed. In Books 7-10, it is their proliferation that begins to efface him. He will begin to tell stories that are barely related to his own. Instead of a human mind trapped in an ass' body, with little reminding the reader of his past or future, he becomes a talking donkey.

4. Slave Self

Lucius experiences the lash of nine masters in the course of the next four books. Under many of these regimes he attempts escape or is temporarily stolen or, under the ownership of one person, is appropriated by another. Here, instead of *mise en abyme* stories, in which the framing situation can be forgotten, the further into subjugation we go, the more all-encompassing the fact becomes. At every turn, we are met again with Lucius' servitude. It is an extensive elaboration on the taming Lucius enured in his first few days as an ass.

Here is a brief summary of the events. The maiden's fiancé comes disguised as a robber and rescues Charite and Lucius. The maiden's family honors Lucius' heroism by giving him over to their stable master with the understanding that the latter will let him roam free. But the stable master's wife has different plans. First, she puts him to work at the mill and then, to make a little extra money, she rents him out for timber hauling and he comes under the hateful rule of a young boy. One day Lucius sees a bear and, out of fear of being eaten, breaks free from his tether. A man finds him and mounts him. A

group of shepherds—friends of the evil boy-master—see the man on the ass and, recognizing the latter, apprehend them. In the meantime, the boy is mauled by the bear. When the dead boy is found Lucius is almost beaten to death by the boy's mother. He is sold at auction to a eunuch priest of the Syrian goddess (8.26). After manifold adventures with the perverse group, they are arrested and Lucius is sold to a baker (9.10). He becomes embroiled in the adulterous shenanigans of the baker's wife. When the family meets its own self-inflicted tragic end, Lucius is sold to a gardener. A soldier steals him. The gardener takes him back. Lucius' own stupidity exposes the gardener to the soldier to whom he is then returned. The soldier has to leave the area and Lucius is sold to a pair of slave brothers, one of whom is a pastry chef. When the slaves discover Lucius' penchant for human delicacies their master, Thiasus, decides to profit on the spectacle. Eventually Thiasus decides to scale up: he plans to include Lucius in upcoming games.

In this section, I will trace Lucius' failing agency in a few ways. I will look at the deeds through which he attempts to exercise agency, namely speech and flight; and I will look at his narrative protestations in the form of appeals to or invocations of *Fortuna*. As his agency fails, I argue, his fictionality thrives.

There is a direct relationship between speechlessness and internal appeals to *Fortuna.* Without speech, of course, the human ability to interact with the social world is almost entirely obstructed. Lucius' options are thus limited. As we saw, in the first moments of Lucius' transformation he wanted to rebuke Photis, and was unable. He could either punish her violently, or accept his fate. Appeals to fate, then, replace—but do little to ameliorate—his loss of human speech.

The link between loss of speech and appeals to *Fortuna* is most apparent at the beginning of Book 7. A robber enters the cave and announces to his brethren that they have nothing to fear with regards to Milo's property: a man named Lucius has been accused of the burglary. This is the cause of profound injury to Lucius. He groans inwardly (*medullitus ingemebam*). He compares the previous fortune (*veteris fortunae*) of that blessed Lucius (*illius beati Lucii*) with the present hardships (*praesentisque aerumnae*) of the unhappy ass (*infelicis asini*). He then launches into a sophistic digression on *Fortuna*. She is unjust since she rewards the evil and punishes the good. She has turned him into a beast and now he is being accused of a crime against his most cherished host (7.3). But he is especially disturbed by the fact that he cannot defend himself: *nec mihi tamen licebat causam meam defendere vel unico verbo saltem denegere*—"Nevertheless, it was not permitted me to present the case for my defense, nor to deny the accusations with so much as a single word." Despite his awareness that he can articulate no defense, he worries that his silence will incriminate him. He tries to say, *non feci*—"I didn't do it." That is not what comes out:

> et verbum quidem praecedens semel ac saepius inmodice clamitavi, sequens vero nullo pacto disserere potui, sed in prima remansi voce et identidem boavi 'non non', quanquam nimia rotunditate pendulas vibrassem labias. (7.3)
>
> And the first word I cried out once and excessively more, but the second I was not able to put together in any way, instead my voice clung to the first sound and I bellowed out, "no, no," although I propelled my pendulous lips with formally perfect roundness.

He cannot get past the overwhelming physicality of his lips in order to move beyond the first part of the phrase.

In this scene, Lucius compares his old self to the new. Internally, he expresses a lengthy human protest; he tries to externalize the core message—"I didn't do it." But this will be one of the last times that he will connect the injustice he experiences to his previous (undeserving) self. Just as we saw that Lucius was disciplined to the point of accepting his immediate metamorphosis at the end of Book 4, now he will be disciplined into accepting his fate within his *fabula*.

Speech

The trauma of his speechlessness is at its most acute when Lucius hears that he has been accused of the burglary at Milo's. After this, there is a steady decline in his preoccupation with speech. After he and Charite are saved and they are paraded through the town triumphantly, *denique ipse etiam hilarior pro virili parte, ne praesenti negotio ut alienus discreparem, porrectis auribus proflatisque naribus rudivi fortiter, immo tonanti clamore personui*—"then I, relatively pleased with the masculine part I played, lest, like an outsider, I prove myself discordant with the present business, with extended ears and inflated nostrils, I brayed loudly, indeed, I sounded out with a thunderous clap" (7.13). This scene resembles Lucius' first escape scene with the maiden discussed above. Here, he embraces his donkey body (*porrectis auribus proflatisque naribus*), uses his *donkey* voice (*rudivi*) to express his pride at his *donkey* deed (*virili parte*). He does so in order not to seem "out of tune" with the events (*ne… discreparem*). He insists that he is part of a harmonious whole.

But this high register plummets as the virgin fades from his life. What few utterances he will venture from then on will now more closely resemble Eeyoric moans

and groans. More often, he will emphasize his pathetic silence. When the evil boy-master tells his cohort that Lucius tries to hump every damsel he sees, Lucius reports, *talibus mendaciis admiscendo sermones alios qui meum verecundum silentium vehementius premerent, animos pastorum in meum perniciem atrociter suscitavit*—"His storytelling, mixed with such lies, suppressed my voice, shamed as it was, and incited the shepherds towards my destruction" (7.22). The man who finds Lucius after he breaks free at the sight of a bear wishes that Lucius could speak as a witness when he is found and accused by the boy's friends of stealing the ass: '*atque utinam ipse asinus*' *inquit* '*quem numquam profecto vidissem, vocem quiret humanam dare meaeque testimonium innocentiae perhibere posset*—"If only that ass—I wish I'd never seen him—had the capacity for human language and could testify to my innocence" (7.25). Soon afterwards, they come across the remains of the mauled boy and Lucius remarks that he would have professed the cause of his death, if he had the means (*si loquendi copia suppeditaret*) (7.26). While in the first passage he does express some regret, the other two are hardly protests at all. They simply point to Lucius' incapacitation.

