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Mimesis and the bodily sign in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* 3. 10

*Vladimir Gildin Zuckerman*


Parrhasius, an Athenian painter, bought an old man when Philip had put up Olynthian captives for sale. He took him to Athens, tortured him and, using him as a model, painted a Prometheus. The Olynthian man died under the torture. He placed the painting in the temple of Minerva. He is accused of harming the state.

This case description concerning the 5th century painter Parrhasius, written as a prompt for a courtroom étude, is a curious piece of evidence about painting in the ancient imagination. In the discussion that ensues, one of Seneca’s litigants dramatized the scene by putting these ghastly words in the mouth of the mad maestro in his atelier: ‘Keep on twisting, keep at it! That’s good, hold him like that. This face has to be the expression of a man being torn apart, this is the face of a man dying!’ (‘Etiamnunc torque, etiamnunc; bene habet, sic tene: hic vultus esse debuit lacerati, hic morientis!’ , 10.5.10).

The anecdote is certainly pure fiction. Nevertheless, if we consider Parrhasius’ alleged deed, intriguing notions about visual art emerge. Parrhasius went about the painting of his chosen theme—presumably a Prometheus, bound and tortured—by representing a model or, in other words, by mimesis. As an artist who is known elsewhere for the ethical and psychological realism of his paintings, the

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1 Parrhasius’ floruit is dated to the 95th Olympiad (400-396 BCE) by Pliny (*NH* 35.64), and Xenophon puts him in conversation with Socrates, which suggests that he was active in the time of the Peloponnesian War (see Rumpf 1951 for a useful survey of the evidence). Parrhasius was likely dead before the Olynthian war, and we do not hear elsewhere of a painting of his depicting Prometheus. For discussion of this anecdote and its relation to the painter’s legacy, see Morales 1996, 188-209. This anecdote resembles equally fictional accusations that were made against other great masters as Michelangelo, who was accused for stabbing a young man who was his model in order creating a life-like representation of the dying Christ (see Land 2006, 205-16).

2 Pliny the Elder’s account of Parrhasius underscores three features that were associated with the artist’s craft: verisimilitude (the famous account of his competition with Zeuxis in *NH* 35. 65), innovation in the drawing of contours (ibid., 67-8) and—crucially for my question—
success if the work relied on the faithful depiction of emotion, of pathos—in this case, the representation of immense suffering. Yet how do you find a model for a titan under immense pain? The painter’s solution was to subject the body of an old man to similar physical violence. The underlying assumption must have been that the appearance of the man’s body, distorted in pain, may be translated to his painting and thus represent another body undergoing a similar pathos. Thus, two notions, each with its own intellectual history, are fused together. Visual art is conceptualized as mimetic, particularly of the human body; the body is conceptualized as a medium that can reflect internal states and do so predictably, so that its appearance may be generalized to other bodies.

These themes and their interrelation are explored in an earlier document involving Parrhasius, which may explain this later fictional anecdote. In Memorabilia 3.10, Xenophon relates three conversations between Socrates and three Athenian artists: the painter Parrhasius, a sculptor named Cleiton, and an armourer, Pistias. In the first two of these conversations, Socrates tackles the question of how visual representation can express imperceptible, internal qualities. Socrates and the artists agree that painting and sculpture are most pleasurable when the artist succeeds in depicting character, emotion and the liveliness of the body. But how might a painting or sculpture achieve that? In the face of this challenge, the artists are perplexed. Xenophon’s Socrates, in striking contrast to the largely negative position of his Platonic counterpart on visual mimesis, argues for a positive answer to this problem, thus providing a vindication of visual mimesis and its capacities.

This short dialogue constitutes one of the earliest and fullest Greek documents of a theoretical discourse about the visual arts that we possess, and it has been

a vivacity and precision in his depiction of the face (cf. ‘primus argutias voltus’, ibid.). Pliny goes on to praise Parrhasius’ depiction of ‘the demos of Athens’, which he depicted through many different ethical types such as ‘irate’, ‘merciful’, ‘arrogant’, or ‘humble’ (ibid. 67-70), and his painting of a Thracian nurse in which ‘one can see the carefree simplicity of childhood’ (‘spectatur securitas aetatis et simplicitas’, ibid. 71). See Stavru 2010, 261-3 for a discussion of this passage and its significance for the interpretation of Memorabilia 3.10.

3 For the intriguing, if unsubstantiated, claim that Cleiton is in fact the famous sculptor, and—importantly—author of a theoretical treatise about sculpture, Polycleitus, see Westermann 1905, who is followed by Brancacci 1995, 109-10.

4 For nuanced accounts of mimesis and the visual arts in Plato, see Webster 1952; Keuls 1978; Halliwell 2012; Petraki 2013; Petraki 2018. The relationship between Republic 10 and Memorabilia 3.10, to which I can merely allude here, requires further study. In the present article, I argue only that the view expressed by Xenophon’s Socrates is distinct from the Platonic position (pace Porter 2010, 170-1). Whether Xenophon’s account in the Memorabilia is to be dated earlier than Plato’s early reflections on art is debated (see Sörbom 1966, 80 n. 7 for discussion and references), but not crucial for my argument.
consequently studied extensively by ancient art historians. Until recently, however, the scholarly opinion was dominated by a view that Xenophon expressed a naive, commonplace Athenian view of the arts. In a recent article, Alessandro Stavru argues against such a reading. By carefully examining the argument and the terminology that Xenophon employed throughout this passage, Stavru argues convincingly for a more nuanced and appreciative reading of Xenophon’s account, that positions it not in it not a ‘popular view’ but rather to sophisticated discussions in Athenian intellectual circles.