The next time Lucius uses his voice he is actually effective. He brays in protest when the eunuch cult is about to ravage a young boy. By happenstance, there is a group roaming the streets looking for a missing ass. When they hear him, they check to see if he is the ass they are looking for and they come upon the scandal. But here his agency is a function of the happy coincidence the story provides. Lucius serves the boy and the story. But his fate stays with the cult members he so deplores.

In a final example, Lucius articulates a mute lament for his master. He introduces his narrative of the adulterous baker's wife with an aside: he often groaned silently in

sympathy for *his master's* plight (*ut Hercules eius vicem ego quoque tacitus frequenter ingemescerem* (9.14)). His emotions are now attached to the stories to which he is uniquely priviledged rather than to his own plight. He is not only a servant to his master, he is his loyal audience as well.

Escape

Another way in which we see Lucius' acceptance of his role is in his escape attempts. These scenes do not involve attempts to escape a master, but to escape death (or, what is worse, castration). His agency, then, is a function not of the impulse for self-determination, but of the impulse for self-preservation. These scenes troublingly suggest that flight would be easier than Lucius lets on. When he does finally break free at the end of Book 10, it is hardly a "break" at all. He simply walks away from the scene; his master was so taken with his obsequiousness that he felt no need to tie him up.

The first of these scenes returns us to the boy-master's reign of terror. The boy tells his toadying shepherd companions tales of Lucius' sexual proclivities. Full of righteous indignation, the shepherds suggest killing Lucius. The boy is all for it. Lucius is saved by a more incisive suggestion: instead of wasting the whole ass, they would do better to remove the offending part. They decide to geld him the next day. Lucius mourns, *Tali sententia mediis Orci manibus extractus, set extremae poenae reservatus maerebam, et in novissima parte corporis totum me periturum deflebam*—"Rescued by this judgment from the middle shades of Orcus, and yet preserved for a more extreme punishment I mourned and I shed tears over my impending doom, which remanded to the final relic of me, would be total." (7.24). Once again, Lucius considers various methods

of suicide. The next day he is taken out into the woods and tied up while the boy collects his timber. Lucius sees a bear and instead of taking this apparition as the bringer of death he was hoping for, he shoots forward with all his might and, breaking the reins, frees himself. There was no need to consider suicide in the first place; he could have escaped at any time. But he only does so (until the very end), when plot makes it absolutely necessary.

The second escape occurs when a desperate cook loses his master's dinner to the dogs. His wife suggests they slaughter the donkey instead (8.31). Lucius decides to make a run for it (9.1). He breaks free of his reins once again and rushes through the dining room destroying the sacrificial meal the host is sharing with the eunuchs. The master orders Lucius be locked away. At that moment, a boy comes in and announces that there are rabid dogs loose. Justifying his wild intrusion by this fact, Lucius is sure that they will kill him, and he runs off into a room. The humans bolt the door closed behind him. For now, he is safe.

***Proleptic* Fortunae**

In the middle of the previous episode—between the order to lock Lucius up and the announcement of the rabid dog—Lucius-*auctor* explains, *sed nimirum nihil Fortuna rennuente licet homini nato dexterum provenire, nec consilio prudenti vel remedio sagaci divinae providentiae fatalis dispositio subverti vel reformari potest*—"But evidently *Fortuna* does not allow man born to prosper; neither by prudent deliberation, nor by learned remedy is the disposition of deadly providence able to subvert or to transform" (9.1). Here, the narrator is not reporting on Lucius' internal ruminations as he did in the

last reference to *Fortuna*. Rather, he is interrupting and looking forward to events that follow. This prolepsis, of course, can only originate from the position of someone who knows what will happen next. A strictly narratological reading would emphasize that here the *ex eventu* narrator emerges. But as Winkler explains, these appeals to *Fortuna* actively suppress the *ex eventu* author. These prolepses only refer to the most immediate of events. They never extend to Lucius' ultimate fate—his return to human form and initiation under Isis. The prolepses place the immediate story more vividly before us.[253]

As I argued above, appeals to *Fortuna* mark the speaker as a subject of the reigning goddess of *fabula* and thus as speaking from the perspective of being inside a story. At 7.2, Lucius-*actor* soliloquizes on *Fortuna*'s injustice directly; here, the narrator has appropriated the language of the character and soliloquizes on his behalf. He is assimilated into the *actor*'s immediate world, consumed by his most pressing concerns.

These proleptic *Fortunae* cluster around the boy-master episode. This episode constitutes Lucius' most thorough conditioning into the character of the talking ass. At 7.16 he says, *Talibus aerumnis edomitum novis Fortuna saeva tradidit cruciatibus, scilicet ut, quod aiunt, domi forisque fortibus factis adoriae plenae gloriarer*—"Savage *Fortuna* handed me, already thoroughly tamed by such great hardships, to new tortures, so, I guess, as they say, at home or abroad, I might boast of courageous deeds done with full distinction." Lucius concedes that his glory resides in his assdom. His transcendence is bound to his servile hide.

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[253] Winkler (1985) calls these "Fortuna-comments" falsifications. The first falsification is that it produces the effect of an "allu[sion] to a consummation of the narrative." The second is that "any first-reader understands such remarks as a playwright's or a novelist's technique for heightening the vividness of the story and defining the units of action" (148). But as he points out, because some of the references to *Fortuna* are positive, "the second-reader can only force the text into the mold of Mithras's theology by snipping off, like Cinderella's stepsisters, parts of what should fit in there" (149).

The prolepses are repeated like a refrain in this section:[254] *verum Fortuna meis cruciatibus insatiabilis aliam mihi denuo pestem instruxit*—"But Fortuna, never sated with my tortures, prepared another plague for me once again" (7.17); and when he is almost burned to death: *sed in rebus scaevis adfulsit Fortunae nutus hilarior, nescio an futuris periculis me reservans, certe praesente statutaque morte liberans*—"But the cheerful command of *Fortuna* shone her favor on me in the midst of my misfortunes, either preserving me for dangers to come, or in any case, freeing me from the immediate appointed death" (7.20). The invocations of *Fortuna* occur from-within Lucius' story. They become a way for Lucius-*auctor* to signify his recognition that Lucius-*actor* is bound to the vicissitudes of his subjugation. As Lucius-*auctor* remembers the past, he re-enters it. And he too submits to the troubling constraints of the story. He completely identifies with the previous self.