In this article, I aim to investigate further into the rich intellectual context of this important, yet still often overlooked, passage, focussing particularly on the conception of the body and its relation to the visual arts in Socrates’ conversations with Parrhasius and Cleiton. My argument proceeds by two stages. First, I argue that Socrates’ conversation with the artists should be read as a reaction to reproaches of visual art that are scattered through the fragmentary evidence of 5th and 4th century art criticism. Such critiques singled out the plastic arts as limited to representation and depiction of external appearances, and thus as incapable of depicting the soul or the intellect. These reproaches originated in various intellectual contexts, but it is noteworthy that they seem to have influenced Plato’s account of mimesis and the visual arts in the 10th book of the Republic. Then, I focus on Socrates’ discussion of the body and its relation to internal states. I argue that in developing his defence, Xenophon draws on a contemporary 4th century interest in theorising the body. Brooke Holmes’ study of the medical writings of

7 Stavru 2010.
8 Ibid, 242-3. In 248-50, Stavru argues for echoes of Sophistic discussions of rhetoric and art, pointing out, specifically, the affinities between the Mem. 3. 10 and Gorgias Helen. Aldo Brancacci’s articles from 1995 and 1997 offer an attentive analysis of the terminology used by Xenophon in this passage which suggests that he was completely in tune with contemporary intellectual’s theorisation of art.
9 For a useful overview of pre-Platonic discourse on the visual arts, see Webster 1939; Halliwell 2002, 120-4.
10 Several scholars suggest, cursorily, that Mem. 3.10 reflects Xenophon’s interact with physiognomy and medicine, yet no sustained study has, to the best of my knowledge, has examined this interaction and its scope in detail. Métraux 1995, 3-5, who notes the ‘affinities’ between the passage in Xenophon and medical and physiognomic thought, but remains vague as to what these affinities amount to; Goldhill 1998, 174 calls Socrates’ lesson ‘painterly physiognomics’, but does not discuss this idea further; Halliwell 2012, 175 and Stavru 2010, 247 both flag the notion of external signs for internal states as
the late 5th and early 4th points to a shift in the conceptualization of the body.\textsuperscript{11} The body became both a space for the operations of unseen powers, and at the same time a surface upon which signs manifest themselves.\textsuperscript{12} Both Hippocratic prognostics, and the practice and theory of physiognomy\textsuperscript{13} theorized the relation between bodily signifiers of ethical and internal states. I argue that Xenophon’s Socrates draws on the conceptual schemes as well as the linguistic practices of these traditions in his defence of visual art.

1. Socrates and the artists on the representation of bodies

Xenophon begins the discussion with Socrates’ exchange with the painter Parrhasius, in which the painter and philosopher agree on a definition of painting, what it represents and by what means:

\begin{verbatim}
Ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Παρράσιε, γραφικὴ ἐστὶν εἰκασία τῶν ὄρωμένων; τὰ γοῦν κοῖλα καὶ τὰ ύψηλα καὶ τὰ σκοτεινὰ καὶ τὰ φωτεινὰ καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ καὶ τὰ μαλακὰ καὶ τὰ τραχέα καὶ τὰ λεῖα καὶ τὰ νέα καὶ τὰ παλαιὰ σώματα διὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμεῖσθε. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη (Mem. 3.10.1).
\end{verbatim}

[Socrates] asked: ‘Is painting, Parrhasius, the depiction of what is seen? You imitate bodies sunken and high, in shadow and in light, hard and soft, rough and smooth, young and old, depicting them by means of colours.’ ‘You speak the truth,’ he replied.

We are presented here with a schematic definition of painting as a mimetic art:\textsuperscript{14} firstly, the genre is explicated as a representation of visual objects—a ‘depiction of the visible’ (‘εἰκασία τῶν ὄρωμένων’). More specifically, the objects appropriate to it are bodies (‘σώματα’), described as set in various positions and postures as well as having different physical qualities, tones and textures. The medium of painting is pigments (χρώματα), a somewhat ambiguous term here that refers

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\textsuperscript{11} Holmes 2010, esp. 13-9.
\textsuperscript{12} Cf. Manetti 1993, 33-6.
\textsuperscript{13} By Aristotle’s time, physiognomy was considered a techne and had its own professional practitioners (see Arist. \textit{GA} 769b 21-22 with Evans 1969, 7). For overviews of the physiognomic material, see Evans 1969; Swain 2007; Stavru 2019, 144-52. The fragments of the \textit{Zopyrus} of Phaedo of Elis testify that physiognomy has drawn interest from the Socratic circle (for an edition of the fragments of this fascinating dialogue, see Rossetti 1980 with Boys-Stones 2004 and 2007, and my discussion below.
\textsuperscript{14} Cf. Aristotle’s three parameters for differentiating the mimetic arts in \textit{Poet}. 1447a 16-8: they differ in media, objects, and mode of representation.
both to the pigments used by painters, or, alternatively, to the tone of the bodies represented. This ambiguity may well be intentional, as it pinpoints the very quality shared both by the original and the likeness created by the artists. Finally, painters ‘represent’ (‘ἐκμιμεῖσθε’) these bodies by ‘depiction’ (‘ἀπεικάζοντες’), a seemingly technical term that implies the specific mode of mimesis through which painting represents, namely, the creation of a visual likeness of the visual properties of the object. In other words, painting creates a likeness of the visible properties of the objects of mimesis, i.e. their colours and forms by means of its own pigments and shapes.

This definition of painting is operative throughout the conversation and introduces the central question at stake in the exchange with Parrhasius as well as the following conversation with the sculptor Cleiton. When Socrates asks whether painting can also represent ‘the character of the soul’ (‘τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθος’, 3.10.3), Parrhasius, perplexed, asks: ‘how could, Socrates, ... that which has no proportion, colour ... nor is even at all visible possibly be representable?’ (‘Πῶς γὰρ ἄν ... μιμητὸν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ μήτε συμμετρίαν μήτε χρῶμα ... μηδὲ ὅλως ὀργῆτον ἐστίν;’, ibid.). If we adopt the definition of art that Socrates and Parrhasius have just agreed on, Parrhasius’ perplexity is understandable. As scholars noted, Socrates tackles here a profound question that continues to engage theoreticians of

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15 This idea is echoed in 10.3.6, when Parrhasius asks how something that has no χρῶμα could be imitated.