Becoming Fabula

Lucius-*auctor*'s ironic side emerges in his prolepses, for example, the one quoted just above: *sed in rebus scaevis adfulsit Fortunae nutus hilarior, nescio an futuris periculis me reservans, certe praesente statutaque morte liberans*—"But the cheerful command of *Fortuna* shone her favor on me in the midst of my misfortunes, either preserving me for dangers to come, or in any case, freeing me from the immediate appointed death" (7.20)

He also uses irony to point out the uselessness of an ass who thinks.[255] This pattern begins when he is still under the sublime auspices of the maiden. Lucius becomes

[254] Lucius' taming under the boy recalls his first hours as an ass. There Lucius the *actor* inscribes his reactions as submission to fate (*casui meo serviens*, and *casum praesentem tolerans*).
[255] Winkler (1985) calls these "sophomoric" utterances, explaining that the narrator's own term "might perhaps be 'philosophizing ass'" (150).

angry that she is flirting with the "new recruit" while engaged (the new recruit will turn out to be her fiancé). Lucius-*auctor* comments, *et tunc quidem totarum mulierum secta moresque de asini pendebant iudicio*—"The traditions and mores of all of womankind hung on the judgment of an ass" (7.10). While it could be argued that such a statement represents the instantiation of the extradiegetic narrator (as distinct from the *ex eventu* narrator), the emotional force of the statement comes (to the first reader at least) as an instance of humorous self-awareness on the part of Lucius-*actor*. He pities the ridiculousness of the circumstances which pit a maiden against an ass. He cannot help but to pass human judgement, even though he has no human agency.

Ironic references to himself as an ass also do the work of connecting Lucius' personality to his body. Whenever he is identified as an ass the metaphorical meaning of the word governs the human mind trapped in the ass' body. Lucius is *asinus*—he is a fool.[256] More to the point: his asinine mind and body are coextensive. The figurative and literal meaning of the word *asinus* cannot be disambiguated and it becomes more and more difficult for the reader to experience Lucius as a human mind separate from his body. This corresponds to Todorov's explanation of the supernatural: "the supernatural begins the moment we shift from words to the things these words are supposed to designate…[M]etamorphoses too, therefore, constitute a transgression of the separation between matter and mind…[they] collapse (which is to say illuminat[e])…the limit between matter and mind…the transition from mind to matter has become possible."[257]

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[256] So, when the auctioneer tries to convince the eunuch priest of the Dea Syria that Lucius is not a trouble-maker he says, *vervecem…non asinum vides, ad usus omnes quietum, non mordacem nec calcitronem quidem, sed prorsus ut in asini corio modestum hominem inhabitare credas* (8.25)—"What you see here is a castrated sheep, not an ass, calm in every context, not a biter, not even a kicker—honestly, you'd think a civilized gentleman was living in that ass' hide." See Winkler (1985) 149-153.
[257] Todorov (1973) 114.

But this is possible only in *fabula*, in the language of unbelievable story.

The literal and metaphoric converge in a scene at the end of the particularly long ninth Book. Lucius has finally landed in the hands of a benign gardener, when he is appropriated by a soldier. The gardener topples the soldier and manages to get Lucius back. The two hide out in a house. The soldiers who are looking for him are about to give up, but all the commotion piques Lucius' curiosity.

> curiosus alioquin et inquieti procacitate praeditus asinus, dum obliquata cervice per quandam fenestrulam, quidnam sibi vellet tumultus ille prospicere gestio, unus e commilitonibus casu fortuito conlimatis oculis ad umbram meam cunctos testatur incoram… (9.42)
>
> Generally curious and, as an ass, given to fitful recklessness, as I moved my neck to the side through a some small little window—itching[258] to see what all the commotion was all about, by total chance one of the soldiers also glanced to the side and, catching sight of my shadow, he called on all of them to see.

Here Lucius' human attribute of *curiositas*, and his asinine proclivities converge. He cannot *help* to make a fool of himself. Against his own self-interest, his human curiosity becomes the twitch of an ass' stupidity. The soldiers retrieve him and find the gardener. They go off, making fun of his having looked out (*summoque risu meum prospectum cavillari non desinunt*). In the convergence of the metaphorical connotations of the asinine (foolishness) and the body of the ass (animal instinct), Lucius loses purchase on a human self. We laugh along with the villains. In the last lines of the Book, the narrator explains that this event is the origin of a proverb: *unde etiam de prospectu et umbra asini natum est frequens proverbium*—"whence originates the popular proverb about the ass' looking out and his shadow" (9.42).

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[258] *GCA* (1995) *ad loc*.

The Greek proverb about the ass' shadow was used to expresses the utter uselessness of something—the only thing less useless than the ass is the ass' shadow. If this is the proverb that Apuleius references here,[259] then it appropriately marks Lucius' self-effacement. He is a proverb, a linguistic phenomenon; he is a lesson for, but not a part of humanity. His unattributed fame indexes his own stupidity.

Here Lucius begins to become a spectacle and this will be a role he increasingly plays in the final Book of his assdom. His next masters are a slave-sibling duo, one of whom is a pastry chef for the master of the estate, Thiasus. Lucius cannot help himself. After days of disappearing food, the brothers begin to accuse one another of stealing until they notice that the ass is growing fat. For once, his misbehaving does not lead him deeper into slavery; instead, Lucius becomes a domestic spectacle.[260] The brothers close the door and watch him perform. They laugh hysterically and call all the other servants to watch. The laughter grows to such a pitch that the owner of the estate overhears. He is brought to the peephole and he too erupts in laughter. He opens the door and approaches Lucius who continues to eat, happy to indulge to their amusement:

> nam et ego tandem ex aliqua parte mollius mihi renidentis Fortunae contemplatus faciem, gaudio praesentium fiduciam mihi subministrate, nec tantillum commotus securus estiabam, quoad novitate spectaculi laetus dominus aedium duci me iussit… (10.16)
>
> And I, from the other side, noticing that the face of Fortune was shining upon me rather kindly—since the merriment of those present afforded me

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[259] The *Onos* (45) also inscribes Loukianos as the origin of the "peeping out" (ἐξ ὄνου παρακύψεως) expression. The "shade of the ass" has two explanations in Greek. Second century AD grammarian Diogenianus tells a story about a man who buys a donkey, but when he wants to rest in his shade he is told that he bought the donkey not his shade. A later source explains: Ὄνου σκιά ἐπὶ τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων.
[260] As Schlam (1968) notes at 10.23, "The Ass thus becomes an object of wonder, an object of both private and public curiosity" (124).

> some confidence—I did not budge in the least, but continued eating without a care, until the master, pleased by the novelty of the spectacle, ordered me to be led to the dining room…

Here, Lucius describes the perfect confluence of positive attention upon him. Fortuna's shining presence represents the collective force of his spectators' good will. These spectators take pleasure in Lucius' pleasure. And Lucius feels no inhibition about embodying such a curiosity. He continues to indulge his enjoyment.

Up to this point, Lucius' experience has, for the most part, diverged from his masters'—as is to be expected when one is a slave. This divergence causes the reader's sympathies to settle with Lucius. Here, there is no divergence in the emotional experience of the master and slave. But there is nevertheless an asymmetry. Lucius enjoys his human food sincerely, while the men enjoy the spectacle of Lucius as a donkey. They enjoy the contrast of an unwieldy beast demonstrating an appreciation for refined foodstuffs. And because Lucius offers no protest to their misconceived revelry, the reader is drawn outside of Lucius' internal experience. We see him as his masters do. We picture a donkey maw scarfing down macarons and cupcakes.

Apuleius has translated this scene closely from the *Onos*. Nevertheless, there are important divergences from the text as we have it. First of all, in Apuleius' version there is a greater emphasis on the body: as the servants grow in number they marvel at the *monstruosas asini delicias*—'the aberrant affectations of the ass'. And they point out to one another the *infandam memoratu hebetis iumenti gulam*—'the monstrous appetite of the lazy pack animal'. In the *Onos*, Loukios refers to himself using the pronoun "me" instead of describing his body. In Apuleius' version, the monstrous body interrupts this focalization: we see him as his human masters do. Moreover, the phrase which Apuleius

translates as *gaudio praesentium fiduciam mihi subministrante* is much more direct in the Greek: μαθὼν ὅτι με τοῦτο μόνον τὸ παίγνιον ἀνασώσει—'realizing that only this little game would save me' (47). Loukios links his participation now with his future safety. Lucius, on the other hand, speaks only of his present state of mind: his *fiducia* might relate to his future well-being, but the cause and effect relationship is, at best, implicit. He is bound to his body and to the moment.

By accepting his role as a spectacle and a pleasure, Lucius has accepted his role as the object of others' imaginations—both his internal audience's and ours. Instead of a human mind trapped in a donkey's body, he becomes a talking donkey. His body is no longer a problem—it is a source of enjoyment. He even has sex with a woman. When the voice narrating the events confirms his compliance with the scenario that has been drawn up in the mind's eye of the reader, we do not resist on his behalf. We get the sense that Lucius could happily live out his life like this. His satisfaction (for as long as it lasts) regarding this state of affairs, becomes the ultimate threat to his humanity; he is reduced to the pleasures of the flesh and seems to acquiesce to this life.

Scholars have tended to see this turn to human life as a sign of Lucius' readiness to return to human form.[261] But the reader sees Lucius in these scenes as the humans do: he is loveably ridiculous. He is the story of the sort he otherwise would have been narrating about someone else.

[261] See esp. Shumate (1996). The culmination of his readiness is identified when Lucius rejects intercourse with the murderess (see Gianotti (1986) 46). This reading implies that Lucius has developed a stronger moral sense through his trials, which seems unlikely (see, Finkelpearl (1991). Heath (1982) applies this moral interpretation to a scene in Book 10 where Lucius happily eats grass. He writes, "Lucius, by showing himself behaving as an ass should (in terms of diet) for the first time, is demonstrating an admission, a recognition that in fact he has led a life governed by bodily desires, and that he can no longer tolerate this kind of life...The significant (and very Apuleian) paradox is that the Lucius seen calmly chomping on grass is less 'bestial' in the religious terms of the last book than any previous Lucius" (65-66). I agree that Lucius demonstrates his admission, but not to the fact of his previous servility to human pleasures.

The Narrator Unhinged

As we have seen, Lucius-*auctor*'s narration changes as Lucius-*actor* begins to more fully embody the role of the ass. This is evident in the proliferation of *fabulae* over the course of his subjugation. These stories become a stand-in for his agency. After his time with Charite and until his stint as a spectacle for human consumption, the stories he narrates become less and less entwined with his own. This is especially the case in Book 8 where he sometimes gives almost no context for a story. For example: *celerrime denique longo itinere confecto pagum quendam accedimus ibique totam perquiescimus noctem. Ibi inceptum facinus oppido memorabile narrare cupio*—"Having completed a long portion of the journey at a quick pace, we reached a certain town and spent the whole night there. I want to describe a very memorable scandal that happened there" (8.22). The scant one-page story that follows is the only thing we hear about this "certain" rest-stop.[262] There is no setting, no link between his presence and the story he hears. Like Lucius' knee-jerk turn of the neck, in which his animal self acts despite him, the accumulation of such introductions reduces the narrator to a narrative function.

Lucius undergoes various kinds of conditioning at every level of selfhood—all marked by his acceptance of his fortune. The narrator is likewise conditioned. As Lucius-*actor* enters a world of repetitious and accumulating misfortune, Lucius-*auctor* latches onto the stories he encounters. This process at once imitates Lucius-*actor*'s suffering and diverts attention away from it. His obsession with other people's lives

[262] Cf: *devertimus ad quempiam pagum, urbis opulentae quondam, ut memorabant incolae, inter semiruta vestigia conditum, et hospitio proxumi stabuli recepti, cognoscimus lepidam de adulterio cuiusdam pauperis fabulam, quam vos etiam cognoscatis volo* (9.4). This introduces the tale of the wife's tub, which represents a narrative model for his time with the miller and his adulterous wife.

gives Lucius respite from the pain that is attached to his very body. The remarkable logic of all these episodes of habituation is similar: any move toward respite only brings him closer to his subjugation—that is, to his essence as an ass. This is no less the case in Lucius' narrative habituation. Consider the following quote, in which Lucius suppresses his bodily needs, in order to mull over the gruesome sight of overly worked donkeys:

> at ego, quanquam eximie fatigatus et refectione virium vehementer indiguus et prorsus fame perditus, tamen familiari curiositate attonitus et satis anxius, postposito cibo, qui copiosus aderat, inoptabilis officinae disciplinam cum delectatione quadam arbitrabar (9.12).
>
> But I, although completely exhausted and desperately in need of invigoration and basically dying of hunger, nevertheless, struck with and rather unsettled by my familiar curiosity, I disregarded the food which had been copiously laid out, and I observed the routine of the unappealing work place with a certain pleasure.