16 See Stavru 2010, 246-7, who discusses the expression ‘ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμεῖσθε’. While I agree with his insightful identification of the unique mimetic modality of painting in this expression, his suggestion that the expression itself implies the representation of internal qualities by external signs in this stage of the conversation between Socrates and Parrhasius is still unsubstantiated. For the term ἀπεικάζειν in the context of visual representation, cf. also Arist. Poet. 1447\a 19, where the word is attached specifically to visual representation by means of colors and shapes (‘χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι ... μιμοῦνται ... ἀπεικάζοντες’).

17 Here Xenophon echoes the widespread conception of the medium of painting as constituted by color and shape: cf. Pl. Crat. 431c4-5 (‘ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν ... χρώματα τε καὶ σχήματα’), 432b6-7 (‘χρώμα καὶ σχήμα ἀπεικάσειν ὄσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι’); Rep. 373b4-5 (‘οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματα τε καὶ χρώματα’); Arist. Poet. 1447\a 19 (‘χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι ... μιμοῦνται’); Pol. 1340\b 34 (‘σχῆματα καὶ χρώματα’). Cf. also Gorg. Hel. 18, where σχῆμα is coupled with σῶμα (in the atomistic sense): ‘οἱ γραφεῖς ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν χρωμάτων καὶ σωμάτων ἐν σώμα καὶ σχῆμα τελείως ἀπεργάσονται.’

18 See Stavru 2010, 255-68 for an insightful discussion of this expression. ἔθος is used in this passage to indicate the fixed (as opposed to πάθος, which implies transient psychic events) moral character or personality of a person (cf. Mem. 4.8.11; Symp. 8.13.4, 8.16.13, Oec. 21.1.11). Together with πάθος, ἔθος becomes a terminus technicus in the criticism of poetry and art from the 4th century (Pollitt 1974, 194-9; Pollitt 1976). See Brancacci 1995 for a discussion of the use of these two terms in Xen. Mem. 3.10.
art: how is it that visual art can represent what is non-visual in nature? Yet this problem was clearly already an ancient one. Parrhasius’ question echoes reproaches of the visual arts that emphasized the superficiality and lifelessness of artistic imitation: a fragment of Democritus describes artistic images as ‘magnificent to look upon in clothing and adornment, but devoid of heart’ (’εἴδωλα ἐσθῆτι καὶ κόσμῳ διαπρεπέα πρὸς θεωρήν, ἄλλα καρδίης κενεά’, fr. 195 D-K.); the 4th century rhetor Alcidamas, wishing to stress the expressive limitation of the written word, compared written speeches to statues and paintings of living bodies in order to underscore their lifelessness; Plato made this same point when he famously compared printed discourse to painting (ζωγραφία): ‘like the [figures] born of painting, [written discourses] stand as if they were alive, but upon being asked anything, they remain solemnly silent’ (’τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἑστηκε μὲν ώς ζόντα, ἐὰν δ’ ἀνέρῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ’, Phdr. 275d5-6). This line of critique of the visual arts is most clearly elaborated in the tenth book of Plato’s Republic. Although poetry is the main target of Plato’s discourse, he chose visual art as the paradigm of the epistemic limitation of mimesis. Painters are classed together with the sort of craftsmen who produce ‘things as they appear, but not as they truly are’ (’φαινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γέπου τῇ ἀληθείᾳ’, 596e4). The painter is thus inferior even to other craftsmen; while they produce likenesses of the forms, painters imitate things not as they are but only as they appear, and thus their products stand at a third remove from the realm

19 Rouvert 1989, 133; Goldhill 1998, 173; Stavru 2010, 262-3 and n. 74, mentions the engagement of modern philosophers of art as Ernst Gombrich and Rudolf Arnheim with similar questions.
20 The evidence of discussions of the arts prior to Plato is unfortunately scarce and fragmentary. For an overview, see Webster 1939; Halliwell 2002, 120-4.
21 This, of course, is but a fragment that may not reflect Democritus’ attitude towards the arts, who seems to have been an important and prolific theoretician of visual art as well as poetry and music. Among the works attributed to him are treatises Περὶ ζωγραφίης and Περὶ χροῶν (DL. 9.7.46-49), and other fragments suggest a positive attitude toward the pleasure derived from art and beauty (cf. fr. 194 D-K; fr. 207 D-K). See Keuls 1978, 126-38; Brancacci 1997, 126-7; Brancacci 2007.
22 Alcidamas, Soph. 27: ‘ήγούμαι δ’ οὐδὲ λόγους δίκαιων εἶναι καλείσθαι τοὺς γεγραμμένους, ἄλλ’ οἶσπερ εἴδολα καὶ σχήματα καὶ μιμήματα λόγον, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν κατ’ αὐτῶν εἰκότως ἃν δόξαν ἔχομεν, ἧπερ καὶ κατὰ τῶν χαλκῶν ἀνδριάντων καὶ λιθίνων ἀγαλμάτων καὶ γεγραμμένων χζών. οἶσπερ γὰρ ταύτα μιμήματα τῶν ἀληθινῶν σωμάτων ἑστὶ, καὶ τέρτιον μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἔχει, χρῆσιν δ’ οὐδὲμίαν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ παραδίδωσι’ (‘I think that it is not right that written compositions are even called logoi, but they are just like images, outlines and representations of speeches, and we may plausibly have the same opinion of them as of bronze statues, stone sculpture, and paintings of animals. For just like those they are imitations of real bodies, and they bring pleasure when one observes them, but provide no utility at all to human life’).
23 For additional sources, see Webster 1939, 185.
of true being. Painting (γραφική) ‘touches only some small part of each thing, and even that is an image’ (‘σμικρόν τι ἐκάστου ἐφάπτεται, καὶ τοῦτο εἶδωλον’, 598c2). A well-produced trompe-l’œil can perhaps deceive children and fools, appearing like a real object, but painting cannot provide access to true beings or to knowledge of them. In short, in the intellectual landscape in which Xenophon portrays Socrates’ conversation with the artists, the visual arts were emblematic of the suspect relations between surface – τὰ φαίνομεν or τὰ ὁρατά – and what constitutes the completeness of a being, be it the soul, cognitive functions, or, in the case of Plato’s Republic, the forms. All these references, although stemming from different motivations and discursive contexts, refer to the visual arts to evoke the limits of the visible surface as a mere figure without content and imply that value lies beyond it.