This is the second time in which Lucius uses the word *familiaris* to describe his curiosity. On the first occasion (3.14), the adjective described his curiosity for his own story; here, he is curious about his own kind, the asses whose gruesome fate portends his own. In the first instance, I argued that his *familiaris curiositas* allowed Lucius to relate to his traumatic humiliation at the Risus festival as a story external to himself about which he was seeking information. Here Lucius' external reality is a disturbing extension of his own. He has forgone his meal—his physical needs—in order to indulge a spectacle of his own imminent deterioration. His curiosity brings him up to an image of himself and he takes pleasure in the horror of it, just as spectators take pleasure in watching others being violently ravaged.

He gives an extensive ekphrasis of the horrible sight and then pontificates:

> talis familiae funestum mihi etiam metuens exemplum, veterisque Lucii fortunam recordatus et ad ultimam salutis metam detrusus, summisso

> capite maerebam. nec ullum uspiam cruciabilis vitae solacium aderat, nisi quod ingenita mihi curiositate recreabar, dum praesentiam meam parvi facientes libere, quae volunt omnes et agunt et loquuntur. nec inmerito priscae poeticae divinus auctor apud Graicos summae prudentiae virum monstrare cupiens, multarum civitatium obitu et variorum populorum cognitu summas adeptum virtutes cecinit. nam et ipse gratas gratias asino meo memini, quod me suo celatum tegmine variisque fortunis exercitatum, etsi minus prudentem, multiscium reddidit. fabulam denique bonam, prae ceteris suavem, compertam ad auris vestras adferre decrevi, et en occipio (9.13-14).
>
> Fearful of the deadly warning such servitude posed to me, and remembering the fortune of the old Lucius, and thrust to the final checkpoint of life I dropped my head and mourned. And there was no solace for my tortured life anywhere, except for the fact that my inborn curiosity was restoring me all the time, as long as everyone, making little of my presence did and said whatever they wanted. And not without cause did the divine author of ancient poetry among the Greeks, desiring to show a man of great wisdom, sing that he gained the highest virtues by traveling to many cities and getting to know different people. So, I give thanks for my ass self, because, covered in his skin and disciplined by different fortunes, he rendered me, although not perhaps wise, knowledgeable. Finally then, I have decided to relate a tale, good beyond the rest, pleasing, composed for your ears.

Now his *curiositas* is *ingenita*, inborn. It is an inextricable part of him. It is his only solace and a source of constant rejuvenation. This is only possible because no one paid him any attention: thinking nothing of him, the people around him were uninhibited—he had full access to their lives and the stories they told.[263] His hide, then, isolated his curiosity, which became the governing principle of his agency. Stripped of human agency, he becomes a receptacle for other's words and deeds.

The contrast between the dismal picture that prompts this unique reflection and the exemplary model he invokes tinges Lucius-*auctor*'s gratitude. His definition of knowledge has not changed since the prologue. It still refers to other people's experiences. Although he does seem to realize that this knowledge is distinct from

[263] On the erasure of the *actor*, see (Winkler) 1985, 50; on the erasure of the author, see Kahane (2001).

wisdom or understanding (*prudens*). Lucius-*auctor*, then, even in retrospect, only relates to his experience passively; he is unable to synthesize or make sense of it. It remains a separate and contained entity, resistant to assimilation.

Lucius-*auctor* then pivots, without warning, to his narrative function (*fabulam denique bonam*). Addressing the reader, he refers to the composition of the story. This is another instance in which the *ex eventu* narrator seems to emerge.[264] This is the first time that the narrator references the act of writing.[265] Here his turn to story-telling is an act of resignation relating directly to his *actor*'s body—the former replicating at the discursive level the latter's physical function. The latter's curiosity feeds not only the past self, but the narrating self as well. The transformations of the character result in changes in the narrator as well.

Book 10 constitutes Lucius' happiest time as an ass. He enjoys good food and his fame brings him under the amorous eye of a wealthy woman. She pays for a night with him and despite Lucius' anxiety about harming her, they make love. These scenes represent the ultimate threat to Lucius' humanity. The last book flirts with the possibility of a happily ever after ending for Lucius as an ass. He could eat and drink with his master at the dinner table and go to bed with his mistress. In Book 10, we see, not the beginning of the end, but an elaboration of the logical endpoint of magic's reign.

Forever is upended by the prospect of a public sex act.[266] He has been brought to Thiasus' games in order to have sex with a convicted murderer. Lucius' horror is partly

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[264] See de Jong (2001).
[265] He will again at 10.2 and 10.7.
[266] As Winkler (1985) points out, Lucius repugnance at the prospect of copulating with a murderer is not moral. Rather it "is a convenient expression, in this context, of a desire for the end of the tale" (147).

moral, but he also doubts whether the beasts that will be set upon her will be able to make the fine distinction between their prey and their fellow executioner of justice. The larger problem is that Lucius will be *reduced* to spectacle. Whereas, for most of his time as an ass, he was invisible and had the constant nourishment of other peoples' stories, here, he would be consumed by the eyes of the masses, much as he was at the Risus festival. But the consumption of the spectators would only portend a more literal, devastating, and total consumption.

So, with the helpful explanation that his master so trusted him that he was never tied up, he simply walks away from the games. The escape is singular in its effortlessness and it begs the question, why did he not walk away earlier?

5. Isis Book

I have argued that the *Metamorphoses* dramatize an encounter with *fabula*. The mechanism of magic allows Lucius to cross the boundary from a world in which people exchange *fabulae* into the fictional space in which that exchange becomes impossible. Lucius' agency is contingent entirely on his body which functions as an instrument of human labor. His agency on the narrative level is under similar constraints. His actions only participate in the plots of his masters. In addition he becomes a vessel for others' stories, his only function is to make sense of what he hears. As such, Lucius embodies the fictionality of *fabula*—he is entirely subjugated to it.