Interestingly, the person who articulates the limitation of artistic representation in Mem. 3.10 is no other than Parrhasius, a painter who is renowned in the ancient tradition precisely for the ethical, psychological and lifelike qualities of his paintings. In his discussion of this passage, James Porter suggests that by putting the question in the mouth of the painter, Xenophon portrayed a conceptual clash between Socrates and the painter. Socrates, in Porter’s reading, is portrayed as ‘denying the power of painting to capture the invisible’, while the artist ‘professed that his only interest lay in depicting visible objects (τὰ ὁρατά).’

Despite the negative treatment of painting in Republic X, scholars have pointed to other passages that show Plato’s more ambivalent approach to painting. Halliwell 2012, 182-3 notes, this passage has often overlooked ‘rhetorical satirical dimensions’ that preclude an interpretation of simply negative attitude to painting tout court. Petraki 2013 and 2018 points out the constructive use Plato makes of painting as an analogy that helps articulate central aspects of his philosophy. Like in the case of poetry in 607d-e, which Plato challenges to find a new justification for, it is possible that Plato would have thought that a certain form of painting could be justified as well. It is tempting to read Mem. 3. 10 as Xenophon’s attempt of such a justification. For a discussion of painting in the tenth book of the Republic, see Halliwell 2012; for studies of Plato’s approach to art generally, see Webster 1952; Keuls 1978.

See n. 2 above.

Porter identifies in Xenophon’s portrayal of the painter a representative of a mode of art theory that focussed on artistic technique and material, what he calls ‘materialist aesthetics’ (ibid., 7 and passim). He quotes Parrhasius’ response to Socrates initial questions as evidence for a sort of theory that theorised a ‘purely’ material or sensuous realm’ (ibid., 251). Although Mem. 3.10 shows that Xenophon himself was aware of and interested in this kind of criticism, I cannot agree with Porter’s evaluation that Socrates is presenting an alternative view. Porter writes that Socrates is ‘attempting to explain why painting is a deficient art ... In denying the power of painting to capture the invisible, Socrates is implicitly denying the philosophical maxim, ‘phenomena are the sight of things unseen’’ (ibid., 171). In the rest of the conversation, Xenophon’s Socrates clearly and repeatedly shows his interest in the physical appearance of the body. Rather than
However, the rest of the conversation makes it clear that Socrates seeks in fact to overcome the initial theoretical impasse of visual mimesis to capture the invisible. I suggest that this point in the conversation is better read as a *variatio* on a common motif in Socratic literature, namely the exchange between the philosopher and the craftsman who is an exceptional master in the craft but lacks knowledge of the theoretical underpinning that can explain his technical success. Under Xenophon’s pen, in contrast to the Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues, Socrates does not lead his interlocutors to aporia, but, as he tells us in the beginning of the third book of the *Memorabilia*, makes them more ‘attentive’ (‘ἐπιμέλεια’, *Mem.* 3.1) to their occupations. As Xenophon indicates in the outset, Socrates was ‘useful’ (‘ὦφέλιμος’, 3.10.1) also to the craftsmen.

It is crucial to note that Socrates maintains his commitment to the preference of the beauty of the soul over the body throughout. Moreover, Socrates’ position here appears to be a more radical one, namely, that the soul remains superior also in respect to its aesthetic dimension. Socrates garners the artists’ agreement that the ‘character of the soul’ (‘τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθος’, 10.3.2-3) is most pleasurable and most captivating; he suggests that it is ‘more pleasant to look at’ (‘Ἡδίον ὁρᾶν’, 10.5.11-4) bodies of people with beautiful and good characters than at those with deprived characters; he claims that ‘moves the viewers most through sight’ (‘μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὀψεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους’, 10.6.5) is the life-like appearance (‘τὸ ξωτικόν’); finally, Socrates claims that the emotions of the represented bodies also ‘produce some pleasure in the viewers’ (‘ποιεῖ τινα τέρψιν τοῖς θεωμένοις’, 10.8.1-2).

With these two positions now in place – visual art as a representation of the visible, and the highest aesthetic pleasure reserved to character, emotions, and the vivacity of a body – the impasse comes into clear focus. In order to overcome it, Xenophon’s Socrates does not propose to alter the initial definition of painting as ‘εἰκασία τῶν ὁρωμένων,’ nor does he, like Aristotle will later, ascribe a cognitive effect to the mimetic work, external to the artwork itself. Instead, Xenophon takes a striking move: he turns to the body itself, the object of the visual representation. Socrates proposes that several locations on the body

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28 For the significance of the term ἐπιμέλεια in Xenophon’s Socratic works, see Dorion 2013, 335-6 and n. 68.

29 Cf. the programmatic first sentence of *Mem.* 3: ‘ὅτι δὲ τοὺς ὀρεγομένους τῶν καλῶν ἐπιμέλεις ἄν ὀρέγοιντο ποιῶν ὄφέλεια’ (‘he helped those who were striving by making them attentive of the things for which they were striving’), with Preißhofen 1974, 26-7, 30.

30 On the significance of the expression ψυχαγωγεῖν see Stavru 2010, 249-50.
can, in fact, show physical manifestations of psychological states and ethical dispositions. The gaze (‘τὸ βλέπειν’, 3.10.4) can be ‘loving and odious towards certain people’ (‘τὸ τε φιλοφρόνως καὶ τὸ ἐχθρῶς βλέπειν πρὸς τινας’, ibid.). The faces of men appear differently according to whether they really care or not for their friends’ fortunes and misfortunes (ibid.), becoming ‘radiant’ (‘φαιδροί’) and ‘sullen-eyed’ (‘σκυθρωποί’), and these qualities can be visually represented. Ethical dispositions can appear through (‘διαφαίνει’, 3.10.5) The face and the posture of the body, and here Socrates lists such dispositions as nobility, liberality, servility, prudence, understanding, arrogance and even bad taste. These physical signs can be represented in the work of art (3.10.4).

In the following exchange with the sculptor Cleiton, Socrates expands the theory to include the bodily manifestation of πάθος in addition to ἔθος.31 When Socrates asks the sculptor how he manages to achieve such life-like creations, Cleiton, like Parrhasius before him, cannot answer. Like in the exchange with Parrhasius, where the eyes could express a range of ethical dispositions, Socrates suggests the representation of the eyes (‘τὰ ὄμματα’, 3.10.8.4; ‘ἡ ὀψις’, 3.10.8.5) in sculpture can express ‘emotions/alterations of the bodies in action’ (‘τὰ πάθη τῶν ποιούντων τι σωμάτων’, 3.10.8.2). In addition to that, he suggests that the sculptor can capture the different parts of the body as they are ‘affected by the pose’ (‘ὑπὸ τῶν σχημάτων’, 3.10.7). He then proceeds to provide a catalogue of anatomical descriptions of the fine alterations in the musculature, the position of the limbs and the folds of the skin: the sculptor ‘represents in the bodies the parts as they are affected by the pose, drawn in and stretched out, pinched together and protracted, tout and loosened’ (‘τὰ τε ὑπὸ τῶν σχημάτων κατασπώμενα καὶ τάνασσόμενα ἐν τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τὰ συμπιέζομενα καὶ τὰ διελκόμενα καὶ τὰ ἐντεινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἀνέμενα ἀπεικάζων’. 10.3.7). This rapid sequence of substantivized participles of compound verbs is striking. It carries an air of technical prose, and indeed, several of these words are seldom used in this physical meaning outside a medical context.32

Whereas the conversational mode of the Memorabilia allows but a brief foray into the territory of technical prose, Xenophon’s handbooks On Horsemanship and On Hunting show a keen interest in the lengthy analysis of minute physical details. When Xenophon provides advice on buying a horse, he describes at great length and detail the signs on the horses’ body that can foretell its quality, behaviour and future performance. What is striking here is that Xenophon explicitly says that the internal properties (‘τῆς γὰρ ψυχῆς’, Eq. 1.8) of the horse are

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31 On this distinction and the identification of ἔθος with painting and πάθος with sculpture, see Dalette 1933, 138; Brancacci 1995; Stavru 2010; Dorion 2011a, 372-3.
32 Cf., e.g., the medical usage of the words κατασπάω in Hp. Vectarius 4.1, Gal. UP 3.834.15; ἀνασπάω: ibid. 33.8; ἐντείνω: Hp. De fracturis 30.49; συμπιέζω: Hp. De morbis popularibus 68.4, De locis in homine 9.15.
not visible, and on account of that he suggests a thorough examination of the body (‘οτι τὸ σῶμα δεῖ δοκιμάζειν’, ibid.). A visible feature like a straight neck on a horse, is interpreted as a sign for his temperament (‘ἡκιστ’ ἄν δύνατο ὁ τοιοῦτον σχῆμα ἔχον καὶ εἰ πάνω θυμοειδῆς εἶ’, Eq. 1.8.7). Similarly, in his recommendation on the selection of hunting dogs, we find lengthy descriptions of the animals’ bodies, that are examined in detail in order to predict their performance and their character. The descriptions are reminiscent of Socrates’ list of adjectives describing the fine alterations of the body: ‘Next, the .head should be light, flat and muscular; the lower parts of the forehead sinewy; the eyes protruding, black and sparkling; the forehead broad, with a deep dividing line; the ears small and thin with little hair behind; the neck long, loose and round’ (‘εἶτα ἔχούσας τὰς κεφαλὰς ἐλαφρὰς, σιμὰς, ἄρθροδεις, ἴνοδή τὰ κάτωθεν τὸν μετώπων, ὄμματα μετέωρα, μέλανα, λαμπρά, μέτωπα μεγάλα καὶ πλατέα, τὰς διακρίσεις βαθείας, ὧτα μικρά, λεπτά, ψιλὰ ὀπισθεν, τραχήλους μακροὺς, ὄγροὺς, περιφερείς’, Cyn. 4.1)

Following the catalogue of physical manifestations of the character, the emotions, and the liveliness of the body, Socrates concludes that ‘the sculptor represents the activities of the soul in the appearance’ (‘τὸν ἀνδριαντοποιόν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα τῷ εἴδει προσεικάζειν’, Mem. 3.10.8).33 Thus, the challenge that was laid at the outset has been answered: the sculptor can, in fact, depict what Parrhasius earlier described as lacking any visible properties. Scholars as Göran Sörbom and Felix Preißhofen find in this view a ‘common-sense observation’ that likely conforms with the view of ‘the average educated Athenian.’34 However, it would be of little use for an author of a Socratic logos to depict Socrates as a representative of ‘common-sense’ view, especially if Xenophon’s motivation was to purge Socrates’ reputation.35 There has to be a certain sting to Socrates’ discourse that makes his position unexpected and, in some way, sophisticated, otherwise the figure of the philosopher will be undermined rather than elevated. Aldo Brancacci and Alessandro Stavru must be right in identifying a serious and sophisticated intellectual contribution here, addressed not to the Athenian