Book 11 seems to turn the previous ten books completely around. Lucius' trial and tribulations are famously interpreted by the priest who will guide his initiation as

punishment for his curiosity. But if the narrator gives thanks for his donkey hide because it gave him unfettered access to the people around him, Lucius cannot have absorbed this message, despite the initiations he undergoes subsequent to the priest's happy interpretation. Moreover, as others have noted,[267] Lucius never himself approves or articulates this "reading" himself. If Lucius' experience as a *fabula* was defined by the erasure of his agency, then his obsequiousness to the religious commands and his passive acceptance of their narrative (even when it is wrong) amounts to much the same. In fact, the reader becomes increasingly alienated from Lucius as he goes through multiple initiations, each of which leaves him increasingly impoverished.

We are distanced from him by his acts of religious devotion. When Lucius reports his human masters' reactions to him, it colors our own experience of Lucius. When Lucius reports on his family's arrival, we find that the tables have turned:

> Confestim denique familiares ac vernulae quique mihi proximo nexu sanguinis cohaerebant, luctu deposito quem de meae mortis falso nuntio susceperant, repentino laetati gaudio varie quisque munerabundi ad meum festinant ilico diurnum reducemque ab inferis conspectum.
>
> So, without delay, the people of my household and young home-born slaves and those joined to me by the closest ties of blood abandoned the state of mourning, which they assumed because of the false news of my death, and, delighted at the unexpected source of joy, each severally bringing gifts, at once hastened to see me in daylight and back from the dead (11.18).[268]

We expect their joy to be reciprocated. Instead Lucius continues, *Adfatis itaque ex officio singulis narratisque meis et pristinis aerumnis et praesentibus gaudiis, me rursum ad deae gratissimum mihi refero conspectum…* —"When therefore each one had been dutifully addressed and after I had described both my previous misfortunes and my

[267] Winkler (1985) calls Lucius' silence "the critical center of Book 11" (208).
[268] Trans. *GCA* 2015. 11.18

present joys, I went back again to the most beloved sight of the goddess."[269] The family is thus dispensed with. This scene represents a marked departure both from the *Onos* and from Greek romance novels where the reunion with the family constitutes narrative telos par excellence.[270] Their dismissal translates into our own.

On the multiple occasions in which Lucius denies his readers access to his new religious knowledge, Lucius distances himself explicitly. According to Alexander Kirichenko's reading, "[T]he whole of Book 11 serves to frustrate the reader's curiosity as persistently as the preceding ten books have worked to mold it. It is a fair assumption that if the obsessively curious characterized fictive reader, addressed in the novel, is to acquiesce to the sudden change of tenor at all, he will probably redirect his curiosity to the new religious subject matter and expect that the narrator will satisfy it as dutifully as he has done before."[271] But Lucius speaks in such familiarly symbolic terms about his initiation, that our curiosity cannot really have been satisfied.[272] Now that Lucius no longer has stories to tell, we are fully remitted to the outside of his experience.

The novel ends with the famous image of Lucius walking happily around with a shaved head. The image has become an important piece of evidence for interpretations of the novel since Winkler emphasized the bald head's many connotations. Shaving one's head was a mark of religiosity, but was also often mocked in satire, for example, in

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[269] Trans *GCA* 2015, modified. 11.19

[270] As in the Greek novels. The *Onos* ends with his happy reception and a reunion with his brother. But when he returns to the woman with whom he copulated as an ass, she no longer finds him desireable.

[271] Kirichenko (2008) 365. I agree with Kirichenko's understanding of the function of curiosity in the novel when he explains that "curiosity may be valued differently in ethics, but, in literature, it serves as the main prerequisite of reading and as such is invariably a good thing" (368).

[272] *Accessi confinium mortis et, calcato Proserpinae limine, per omnia vectus elementa remeavi; nocte media vidi solem candido coruscantem lumine; deos inferos et deos superos accessi coram et adoravi de proxumo.* Lucius is clear he has not divulged anything: *Ecce tibi rettuli quae, quamvis audita, ignores tamen necesse est. Ergo quod solum potest sine piaculo ad profanorum intellegentias enuntiari, referam*. 11.23.

Lucian and Juvenal.[273] Winkler maintains that the image can be read as either devotional or satirical. Either way, the reader is distanced from the narrator. As Winkler points out, the imperfect tense of the final word—*gaudens obibam*—denies the reader closure and narrative synchronicity. We never catch up with his joyous perambulation; he remains in the past, our recognition of him is denied. Thus in the final image, we see another surface of Lucius' body—his head—but are left with no sense of the person within.

In this final section, I would like explore how Apuleius uses surfaces to create an aura of impenetrability, which in turn reflects the material surface with which the reader has been engaged and whose contents have remained essentially ambiguous.

A central motif in this respect is clothing. In the ekphrasis of the epiphany of Isis, which opens the final book, Lucius states that he is especially astounded by her *palla*. Isis articulates her promise to transform him through an imperative: *mihique detestabilis iam dudum beluae istius corio te protinus exue*—"Take off the hide of that creature, detestable to me for such a long time" (11.6). *Exuere* means to take clothes off, to strip. Lucius' hide is thus reconfigured as clothing. This recalls Lucius' promise to Byrhenna that he will provide the *materia* by which "so great a god might dress himself generously" (*quam deus tantus affluenter indueret* (2.31)). But strangely, his experience as an ass is a sacrifice which is neither a dedication for Risus, nor for Isis. The only link between the Risus festival and Lucius' transformation is that the experience propels Lucius even further in his pursuit of magic. And his transformation is subsequently called a punishment inflicted by Isis. The connection is as superficial as folds in a cloth

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[273] See Winkler (1985) 223-226 for evidence and discussion. For an alternative view and a reconsideration of the evidence, see Graverini (2012) 82-89.

or as the homophony among the three names: Risus, asinus, Isis.

When he is transformed and feels impelled to speak, his silence is interrupted by the priest who hands him a veil, for he is naked. Being clothed stands in for the words which we are waiting to finally hear—some reflection on the *verba absurda* we have just read.[274] The priest tells him to let his face rejoice in correspondence to the white robe he is now wearing.[275] Here again, clothing explicitly stands in for, and thus obscures, realization. Surface reflects surface. After his first initiation he is wrapped in an Olympic stola with images of mythical animals woven on it. Instead of wearing the hide of an ass, he wears animals like ornaments.

The short ekphrasis of the stola reminds us of the ekphrasis of Isis' *palla* in the opening of the Book. The parade that lines up before him in the *anteludia* is like an Arachnean tapestry, with characters from the previous episodes marching by.[276] Clothing is something that is worn on the surface, sight scans that surface. And in the end, the surface is where Lucius' self-understanding seems to stay.