33 This conclusion seems to answer directly critiques that, like those enumerated above, targeted sculpture: cf. Hp. De victu 1.21: ‘statue-makers are said to ‘create an imitation of the body without the soul and not [to] create a thing that has intelligence’ (‘ἀνδριαντοποιοὶ μίμησιν σώματος ποιοῦσιν πλὴν ψυχῆς, γνώμην δὲ ἐχοντα οὐ ποιεύοντο’).
34 Sörbom 1966, 80-1; cf. Preißhofen 1974, 27.
35 Pace Sörbom 1966, 81-2, who argues that Xenophon’s motivation to draw a positive portrait of Socrates necessitates him to present a view that does not ‘diverge too much from the commonly accepted view. Otherwise his readers would not have understood in what way the artisans were benefited and his plea for Socrates would have failed.’
common-sense but to the interests of intellectual circles.\textsuperscript{36} However, this does not mean that Socrates comes close to the Platonic suspicion of physical phenomena, as James Porter suggests in his discussion of this passage.\textsuperscript{37} Instead, Xenophon is taking an original approach, which engages with central issues that interested the other Socratic authors: the soul, body, and their interrelations.

What then does the Xenophontic Socrates’ approach amount to? For Socrates, a pleasing and aesthetically moving work of art is one that can depict internal qualities: character traits, emotions, dispositions towards friends and enemies, movement, and liveliness. All of these are discussed as functions of the soul rather than the body, qualities that in themselves are invisible and immaterial. As such, they remain beyond what visual art which was defined exclusively as ‘the depiction of the visible’—the very definition that has afforded other thinkers reasons to discredit its value. What Xenophon’s Socrates adds to the mix is how the form that the body changes in relation to these non-visible properties. The body, in particular the eyes, the face, and the posture and pose of the body (σχῆμα), express different dispositions, be they enduring character traits or transient emotions, through a catalogue of different types of physical manifestations that can be identified and reproduced. The bodily expressions are conceptualized as epiphenomena of psychic events, and it is ‘through [the bodies]’ (‘διὰ ὧν’, 10.5.11-2) that they are visible to the beholder. They can, therefore, be translated from the human body to the body depicted in a painting or in marble, and thus produce in the viewers the pleasurable effect that ethically beautiful bodies would produce. For the viewers of the work, this effect is seemingly achieved without the need of a hermeneutic process. But, according to my reading, Xenophon suggests that the artist, in order to be able to knowingly produce such effects, will benefit from possessing a knowledge of a bodily semiotic, namely, knowing that certain emotions will have certain bodily signs than can be identified, isolated, and eventually reproduced in the mimetic process. Socrates’ lesson in body semiotics to Parhassius may explain the anecdote from Seneca the Elder that I quote above. Misery, abstracted to become the ethical subject of the artistic work, manifests itself on the flesh and is transferred to the canvas.

2. \textit{The body as sign in the 4th century BCE}

Although we do not possess a text that can be identified as a direct source for Socrates’ theory, different technical genres that are contemporary with Xenophon

\textsuperscript{36} Brancacci 1995, 1997 and Stavru 2010, esp. 242-3, 248-50 provide a rich overview of the intellectual discussions with which Xenophon’ terminology and argument reverberate.
\textsuperscript{37} Porter 2010, 171-2. See p.9 and n. 26 above for additional discussion.
or may be dated back to contemporary authors reveal an interest in and engagement with remarkably similar ideas. In *Cratylus* 400b8-c9, Plato provides three intriguing etymologies for the word σῶμα. One of them plays on the similarity between σῶμα and σῆμα: ‘For some say that it is a σῆμα of the soul ... seeing that the soul signifies with [the body] whatever it signifies’ (‘καὶ γὰρ σῆμα τινὲς φασίν αὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ... διότι αὐτὸ τούτῳ σημαίνει ἃ ἐν σημαινὴ ἡ ψυχὴ’, Pl. *Crat.* 400c1-3). This etymology offers a distilled theorisation of the body, which sounds similar to Socrates’ position in *Mem* 3.10.5.11-2, where ethical characters are said to appear ‘through [the bodies]’ (‘διὰ ὧν’). In Xenophon, there is no explicit reference to signs (σήματα), but notionally they are present throughout.

While it is impossible to identify with any certainty the group Plato has in mind with his etymology of σῶμα, to look at the body as a sign and signifier is a central characteristic of the understanding as well as the construction of the body in the medical writers of the 5th and early 4th centuries BCE. σῆμα and cognate forms σημεῖον, ἐπίσημα and σημαίνειν are the common terms to refer to symptoms and signs from which the physician makes inferences regarding the cause of disease, the condition of the body, and the internal constitution that is seen to determines it. Giovanni Manetti argues in his study of semiotic practices in classical antiquity that the early Hippocratic writers distinguished their method of prognosis from other practices such as divination by stressing what he calls its underlying ‘secular semeiotics.’ Thus, the author of *Prorrhettic*, contrasting himself with medical diviners, proclaims that he will ‘note the signs by which one must infer some people will be healthy, and some die’ (‘σημεῖα δὲ γράφω οἷσι χρὴ τεκμαίρεσθαι τοὺς τε ὑγιέας ἐσομένους καὶ τοὺς ἀποθανομένους’, *Prorrh.* 2.1-3). Another treatise ventures further into the realm of divination and tackles the interpretation of dreams. While admitting that there are dream signs that are divine, the author claims for his own profession the interpretation of ‘whatever the soul signifies about the ailments of the body’ (‘ὁκόσα δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα προσημαίνει’, *De victu* 4.87.5-6). What distinguishes the ‘secular’ sign that interested these 5th-4th century intellectuals from the ‘sacred’ sign its appearance in the form of the human body.

The treatise *Prognostics*, written in the last quarter of the 5th, is a telling example of this. It is intriguing in that it does not so much examine symptoms

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38 These etymologies are attributed to certain ‘τινὲς φασίν’ (*Crat.* 400c1) and seen by some as related to the Pythagoreans. See Ferwerda 1985, 272; Barnabé 1995.

39 Manetti 1993, 38. Cf. however, Holmes 2010, 11, who argues against Manetti’s strict semiotic approach. Holmes 2010, 10-1, I think rightly, points out that a strict semiotic understanding of the Hippocratic texts overlooks the fact that the inferences are in fact conjectures, inferential leaps to general rules that are formulated by the Hippocratic authors themselves. The body is not only a sign that signifies something else, but it is also the means through which the signified itself is constructed.
of fully-fledged diseases that can be easily recognized by anyone. Rather, it deals with signs predicting possible future ailments which are not yet manifest—at least not to the untrained eye. Consider this passage, which describes the author’s prognostic methodology:

In these acute diseases, one must inquire in the following way. First, the face of the patient, whether it is like those of healthy people, and especially, whether it is like its usual self. For this may be the best [sign], the opposite of this, the worst. It will be as follows: nose sharp, eyes hollow, temples sunken, ears cold and contracted and the lobes of the ears turned backwards, the skin about the face is hard, tightly stretched and dry. And the tone of the whole face is pale yellow or dark and livid or lead-like. If, then, the face is of this sort in the beginning of the disease, and it is not yet possible to conjecture from other signs...

The Hippocratic author provides the practitioner both a theory and a methodology: the former is the idea that in order to discover what may be happening inside the body but has not yet become obvious, one can look on the body for indications. The latter is given in a list of the possible inferences that different physical signs amount to. The author then goes on to provide a long catalogue of possible signs and what inferences the physician may draw from them. The art of prognostics, then, is an art of looking at the body. To the practitioner, a wide array of subtle signs manifests itself on the body. Note too that the main semiotic loci are the face, the eyes, the tension and tone (‘χρῶμα’) of the skin.

These elements are also present in another intellectual tradition which brings us even closer to the notion that the soul in some way becomes manifest through the physical appearance of the body. This is the tradition of physiognomy, which arrives to Athens at least as early as Socrates’ lifetime. Although we have only fragments of Phaedo of Elis’ Zopyrus, they offer a fascinating glimpse to a

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40 See Evans 1969 and Boys-Stones 2007, n. 4 a survey of the evidence (which becomes highly tentative before the time of Socrates) and scholarship.
Socratic perspective, contemporary with Xenophon, on physiognomy. Zopyrus arrives in Athens to teach and interact with the local intellectual milieu, converses with Socrates and performs a public physiognomic analysis. Cicero’s paraphrase is suggestive:

*Socraten nonne legimus quem ad modum notarit Zopyrus physiognomon, qui se profitebatur hominum mores naturasque ex corpore, oculis, vultu, fronte per noscere? stupidum esse Socraten dixit et bardum, quod iugula concava non haberet obstructas eas partes et obturatas esse dicebat; addidit etiam mulierosum; in quo Alcibiades cachinnum dicitur sustulisse* (Cic. Fat. 10 = Rossetti 1980, fr. 6).

Have we not read how Zopyrus studied Socrates, the physiognomist who professed to know through and through the character and nature of men from their body, their eyes, their face and their brow? He said that Socrates was stupid and dull-witted since he did not have a concave neck, and he used to say that these parts were blocked and clumped up; he also added that he was a womanizer, at which Alcibiades is said to have raised a laugh.

Other fragments indicate that Zopyrus made inferences from the appearance of the face (‘de vultu hominum mores agnoscebat’, Rossetti 1980, fr. 8) and of the eyes (‘ὀμματα παιδεραστοῦ’, Rossetti 1980, fr. 11). Phaedo’s is obviously not a neutral account of physiognomy, but even in this parodic portrayal we can identify several familiar themes. The physiognomist inspects the eyes, face, and other signs visible on the body, and infers about the intellect and ethical character of the subject.

These themes can be also identified in the existing physiognomic treatises, although they are considerably later. The oldest surviving treatise dedicated to this ‘science’ came down to us as part of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, written, as most scholars now believe, in the peripatetic school around the year 300 BCE. Nevertheless, this treatise likely preserves some of the principles and basic observations of physiognomy, which, as Aristotle indicates, was practiced in the middle of the

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41 See Cic. *Fat.* 10; for studies of the fragments of the *Zopyrus* of Phaedo of Elis see Rossetti 1980 and Boys-Stones 2004. On the evidence for the origins of physiognomic practices, see Evans 1969 and Boys-Stones 2007, 20 n. 4, who also provides additional references.

42 Alcibiades laughs at Zopyrus’ analysis, but Socrates later claims that he is right about his nature, which is tamed by philosophy. For a stimulating reconstruction and interpretation of the fragments and the thought of Phaedo of Elis, see Boys-Stones 2004.

4th century and probably even earlier.\textsuperscript{44} The programmatic statement that opens the treatise illustrates nicely how the physiognomists approached the human body:

\textit{ἡ μὲν οὖν φυσιογνωμονία ἐστί, καθάπερ καὶ τοῦνομα αὐτῆς λέγει, περὶ τά φυσικά παθήματα τῶν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἐπικτήτων ὁσα παραγινόμενα μεθίστησι τῶν σημείων τῶν φυσιογνωμονουμένων. ὅποια δὲ ταῦτα ἔστιν, ὅστερον δηλωθήσεται. ἐξ ὧν δὲ γενόν τά σημεία λαμβάνεται, νῦν ἐρῶ, καὶ ἔστιν ἄπαντα: ἕκ τε γὰρ τῶν κινήσεων φυσιογνωμονοῦσι, καὶ ἐκ τῶν σχημάτων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἥθων τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου ἐμφανισθέντων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν τριχωμάτων, καὶ ἐκ τῆς λειότητος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς, καὶ ἐκ τῆς σαρκός, καὶ ἐκ τῶν μερῶν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τύπου ᾗλου τοῦ σώματος. καθόλου μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα ἔστιν ἢ λέγουσιν οἱ φυσιογνώμονες περὶ ὅλων τῶν γενόν ἐν οἷς ἔστι τά σημεία (Phgn. 806a 23-33).}

Physiognomy, just as its name implies, is about the natural affections of the intellectual faculty and of all those acquired affections that, when they occur, bring about a change to the signs that are being interpreted by the physiognomist. It will be demonstrated later on what kind these are. Now I will say out of what classes the signs are drawn, and these are all of them: they make inferences from the movements, and from the poses and from the tones, from the characteristics that appear on the face, from the hair, from the smoothness of the skin, from the voice, from the condition of the flesh, from the parts of the body and from the type of the body as a whole. These are generally the kinds that physiognomists claim about the general classes in which the signs are found.