Sight is of central importance to this final book. In anticipation of Lucius' initiation, the priest Mithras, whom Isis has just designated as Lucius' guide, takes him inside the temple and shows him books with indecipherable writing:

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[274] Shumate (1996) suggests that Lucius regained speech as a mark of his reintegration, "when with his conversion Lucius constructs a new 'cognitive and normative edifice' to take the place of the old one that has shattered, his voice…will be 'reborn'" (123). Finkelpearl reads Isis as giving Lucius a voice and the author a Muse (1998). But at the moment when Lucius identifies the reclaimed capacity, he finds himself unable to articulate for himself what he has just undergone. (11.14).

[275] *sume iam vultum laetiorem candido isto habitu tuo congruentem* (11.15)

[276] As Finkelpearl (1998) notes, "It is clearly tantalizing and frustrating that some of the details…seem to refer back to elements of the book and some do not" (211). Most notable, is the winged donkey which reminds the reader of Lucius' escape with Charite. Finkelpearl argues that "Lucius wakes out of his magically stuporous Isiac vision to a real and comic celebration of the possibilities of the genre in which he has been a character" (211).

> …profert quosdam libros litteris ignorabilibus praenotatos, partim figuris cuiusce modi animalium concepti sermonis compendiosa verba suggerentes, partim nodosis et in modum rotae toruosis capreolatimque condensis apicibus a curiositate profanorum lectione munita. (11.22)
>
> …He produces some rolls written in unknown characters. Some of those rolls bring to mind, through drawings of animals of all sorts, concise versions of solemn formulae; others have their meaning protected from the curiosity of the uninitiated by letters that are intricate, twisted into themselves like a wheel, and thickly knotted like vine-tendrils[277]

Winkler interprets this scene as an encounter with the self: "Apuleius brings his alter ego face to face with the original title of his own book, written in a book that Mithras will follow in conducting Lucius' own initiation. This act of looking into a mirror and seeing nothing there … is a paradigm of the hermeneutic playfulness that not only organizes Books 1-10 but continues to frame the composition of Book 11."[278] When Lucius looks at the hieroglyphics, he sees *figuras cuiusce modi animalium*. But he does not know what they mean and he fails to identify his own story in it.

Lucius' encounter is a mirror image of our own. He gazes upon the Egyptian letters just as we gaze upon and hold the Egyptian papyrus. We do not know what we are holding though, or whom we have encountered, except, perhaps, a voice.

[277] Trans. *GCA* (2015).
[278] Winkler (1985) 317.

Conclusion

In this dissertation I analyzed two texts in which a previous experience of bodily incapacitation is reembodied by a narrator through the process of recounting the past. The body's failures limit the horizon of the narrator's perspective to that of the 'experiencing-I'. In the course of narrating his past, the narrator's relationship to the previous body and self changes. I argued that Aristides' *Hieroi Logoi* actively transform Aristides' relationship to his body and to his god. Aristides used metaphors in order to solicit his audience's participation in reconfiguring these relationships and reconstituting him as an orator.

Apuleius' fictional first-person narrative, to the contrary, dramatizes one man's failure to achieve direct contact with the unbelievable, the beyond. While he has, indeed, become a book, I argued that Lucius' selfhood is ultimately lost to the reader. Lucius' transformation into a fiction results in the gradual loss of his human story and self. The audience, the reader, contributes to this loss by increasingly identifying with Lucius as an animated donkey rather than a trapped human. If Aristides uses language to reconstitute the self, Apuleius uses the figure of the ass to fragment the self.

In the introduction, I used the concept of "recognition" to anchor my analysis of the poetics of bodily self-presentation in the second sophistic. I argued that, in oratory, discourse about the body triggers the audience's recognition. Ideally, the authority garnered in the moment of performance is metonymically connected to a transcendent authority, whether that of immortal authors or a divinity. Tapping into the transcendent authority entailed a promise of future fame.

The *Hieroi Logoi* and the *Metamorphoses* are texts in which "recognition" is

either structurally repressed or precluded entirely. I argued that the *HL* were part of the healing process that Aristides seems retrospectively to narrate. Aristides was thus unable to reveal himself as healed and whole until the orations were completed. However, once the speeches have accomplished their healing work, as we saw, Aristides, in later orations, becomes able to speak directly about his sickness as a function of Asclepius' favor and thus to requisition recognition from his audience directly.

Apuleius' novel might be read as an allegory about the sophistic desire to attain literary fame. Lucius' alienation from his own body is reiterated in his alienation from his own story in the eleventh book. There, the reader and Lucius part ways, if for no other reason than that we cannot give him the recognition that he has sought. In this way we imitate the Risus festival audience, and his human masters during his servitude as an ass.

Beginning with the body, we can conclude with the divine. The religious nature of the texts—specifically the uniquely non-Christian descriptions of a personal relationship with the divine—is, after all, what usually accounts for their joint mention.

Instead of analyzing the descriptive overlap between the texts,[279] I have tried to explain the elements in these texts that "form associations of their own," that form "nonsequential, secret invitations to interpretation."[280] Metaphors in the *HL* were just such "secret invitations to interpretation."[281] In the *Metamorphoses*, it is in Lucius'

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[279] For which, see, Weiss (1998).
[280] Kermode (1980) 89.
[281] In Part I, I challenged theories that saw Aristides' dreams as conscious sites of interpretation. Nevertheless, the cognitive work of associating body, transcription and dream *is* interpretive. But it is work that is accomplished associatively and that requires that the audience accept the invitation. Pardalas' interpretation of Aristides' illness as a sign of divine favor is evidence that the invitation was taken up (IV.27).

encounters with story that we are invited to contemplate the text's secrets. I argued that the stories he encounters threaten to overwhelm him, to subjugate him entirely. In Books 1-10, the encounter with *fabula* represents a disjuncture between his desire and the object of his desire.

In Book 11, the text's secrets reside in the fundamental ineffability of religious content—not only because the quality of the experience exceeds the capacity of human language,[282] but also because of the strict prohibition on relating initiation rites.[283] Apuleius states in the *Apologia* that he has been initiated into many cults.[284] Likewise, as we saw, he repeatedly insists that his silence—for example, with respect to the name of his supreme god—is an indication of his religious devotion.[285] Perhaps, Book 11 shows exactly what people who are uninitiated see: repetition, silence, an inexplicable joy. With respect to religious experience, language can only capture what is exterior to the experience—it is a formal approximation of an unseen force (to recall Tambiah). The religious cannot be contained in the text and neither can the self.

In Aristides' associative, nonsequential text, Asclepius' presence is evoked. But the god is likewise never contained. If inscription is a mode of externalization, just as Aristides moves in the fourth oration to make the god's presence permanent, he also transfers the divine to a station outside of his body.

In this dissertation, I have based my analysis on narrative structure and on the formal properties of language in order to trace the changing relationship between the

[282] As Lucius himself says of Isis' epiphany at the beginning of Book 11: *Eius mirandam speciem ad vos etiam referre conitar, si tamen mihi disserendi tribuerit facultatem paupertas oris humani, vel ipsum numen eius dapsilem copiam elocutilis facundiae subministraverit*—"I will now try to describe her marvelous image to you, if the poverty of human speech grants me the ability, or if the divinity herself provides the rich abundance of expressive eloquence" (11.3).
[283] As Lucius again states explicitly (11.23).
[284] *Apol.* 55. He might have been a priest of the cult of Asclepius or Demeter.
[285] *Apol*. 64; also, 56.

narrative-self, the body and the divine in two unique second century texts. One benefit of this reading is that it allows for a wide range of interpretations. My reading of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* does not, in the final analysis, preclude a satirical, religious or Platonic interpretation. But I hope it has demonstrated, following Winkler, that the novel is particularly powerful when it is not yoked to the service of any one of these ascribed goals. Similarly, I hope that my analysis of Aristides' *Hieroi Logoi* represents an acknowledgment that the text does what it says it will do—namely, give narrative authority over to the god—without conceptualizing this concession as a psychological symptom.

Appendix: Outline of *HL* IV

Asterisk marks episodes relating to the "inscription" metaphor.

A. 1-11: The prophecy of the tenth year and his journey to the Aesepus
   a. 8: Recovery
   b. 9: Sickness again and recovery, "All of which the god settled, and if I may say so by his grace, he still settles them by daily regimens and predictions"
   c. 10: Return from Aesepus; he is acclaimed by onlookers, "Hail to the Master!"
   d. 11: The god commands Aristides to sprinkle himself
B. 12-13: Introduction to theme of speeches and legal actions
   a. Speeches (1-70)
      i. 14: Abandons oratory when sick and is commanded not to do so by the god
      ii. 15: Exhortation dreams by the god: "it befits you to speak like Socrates, Demosthenes, and Thucydides."
         1. 16-18: Declaims in front of two others in the temple at Pergamum on the proposed topic of Alexander in India
         2. 19-20:* He is admired by Rhosander, a philosopher in a dream; the compliment was "sealed" by the god as he begins practicing
         3. 21:* Dream: Rhosander = god; written "through some diagram, in the manner of the geometricians."
         4. 22: Physical difficulty with oratory: at first he has trouble, but as he continues, "he is filled with strength and lightness."
         5. 23: Others' dreams about him
         6. 24: The god prescribes regimen of study
         7. 25-26: On the god's training: greatest part of "my training was my access to and communion with these dreams…for I dreamed better than my wont…"; list of orations; help with improvisational speaking; introduces thoughtfulness
         8. 27: Pardalas (orator) said that "[I] had become ill through some divine fortune, so that by my association with the god, I might make this improvement;" then notes that it is outside the plan to continue speaking of others' praise
         9. 28: Dream in which he is praised
         10. 29: The god also ordered composed speeches (vs. extemporaneous); "First I had to be saved…[but] he had better plans than salvation alone. Therefore he saved me by means worth more than being saved."
         11. 30: Toothache is cured through declamation
         12. 31: Composes paean to Apollo, despite having no knowledge about how to do so
         13. 32-37: Saved during trip to Delos; on account of his paean?

Either way, "the god gave a sign for everything which was going to take place, on the one hand, that dangers would befall on the sea and salvation from these, and on the other hand, that he himself would be the healer of my body's troubles…" (37)

14. 38: Has chorus of boys who sing his songs and heal him when not doing well
15. 39-41: Ordered to compose lyric for other gods as well; the poems come from dreams; fragments from his songs
16. 42: Another pilgrim has dream in which he sang one of Aristides' paeans
17. 43-44: Puts on ten choruses; Rufinus ordered by the god to attend first performance
18. 45-47:* Decides to offer a tripod as thanks offering the god in memory of these performances and gives the inscription; but then has dream in which a different inscription[286] comes to him and he inscribes and dedicates the tripod with the latter

iii. **Interlude of dreams in which Aristides is "acclaimed" (48-70)**

1. **48-49: Dream of the tomb of Alexander:**
    a. **At the temple of Olympian Zeus with a group of people. The herald calls his name and adds, "because of his speeches" and reiterates emphatically, "for he is invincible in oratory" (προσθεῖναι δὲ ὅτι λόγων ἕνεκα· βεβαιώσασθαι δ' αὐτὸ ἑτέρᾳ προσθήκῃ ἐπειπόντα, καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀήττητος περὶ λόγους).**
    b. **He leaves and finds a tomb shared by him and Alexander. On one side would lie Alexander and he on the other.**
    c. **He bends over and appreciates the smell of incense. He rejoices, "conjectur[ing] that [each] had reached the top of [his] profession…and that this man was very important in Pella and that those here would be proud of [him]."**
2. **50: Apostrophe to Asclepius**
3. **50: Continues dream**
    a. **The cult statue appeared with three heads and body shone with fire.**
    b. **"[I]n the posture in which he is represented in his statues," the god indicates that all present should leave, but when Aristides turns to go, the statue indicates that he should stay.**
    c. **He shouts out, "The One," but the god responds, "It is you."**
4. **51: Second apostrophe to Asclepius**
5. 52: His superiority is justified by the god
6. 53-54: Dreams in which he is given the name Theodorus

[286] "Not unknown to the Greeks, Aristides dedicated this,/ The glorious charioteer of everlasting words."

7. 55-56:* Dream in which Asclepius of Pergamum is established in heaven
8. 57:* Dream of Plato writing to Dionysius
9. 59-61: Dreams in which he sees “ancients most famous in literature”
10. 63-67:* Incident of letter to Quadratus and the latter’s visitation in a dream
11. 68-69:* Asclepius intercedes in the composition of *HL*IV

b. 70: Legal Issues
    i. 93: Appointed “police commissioner” of Smyrna by Severus (governor) and begins campaign to be absolved of the duty; succeeds
    ii. 94-99: Appointed tax commissioner; avoids this office as well
    iii. 100-104: Avoids priesthood of Asclepius
    iv. 105-108: Wins court battle in which he defends against the appropriation of an estate by a group of Mysians.

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