The similarities in the types of signs that the physiognomist observe on the body and those that Socrates pointed out to the artists are striking. The terms \textit{σχῆμα}, \textit{χρῶμα}, \textit{κίνησις}, the ‘appearance on the face’ (‘ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου’), the tightness of the skin and the condition of the muscles – all bring to mind Xenophon’s Socratic discourse.

Indeed, in 1893, Richard Foerster found the similarities so striking, that he included the \textit{Memorabilia} 3.10 in the collection \textit{Scriptores physiognomonici graeci et latini}. Nonetheless, George Boys-Stones warns against identifying physiognomy in Xenophon’s Socrates.\textsuperscript{45} Boys-Stones warns that the Peripatetic

\textsuperscript{44} Aristotle mentions physiognomy several times, e.g. in \textit{Pr. An.} 70\textsuperscript{b} 7 where he analyses physiognomic inferences (‘τὸ φυσιογνωμεῖν’); \textit{Gen. An.} 769\textsuperscript{b} and \textit{Rhet.} 1430\textsuperscript{b} also mention the practitioners of physiognomy. Physiognomic thought is common in Aristotle’s biological works (see Stavru 2019, n. 7 for references). For a discussion of the central passages concerning physiognomic thought in Aristotle, see Raina 1993, 21-4; Stavru 2019, 144-8; Vogt 1999, 133-144.

\textsuperscript{45} Boys-Stones 2007, 33-4.
physiognomists operated with a conception of the soul which is different – in fact, almost diametrically opposed to Socrates’ intellectualism. The physiognomic position is that the natural, innate physical characteristics of the body are linked to a natural psychological character. In short, the soul is not incorporeal, but it is rather enmeshed with the natural forms of the body and its alterations. This is also true in Phaedo’s representation of the physiognomic position earlier in the 4th century. In Xenophon, in contrast, it is the body that is affected by internal, psychic states, which, as we have seen, are invisible incorporeal and. Yet while it is true that there is nothing like the physiognomic position that claims for the physicality of the body affecting the soul in Xenophon, there is still plenty of similarity between the two positions. Even in the Peripatetic treatise, causation clearly goes both ways: the body and the soul are said to affect one another sympathetically, it is not only bodily alterations that affect the soul, but ‘when the state of the soul changes, it changes with it the appearance of the body’ (‘ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξής ἀλλοιομένη συναλλοιοτή τηντού σώματος μορφήν’, 808b 11-2).

The author states that ‘states of mind change through the affections of the body’ (‘ἐξαλλάττουσαι φαίνονται αἰ διάνοιαι ύπο τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων’, 805a 4-5), but also that ‘the body is clearly affected together with the affections of the soul, in cases of love, fear, pain and pleasure’ (‘τῆς ψυχῆς παθήμασι τὸ σῶμα συμπάσχον φανερὸν γίνεται περὶ τῶν ἔρωτας καὶ τῶν φόβων τε καὶ τὰς λύπας καὶ τὰς ἣδονὰς’, ibid., 6-8). The similarities I wish to point out, however, are not in any explicit theoretical position. I do not intend to suggest that Xenophon adopted any of the specific theories – such as the harmony theory, the humoral theory, etc. – of the Hippocratic authors or of the physiognomists. What I wish to illuminate by these parallels is the praxis of observing the body and the underlying notion that these various discourses share: that by looking in a certain way at what is visible upon the body, a world of hidden causes and forces can become manifest. In all these distinct practices – Xenophon’s philosophical discourse on the visual arts, medical prognosis and diagnosis, and physiognomic scrutiny of character – the physical body is treated as what Brooke Holmes calls a ‘conceptual object’, an observable, physical locus of contemplation that is conceptualized as a threshold to an unseen world. The role of the Hippocratic author and the physiognomist on the one hand, and the philosopher on the other, as these thinkers construct it, lies precisely in ‘identifying’ this, and then in developing and providing a system of classification.
of signs for the practitioner. Once the body becomes a sign, the eye of the expert observer begins to identify more and more subtle appearances and constructs a linguistic system to describe their multiplicity.

3. Conclusion

For Xenophon’s Socrates, the way to provide the painters and sculptors a philosophical legitimation is to grant them and their representative media access to the character of the soul and to the emotions. Without altering the basic understanding that the visual arts create a likeness of visible objects only, Socrates suggested to the artists that art may still achieve a representation of the psychic inner life of bodies. This can be done since character traits, emotions, and psychic dispositions appear on the body, and an expert observer is able to identify where and how they do so. Socrates’ ὠφελία to the artists in this passage lies in providing them a systematic, theoretical account of how to knowingly produce the desirable effects of ethical and psychological representation. This knowledge consists of recognizing a kind of body semiotics, namely, knowing that certain emotions will have certain bodily signs than can be identified, isolated, and eventually reproduced in painting or sculpture. The notion that the body can reveal signs upon expert scrutiny, I suggest, is derived from contemporary discourses that conceptualize the body as a signifying or container of signs that open before the eye of the expert, be it a physician, a physiognomist, or, in this case, an art critic.

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